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
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THESIS

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN GUINEA AND SOMALIA
IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

by

Thomas Mitchell Hutcheson, Jr.

June 1980

Thesis Advisor:

M. W. Clough

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The thesis further analyzes the modernizing strategies selected by Guinea and Somalia, at independence, and examines the effects of tradition on the success of these strategies.

The thesis concludes with an analysis of the implications of Soviet foreign policy toward Guinea and Somalia on American policy toward Africa seeking to determine what national interests, if any, the United States has in Guinea and Somalia.

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN GUINEA AND SOMALIA
IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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June 1980

ABSTRACT

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NOTE TO READERS

The spelling of some proper names and organization names may vary throughout this thesis as original source spellings are used in the text.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APC - Armoured Personnel Carrier
CENTO - Central Treaty Organization
CGT - General Confederation of Labor (Guinea)
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
CPGB - Communist Party of Great Britain
FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization
FRELIMO - The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
HDM - Somali Digil Clan Party
IBRD - International Bank of Reconstruction and Development
IMF - International Monetary Fund
LDC - Less-developed country
MPLA - Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MNC - Multinational corporation
NSSM 39 - National Security Study Memorandum Number 39
OAU - Organization of African Unity
PAIGC - African Party for the Independence of Guinea and
Cape Verde
PCF - French Communist Party
PDG - Democratic Party of Guinea (Parti Democratique de
Guinea)
PRC - Peoples Republic of China
PRL - Local Revolutionary Power (Guinea)
RDA - Rassemblement Democratique African
SACP - South African Communist Party
SEATO - Southeast Asian Treaty Organization

SLOC - Sea lane of communication
SNL - Somaliland National League
SRC - Supreme Revolutionary Council (Somalia)
SRSP - Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SYC - Somali Youth Club
SYL - Somali Youth League
UAR - United Arab Republic
UN - United Nations
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US - United States
USP - United Somali Party
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WSLF - Western Somali Liberation Front

I. INTRODUCTION

During the past twenty-five years Africa has been the scene of a continuing struggle between the Soviet Union and the West for political influence. Commencing with Egypt in 1955, this struggle has slowly spread southward until it now encompasses significant portions of the continent. In most cases early Soviet successes were more the result of Western foreign policy miscalculations, than of a coherently executed Soviet strategy. When the United States refused economic and military aid to Egypt, the Soviets stepped in to fill the vacuum. When France cast Guinea adrift following her vote not to join the French Community, the Soviets again stepped in to fill the vacuum. When Somalia found Western sources unwilling to provide her with military assistance because of her claims on the territory of her neighbors, the Soviets became Somalia's primary arms supplier, and as a result acquired significant base rights in the Horn of Africa.

Initial Soviet successes can also be attributed, in part, to their championing of various independence (anti-colonial) movements prior to the colonies receiving independence. Following the colony's achievement of this goal, Soviet success depended on the ability of the governments of the newly independent nations to transform themselves

from traditional/colonial states into socialist states, promising all citizens a better way of life. This effort failed for a number of reasons. First, attempts to establish socialism by modifying and updating traditional patterns and practices proved to be founded on the incorrect premise that traditional African culture was a traditional form of "socialism." Second, the ideology of "African socialism" lacked a systematic focus and was frequently adjusted to deal with the most pressing problem, resulting in a pragmatic, rather than an ideological approach to social change. Third, attempts to bring about change were resisted by various elements of each country's population resulting in the need to utilize coercion to effect change. For the most part the "socialist" governments did not possess coercive power sufficient to deal with the rejectionist elements in their society. Finally, as a result of these weaknesses, the Soviet Union found itself committed to ensuring the survival of these economically devastated countries; a price the Soviet Union became unwilling and unable to pay. When this happened the African countries increasingly looked to the West for military aid and assistance, economic aid and private investment sources, thereby undermining Soviet influence in the country.

Prior to 1957 the U.S. policy toward Africa was characterized by "deferring to the colonial allies" and policy

was based on what they--the allies--said was appropriate. As the former colonies in Africa began to win their independence, U.S. policy began to take on a more activist character. This was due, in part, to the new Soviet interest in Africa as reflected in Nikita Khrushchev's 1960 "wars of national liberation" speech, and their growing influence in newly independent Ghana and Guinea. In the Congo dispute the U.S. supported the territorial integrity of the Congo. In the southern African dilemma, President Kennedy attempted to put the U.S. on the correct side of the problem by coming out in opposition to the South Africans and the Portuguese. This activist approach did not, however, produce any appreciable amount of consensus in American policy toward Africa; American policy thinking was split between those who advocated "deferring to the colonialists" and those who advocated continued dealing with Africa on its own terms.

Africa received little serious attention during the Johnson Administration, however, shortly after taking office President Nixon ordered that a study be conducted to develop foreign policy options toward Africa. The result of the study (which had been requested by National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39)) suggested five policy options which the new administration could pursue. The options ran the gamut from open support of white African regimes, to

open support for black liberation movements in Africa, to staying out of the political fray in Africa entirely. President Nixon opted for a policy which would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political and economic restrictions on "communication" with the white dominated African states.

The April 1974 Portuguese coup d'etat and the subsequent moves to give Portuguese colonies their independence destroyed the basic premise of U.S. policy toward Africa -- "that the whites are here to stay." The following year saw U.S. policy toward Africa incapable of preventing heavy Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Angolan Civil War.

A reevaluation of U.S. policy toward Africa took place following the Angolan Civil War. This resulted in a significant shift in America's African policy. This new policy was articulated by Secretary of State Kissinger in a speech given in Lusaka, Zambia, on 27 April 1976. In the speech Kissinger asserted that the U.S. supported self-determination, majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all peoples of southern Africa.

The Carter Administration has sought to develop a more affirmative policy toward Africa. The objective of this policy is to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace.

The objective of the research for this thesis has been to attempt to determine the similarities and the differences

between the failures of Soviet foreign policy initiatives in Guinea and Somalia, and then analyze what influence Soviet policy has had on U.S. policy toward Africa as a whole and Guinea and Somalia in particular.

The following hypotheses have been examined:

a. Soviet influence in Africa is dependent on the willingness of the Soviet Union to supply the lesser developed African nations with military aid.

b. African nations will become solely or predominantly reliant on the Soviet Union only in the event of Western unwillingness or failure to provide the desired military and economic aid.

c. Relations between the Soviet Union and her African clients will begin to deteriorate when: African demands for more and better military equipment exceed the level which the Soviet Union is willing to supply; or the Soviet Union attempts to exercise greater control over the deployment and use of Soviet-supplied military equipment than the African nations are willing to accept.

d. The Soviet Union is unable and unwilling to provide sufficient economic aid and assistance to ensure the agricultural and industrial development of African nations.

Chapter Two is an analysis of Soviet foreign policy goals toward the Third World in general and Guinea and Somalia in particular. In addition, the chapter also analyzes what motivates Guinean and Somalian policy toward the Soviet Union.

Chapter Three compares the traditional cultures of Guinea and Somalia, and analyzes the development strategy chosen by each nation at independence. This analysis further examines the impact of the traditional culture on modernization efforts, and how this effects each nation's world view.

Chapter Four analyzes the success and failure of Soviet military aid in Guinea and Somalia.

Chapter Five reviews and analyzes the Soviet use of economic and technical aid as a tool of foreign policy in Guinea and Somalia.

Finally, Chapter Six analyzes the effects which Soviet African policy has had on U.S. African policy during the past decade, and discusses U.S. national interests in Guinea and Somalia.

II. SOVIET POLICY TOWARD AFRICA

A. THE CONFLICTING DIMENSIONS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

A significant amount of research has been conducted by numerous non-Soviet political observers in an attempt to acquire an overall understanding of Soviet foreign policy. Nor surprisingly this has resulted in a wide range of different interpretations. The Soviet Union has been variously referred to as "the Great Beast," "the Mellow Tiger," or "the Neurotic Bear."¹ Much of the current analysis of Soviet foreign policy has been influenced by the individual analyst's evaluation of whether Soviet foreign policy action is primarily influenced by internal variables, external variables, or by an interaction between internal and external variables.

William Welch in his book American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy undertakes the task of evaluating these three different views of the determinants of Soviet foreign policy as seen in foreign policy literature at the beginning of the last decade. In his evaluation he attempts to reflect the American academic community's thinking on Soviet foreign policy since the conclusion of World War II. His underlying purpose is to evaluate the models used by American academics and policy-makers to analyze Soviet foreign policy behavior. Throughout the past decade the three basic

positions outlined by Welch have remained basically unchanged. A brief review of the Welch typologies will set the stage for subsequent analysis of current Soviet foreign policy toward Africa in general and Guinea and Somalia in particular.

B. THE ULTRA HARD IMAGE--THE GREAT BEAST

This image asserts Soviet foreign policy is determined by internal variables. It is reflected in the writings of analysts such as Elliott R. Goodman, Robert Strausz-Hupe, and Bertram D. Wolfe.

Goodman argues in his book The Soviet Design for a World State that

...the Soviets have today and have had from the beginning a world state as the goal of their conduct;... [and] that today and since as far back as the late '20s the form which that state assumes in their minds is that of a unit utterly Russified or subordinate to the Russian will.²

He further argues that the objective of Soviet external conduct is one of near-limitless expansion, and that accommodating and cooperative behavior such as peaceful coexistence and detente are indulged in only rarely, and then only as "way stations" on the road to world domination. Goodman sees Soviet conduct as almost wholly initiatory, often military in nature, making liberal use of deception. Conceding that Soviet conduct does change from time to time, Goodman argues that these changes are merely changes in tactics--with Soviet goals remaining unchanged.

Robert Strausz-Hupe in Protracted Conflict argues that the Soviets are guided by a

highly rational way of looking at the world and... [plot] action within the world to gain this end. [To achieve this] doctrine dictates four operational principles for the making of strategic and tactical choices. These are the indirect approach--fighting the enemy through third parties; deception and distraction; monopolizing the initiative; and attrition, or exploiting conflicts in the enemy's camp.³

Bertram D. Wolfe in Communist Totalitarianism: Keys to the Soviet System suggests how "we on the outside" can view this "war to the death" using a counterrevolutionary strategy:

Such a strategy would include the lifting of self-imposed inhibitions against the use of force, the insistence that treaties entered into be self-enforcing, and the mounting of a propaganda campaign which would broadcast the truth that our [non-Soviet] side...is the true friend of the freedoms and justice for which all yearn.⁴

The weakness of this image is that it eliminates "out of hand" many logical arguments which can possibly justify Soviet foreign policy decisions. Since this image sees all Soviet policy flowing from a single Soviet drive (the desire for limitless expansion) it therefore interprets all Soviet foreign policy actions to be consistent with the drive for expansion without looking for alternate explanations. For example, although the Soviet desire and need to ensure its continued access to sources of the earth's mineral resources might be a determinant of Soviet expansionist policies, the proponent of the Ultra Hard image

would continue to attribute Soviet policy to a "global plan of limitless expansion." He would therefore be unable or unwilling to see any possible link between changing Soviet resource needs and changing Soviet foreign policy.

C. THE HARD IMAGE--THE MELLOW TIGER

This image sees Soviet foreign policy as being determined by a combination of internal and external variables. Foreign policy is motivated by both the traditional Russian imperialist drive and Communist ideology; however, if met with resistance, the policies pursued are modified to adjust to the resistance. Marshall D. Shulman and Robert C. Tucker have developed this image in their writings.

Shulman in Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised argues that the conduct of Soviet foreign policy is highly rational in nature, of alternately high and low militancy. He sees the policy as expansion-minded in its objective--the further conversion of the world to socialism and the enhancement of Soviet power and influence. "In pursuit of its goal it is highly active and initiatory, though sensitive to the moves of others and hence also, at times, reactive."⁵

Tucker in The Soviet Political Mind: Studies in Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change divides Soviet foreign policy into two periods--the Stalinist period (1939-1953) and the post-Stalin period. During the former period, Tucker argues, Soviet external conduct aimed at territorial

aggrandizement and ultimately global hegemony. Stalin's foreign policy was uncompromisingly belligerent toward the non-Communist world--seeing the world broken into two irreconcilably antagonistic camps, and viewing periods of peaceful coexistence as "mere interludes between wars."

Unlike those proponents of the Ultra-Hard image, proponents of the Hard image see Stalin's death as a major event in the development of Soviet foreign policy. Tucker argues that post-Stalin policy-makers have set more realistic proximate goals, and in pursuit of the goals employ less severe measures. Although the Soviets remain expansion-minded, this expansion takes the form of influence rather than control. Foreign policy remains active; however, the Soviets have chosen persuasion rather than coercion to achieve their goals. The preferred instruments to achieve these goals are diplomacy, trade, and propaganda. Finally, the vision of the triumph of socialism is no longer seen as contingent on war, and ascribes the policy of peaceful coexistence as a policy of an indefinite duration.⁶

D. THE MIXED IMAGE--THE NEUROTIC BEAR

This image portrays Soviet policy-makers making decisions in response to external variables. The Soviets are viewed as being potentially expansionist, however, primarily driven by a desire to protect their own security. This image is reflected in the writings of Frederick L. Shuman, Michael Gehlen, and Louis J. Halle.

In The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect Shuman's

thesis is that the Cold War was initiated by the West, through its invasions of Russia during the First and Second World Wars. He therefore argues that Soviet actions in Eastern Europe were merely responses to these prior invasions from that direction. Shuman's core argument is that Soviet Cold War conduct is limited and conditional military expansiveness based on fear and concern for their national security.⁷ Shuman takes an historical look at military aggression against the Russian homeland from the fourteenth century until the present, and derives a pattern of post invasion Russian/Soviet territorial aggrandizement following unsuccessful aggression. In this regard he asserts

The Allied invasion of Russia in 1918 and 1919...eventuated in the establishment of Russian sovereignty over more extensive territories than would have passed under Russian sovereignty had these invasions not been launched...The contemporary post-World War II increments of Soviet territory and influence...are once more in part an aftermath of Western aggression against Russia.⁸

To further bolster his thesis Shuman continues

For a period of eighteen years, from 1921 to 1939, when Western military aggression against Russia was not indulged in and not overtly threatened, there was no Russian territorial aggrandizement at all.⁹

The Euro-centric character of the argument detracts from its applicability.

Gehlen in The Politics of Coexistence: Soviet Methods and Motives further argues that

what distinguishes this view most sharply from [the other two] is the belief that Soviet aggression is an occasional,

not a normal affair, and that it occurs not as the expression of an inherent drive or instinctive trait but as a reaction to what are or appear to be menacing actions of environing states.¹⁰

This view sees peaceful coexistence as a long term policy of accomodation. The policy relies heavily on trade and aid, the personal diplomacy of summitry, traditional tactics of divide and rule, manipulation of foreign parties and propaganda.

In The Cold War as History, Halle characterizes Soviet behavior as being "defensive expansion." To Halle, Soviet conduct does not aim at world domination nor even in any meaningful sense at world communism, but rather at the more limited goal of enlarging and strengthening Soviet defenses, with geopolitical location and ideology playing a small role.

The differences between these three views of Soviet foreign policy can best be isolated by comparing their analyses of Soviet objectives, motivating forces, and modes of policy. The Ultra Hard view sees the objective as unlimited expansion, driven by an ideological lust for power, pursued by unremitting war. The Hard view sees limited expansion as the objective, driven in part by communist ideology and in part by security concerns, pursued actively and militantly but nonmilitaristically and with a marked evolution in the moderate direction. The Mixed view sees restricted expansion as the objective, driven by a fear for the national security, pursued reactively, intermittently and cautiously.¹¹

The utility of these different approaches can be evaluated by examining their ability to explain Soviet policy toward Africa.

E. THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

1. The Tsarist Period

Russian interest in Africa can be traced to the 18th century, when Czar Peter the Great dispatched two naval vessels to Madagascar with the intent of establishing a colony there which would be used as a "coaling station" for Russian vessels enroute to or from India and the Far East.¹² Although this effort was aborted when one of the vessels proved unseaworthy, the desire for a strategic Indian Ocean way station was not abandoned.

By the mid-eighteenth century Russia came to recognize that support of indigenous nationalist movements within the empires of rival powers served Russian purposes by not only providing Russia with allies, but also fomenting unrest for their adversaries (specifically the Ottoman Empire). This policy of supporting nationalism for its disintegrative effect on empires to the south of Russia, became an integral part of Russian foreign policy during the reign of Catherine the Great (1762-1796).¹³ Catherine encouraged dissent among the Ottoman's Greek and Egyptian subjects-- scoring Russia's greatest successes in Egypt where in 1783-1784 Russia's first consul in Alexandria negotiated an

agreement with the Mameluk Bey whereby, in exchange for official recognition of Mameluk independence, the Russians gained the right to quarter troops in Egypt.¹⁴

In the mid-nineteenth century Russia's focus shifted to Ethiopia. The theoretical basis for this involvement was developed by a Russian Orthodox monk by the name of Uspensky. Uspensky stressed that because of Ethiopia's growing political power, its potential for leadership in northeast Africa, and its ideal location for the dissemination of Christianity southward into Black Africa, it was a nation to be cultivated. He saw an opportunity for the Russian and Ethiopian Orthodox churches to reunite fusing their apostolic succession. Uspensky asserted that in this way Russia would not only be in charge of Ethiopia's religious affairs, but would perhaps gain influence in Ethiopian political affairs.¹⁵ In addition to these "noble" aims Russia also desired to gain a foothold in the Red Sea area from which it could attempt to thwart Britain's ambition to control a secure lifeline to India.

The last Czar, Nicolas II, continued a close association with Ethiopia, and in 1895 formally received a diplomatic delegation from Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II who was facing a military confrontation with the Italians. The mission, consisting primarily of military men, returned to Ethiopia with modern weapons and the promise of diplomatic and military cooperation. A Russian military expedition

arrived in Ethiopia the same year, and Menelik II in his battle with the Italians followed the strategic advice of a Russian officer, Captain N. S. Leontiev. Leontiev advised Menelik II to follow the historical example set by the Russians in their battle with Napoleon, allowing enemy forces to penetrate well into the interior of the country and then cutting off their sources of supply.¹⁶ The strategy worked, and the Italians were defeated at Adowa by the Ethiopians in March 1896. As the first defeat of a modern European power by an African army, Adowa has been the source of pride to subsequent generations of African nationalists.

The Russians showed an interest in the Afrikaner cause during the Boer War, and a small number of Russian military and medical personnel served with the Afrikaners during the hostilities.¹⁷

As the anti-British impetus in Russia's foreign policy abated in the wake of diplomatic realignments in Europe and the Russian defeat in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, so too did active Russian interest in Africa.

2. The Soviet Period to 1953

The new Communist leadership in the Soviet Union saw good reason to try to exploit the growing nationalistic and anticolonial sentiments in Africa.

The Soviets readily perceived a strategic connection between the economic well-being of the capitalist system and the expansion of capitalist enterprises in Africa

which they labeled "economic parasitism." Another theme that the Soviets exploited was the use of subject armies by the colonists to fight their capitalist wars. In light of their belief that Africa was vital to the economic and military position of European capitalist nations by whom they felt threatened, the Bolsheviks sought to foment unrest in the European colonial empire as a means of refocusing European concern from the Soviet Union to the colonies. However, the Soviets faced enormous obstacles. Aside from the great distances involved, the Bolsheviks had no territorial base or government establishment in Africa to serve as a staging ground for any significant ventures. Propaganda campaigns were hampered by the low rate of literacy and the lack of a proletarian class in Africa. Of no less importance were the Soviet's domestic problems and limited resources which placed practical limitations on what could be done in an area of secondary priority. Therefore advocacy of colonial independence was appealing to the Soviets because it was a costless gesture.

Another significant problem faced by the Soviet leadership was that of redefining the Eurocentric Communist ideology to make it applicable to the colonial/post colonial experience. As early as 1920, at the Second Congress of the Communist International, Lenin advanced the theory that certain backward societies could skip the capitalist phase of development and pass directly into the socialist phase.

This, of course, was possible only in those countries which had an effective Communist organization, which was being aided by "a country of the victorious proletariat such as the Soviet Union."¹⁸

The only Communist Party to be formed in Africa was the South African Communist Party (SACP), which was founded in 1921. Although the SACP endeavoured to develop a multi-racial leadership, and was first among non-black groups to protest against such government measures as the pass system for "influx control," it was primarily perceived by South Africans as a white party.

To achieve their goals in other parts of Africa in the absence of a proletariat the Soviets placed their reliance on the Communist parties of the European colonialists, placing special emphasis on the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and the French Communist Party (PCF).

The efforts of these European Communist Parties did not meet with great success. The CPGB organized an active "League Against Imperialism" but was unsuccessful in attracting many Africans to the organization because most African students in England were from wealthy families which had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo in Africa. Further, the CPGB was reluctant to subscribe actively to the dissolution of the British Empire.

The PCF was somewhat more successful in French West Africa and made use of publications, study groups, "groupes

sociales," and trade unions to propagate their ideology. The PCF further did not advocate the formation of indigenous Communist Parties, but supported the association of the colony's communists with the PCF. The loyalties of the European "comrades" were however, too often to their metropole rather than to the world communist movement, a fact that decidedly lessened their success in Africa.

Throughout the Second World War, Soviet support for liberation movements in colonial areas was virtually nonexistent, except in those instances where the movement was linked to the successful conclusion of the war. By the end of the war, the Communists were beginning to revive their revolutionary propaganda and set up small cells of Communists from which to spread their influence in the colonial areas.

The end of the Second World War found the Soviet Union as the strongest land-power in Europe, her power extending far westward from her prewar borders. The PCF and Italian Communist Party were strong and anticipated early political victory in their states, and in Africa nationalist group activity was gaining momentum.

In September 1947, Andrei Zhdanov delivered a major Soviet policy pronouncement in which he reaffirmed the orthodox Communist line, that saw the world polarized between the capitalists led by the United States of America and the socialist world led by the Soviet Union. Under such a

bipolar scheme there was no place for an uncommitted position. Genuine neutralism as a concept was inadmissible.

Although this hardened line made it more difficult for communism to gain a following in many developing/colonial nations, there continued to be some activity in French West Africa under the tutelage of the PCF.

In 1946 on the initiative of the African deputies elected to the constituent assembly in France, a conference was convened to attempt to unite the numerous territorial political groups and formulate a common policy for French Black Africa. The result was the formation of the Rassemblement Democratique African--RDA.

Communist influence was evident in the RDA on at least two levels. The first was a parliamentary alliance established in France in 1946 between the RDA "parlementaires" and the PCF.¹⁹ The second was the PCF's association with the national branches of the RDA such as the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG).²⁰ In addition in 1952 when Sekou Toure became the Secretary-General of the PDG he actively recruited members from the communist-dominated General Confederation of Labor (CGT).

The RDA found the PCF to be their strongest and most consistent ally in Paris. The PCF assisted the African cause by supporting the extension of constitutional rights to Africans and the elimination of the forced labor system which had been prevalent in French West Africa.²¹ This

association began to weaken in 1948 when the PCF attempted to gain increased influence in the RDA. Further, as PCF influence in France waned, so did the reasons for continued contact between the PCF and RDA. The PCF also failed to take a strong position in favor of African independence thus further alienating the RDA. The majority of the RDA broke with the PCF in October 1950.²²

From 1928 to 1953 Soviet policy toward the Third World was reflected in Stalin's distrust of the so-called "national bourgeoisie" whom he labeled as "imperialist lackeys" and his reliance on native Communists, who had little influence in their own countries, to be the vanguard of the socialist revolution. This unimaginative attitude toward the Third World allowed the underdeveloped/colonial African countries to remain under Western influence.

3. The Khrushchev Era

With Khrushchev's consolidation of power Soviet doctrinal formations concerning the Third World underwent significant evolution. At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956 he established "peaceful coexistence" as the "general line" and basic principle of Soviet foreign policy. He no longer saw the world polarized into two antagonistic camps. He asserted that peaceful coexistence between countries with differing social systems was not only possible, but desirable. Khrushchev did not renounce the class struggle,

but argued that the coexistence of states with differing social systems was a form of class struggle between capitalism and socialism.

Khrushchev admitted that there existed an independent position between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. The new--Khrushchevian--formulation was to "accept these states as truly independent, but underdeveloped and struggling to eradicate the remnants of Western influence, while fighting the return of imperialism under various guises."²³ These neutralist nations were said to be a part of the vast "zone of peace" which included Socialist countries, and who for various reasons were not interested in starting a war.

This stress on peaceful competition was accompanied by a reaffirmation of the Leninist concept of the nonrevolutionary way to socialism. This did not, however, result in the repudiation of the concept of "wars of national liberation." In 1960 the Manifesto of 81 Communist and Workers' Parties reiterated that:

Communists have always recognized the progressive, revolutionary significance of national-liberation wars. The peoples of the colonial countries win their independence both through armed struggle and by nonmilitary methods, depending on the specific conditions in the country concerned.²⁴

Khrushchev also revived the concept of the "national front" whereby Communists and non-Communists cooperated to attain their revolutionary objectives of liberation from

imperialism (where it still existed) and socialist transformation. The Manifesto of 81 further refined the components of a "national front" identifying them as "the working class, peasantry, intellectuals and the petty and middle urban bourgeoisie."²⁵

When it became apparent that the Soviet Union was not gaining the influence in the Third World that it desired, the broader concept of the "national democratic state" was expounded. These states were defined as those which refused to join military blocs or provide foreign military bases on their territory; made a major influence to reduce Western economic influence; granted democratic rights and freedoms to progressive parties, labor unions, and other organizations including the Communist Party; and introduced major social change, especially agrarian reform, which is in the interest of the people.

4. The Brezhnev Era

Khrushchev's downfall did not precipitate any vast theoretical changes with regard to Soviet relations with the Third World. Yet despite the basic continuity there were minor adjustments made on three issues: coexistence, revolutionary democracy, and national front.

Under Khrushchev the general form of peaceful coexistence was characterized by significant differences in warmth between the Soviet Union and various developing nations.

For example the relations between the Soviet Union and Iran, a member of the Central Treaty Organization, were no more than correct. Toward the end of the Khrushchev era the Soviet government began a period of determined concilliatory diplomacy toward Iran. This trend was further strengthened in the post-Khrushchev era resulting in the conclusion of a number of trade and aid agreements with Iran, thus significantly enlarging the concept of coexistence.

Within a number of Third World nations the Soviet theorists were confronted with a paradox. They found the national bourgeoisie, rather than the Communist proletariat, developing one-party regimes and a socialist society and economy. The problem was on occasion further complicated by official and sometimes actual suppression of the Communist parties in the Third World countries. To account for this theoretically the Soviets developed the concept of revolutionary democracies, which permitted differentiation between such socialist regimes, ruled by national bourgeoisie who did not adopt socialism. Revolutionary democracies were supported because of their revolutionary and progressive nature.

Adoption of the concept of revolutionary democracy required modification of the theory and practice of the national front. Because the Communists were not directly involved in the social transformation in revolutionary

democracies they ran the risk of being left out when radical social changes took place. To overcome this the concept of "party self-effacement" was proposed whereby the Communist party in a revolutionary democracy either remained inactive (even to the point of disbanding) or allowed its members to participate in the government apparatus on an individual basis, in the hope that ultimate Communist goals could be attained at some future date.

A theoretical formulation which although not new was forcefully reiterated in 1968 was dubbed the "Brezhnev Doctrine." In this Doctrine the Soviet leadership "reaffirmed its [Soviet] right and obligation to interfere in the affairs of a fellow Communist country whenever in its view the interests of socialism were being threatened."²⁶ To date there are no African countries which have achieved such a degree of socialist development as to fall under the umbrella of the Brezhnev Doctrine.²⁷

F. THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF THEORY

The Soviet Union was presented with the opportunity to put theory into practice in the mid-1950s and early 1960s when the British, French, and Belgian colonial empires began to dissolve into independent nations. Until the late 1950s the Soviets pursued what has been called a "defensive" option in their affairs with the newly emerging nations. Perceiving the "correlation of forces" to favor the United

States and its allies, the Soviets sought cooperation with former colonies as a means of buttressing the Soviet Union's position against any possible Western onslaught.²⁸ This approach was characterized by the Soviets working through their Eastern European allies to gain entrance into those countries which had been "cast adrift" by the West. As a result, the Soviet Union gained considerable influence in nations such as Egypt and Guinea.

Following the Soviet's successful launch of both an intercontinental ballistic missile and an artificial earth satellite toward the end of 1957, the Soviet policy-makers perceived that there had been a dramatic shift in the "correlation of forces" and that a condition of mutual deterrence existed between the East and the West in military terms. In light of this development Moscow adopted a more "forward" strategy. To accomplish this it attempted to encourage the newly independent states to "consolidate their political independence by embarking on the 'socialist path to development'."²⁹ This approach cited the Soviet Union's achievements as evidence that socialism was the wave of the future, and offered economic aid to those who followed the socialist course. The Soviets also "[capitalized] on the survival of resentments going back to the colonial era, on frictions between governments of developing nations and foreign corporations, and on mistakes committed by the Western powers."³⁰

After experiencing embarrassing setbacks in the Congo in 1960 and Guinea in 1961, Moscow reappraised its view of the newly emerging nations and concluded that it had been wrong to assume that the "crumbling of the colonial empire" was the herald of an imminent swing of these states into the Communist orbit. Having thus decided Moscow began to attempt to distinguish between countries where genuine revolutionary potential existed and those where it did not, and to devote its energies to the former.

African states in general dominated the favored group and the Soviets focused the majority of their attention on the "Casablanca Group" established in January 1961.³¹ A second political grouping of African nations, "the Monrovia Group", which was formed in May 1961 was viewed by the Soviets as too moderate politically to warrant their support. Over the next two years, African nations continued their search for a more satisfactory supranational grouping of African states. This search culminated in the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 28 May 1963. Both the Casablanca Group and the Monrovia Group were incorporated into the OAU.

Within the OAU the Casablanca Group gradually lost cohesiveness. The disintegration was occasioned first, by Morocco distinguishing itself from the other members of the "Group" by giving vent to its basic conservatism; second, by Guinea's falling out with the Soviets over what Sekou

Toure regarded as their attempts to push his regime toward extremist policies, even to the extent of replacing Toure himself; and finally, by the fact that within the OAU the "radical Casablanca Group" lost most of the internal battles to the larger "moderate Monrovia Group."

During this period the Soviets were faced with the problem of how to nurture "progressive" trends so as to realize their ultimate revolutionary potential. To accomplish this the Soviet Union decided to encourage indigenous Marxist-Leninists to work with the "revolutionary democrats" in an effort to "educate" the latter to embrace "scientific socialism," and therefore lead to a corresponding reshaping of their policies and societies.³² Further, Moscow deemed that the USSR could reinforce these "educational" efforts by efforts of its own such as providing political training and extending economic aid to enterprises in the state sector.

The June 1965 coup d'etat in Algeria which deposed Ahmed Ben Bella, the January 1966 coup in Nigeria, and the February 1966 overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and the November 1968 coup d'etat in Mali were severe blows to the Soviets and prompted a fundamental reexamination of Moscow's policy toward the Third World in general. The re-examination reached two key conclusions:

- (1) The 'revolutionary democratic' leaders in the Third World suffered from such monumental faults that they would probably never effect a transition to 'genuine socialism'.
- (2) The Third World offered

no promise of great revolutionary advances in the discernable future, for 'reactionary' forces still retained an upper hand over 'progressive' forces everywhere.³³

Out of this reassessment emerged a new Soviet approach toward the Third World. On the political plane it involved an emphasis on states which had some inherent importance, including geopolitical significance, to the Soviet Union. Economic relations would no longer entail the use of economic aid to gain influence, rather the USSR would exploit its economic strength and seek to produce an "international division of labor." This policy called for the Soviet Union to supply machinery, equipment, and producer goods to Third World nations in order to permit them to industrialize and to provide the Soviets with finished and semi-finished goods. This policy has resulted in the provision to Third World countries of entire factories. In sum, this new policy resulted in a reduction of Soviet emphasis in the Third World, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Despite this deemphasis, the Third World remained a focus of Soviet foreign policy. In 1968, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stated,

...in its foreign policy the Soviet government has always attached great importance to relationships with the uncommitted states... These uncommitted states as a whole represent a great force on the international stage, a force with which we successfully cooperate.³⁴

In a speech made to the Supreme Soviet a year later Gromyko expanded on this theme when he stated, "it is natural...

that the Soviet Union, which as a major world power has extensive international ties, cannot adopt a passive attitude toward events which might be territorially remote but effect our security and the security of our friends."³⁵

Throughout the early 1970s the Soviet investment in Sub-Saharan Africa remained relatively small, although significant contributions were made to Somalia to insure access to facilities in that country. With the dissolution of the Portuguese colonial empire in the mid-1970s the Soviets seized the opportunity, took advantage of the reluctance of the West, and pursued a pragmatic policy from which they garnered significant influence in Angola and Mozambique.

The Soviet intervention in Angola is illustrative of Soviet thinking in the mid-1970s with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa. The Soviet leadership must have been aware of the strategic significance of Angola. First, Angola could provide the Soviet Union with port facilities for use by their Navy. Second, there is evidence that the Soviet leadership was aware of the potential provided by Angola's oil and mineral reserves.³⁶ Since the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China were supporting national liberation movements opposed to the Soviet supported Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the success of the MPLA would provide the Soviets with an opportunity to weaken U.S. and Chinese influence in Africa. Finally, the Soviet intervention

provided the Soviets a geostrategic position from which to pursue its goal of acquiring a greater voice in southern African affairs.³⁷

Throughout the late 1970s, much of the focus of Moscow's foreign policy has been toward southern Africa. Areas of particular interest have been the now resolved Rhodesian civil war, the unresolved question of the future of Namibia, and the racial unrest in the Republic of South Africa.

Despite this focus, the Soviets again exhibited their ability to successfully intervene on behalf of their clients in Africa when in 1977-1978 Soviet support and assistance (in conjunction with the Cubans) was pivotal in the survival of the revolutionary regime in Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian defeat of Somalia in the Ogaden. A number of factors prompted the decision to intervene in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia was strategically located in relation to the Suez Canal, Red Sea, and northwestern Indian Ocean, providing the Soviet Navy access to this important area of the world. While the military facilities lost by the Soviets in Somalia had been valuable, the loss was not as significant to their peacetime Indian Ocean strategy as originally thought. The Soviets were able to shift aerial reconnaissance and other support activities to Aden. Moreover, they could bunker warships at least on an ad hoc basis in Mauritius and Mozambique. The most significant loss would appear to have been the loss of the long range communication facility at Berbera;

however, Soviet planners may have thought that they would be able to replace the loss by modifying and using the former American communications station at Asmara, Ethiopia.

Furthermore, the loss is not necessarily irretrievable. Since the Somali facilities probably have a good deal more positive value to the Soviets than to the West, it is conceivable that a failure of the West to provide the amount of aid Somalia desires could result in a renewed Soviet-Somali alliance.

Second, since Ethiopia was not a member of the Arab League, as was Somalia, the Soviets perceived their alliance with Ethiopia as more secure than that with Somalia. As a Muslim nation and a member of the Arab League, Somalia was attracted to the Arab bloc; thus, the Soviets had to compete for Somali loyalty against both the West and the Arabs. This in turn gave the Somalis added leverage in their dealings with the Soviets. Ethiopia on the other hand, having historically been a "Christian nation" struggling for "survival in a Muslim sea" was not likely to be swayed by Arab economic blandishments. Additionally, Ethiopia appeared to exhibit a greater commitment to socialism than Somalia.

Third, Ethiopia, with a population almost ten times larger than Somalia's and having far greater international prominence, seemed a more attractive showcase for Soviet development assistance (which as will be seen later they are reluctant to provide in great quantity), provided the

revolution succeeded in maintaining the empire's territorial integrity. This endeavor was made all the more inviting by the fact that Ethiopia had sufficient resources to repay at least part of the Soviet investment, especially in the long run, if the revolution succeeded in reestablishing stability in the country.³⁸

Soviet foreign policy toward Africa has, however, suffered some reversals during the 1970s, most significant of which were their expulsions from Egypt and Somalia, both countries having been the recipients of large quantities of Soviet military and economic aid.

Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, has remained well down on a rank ordering of Soviet concerns throughout the 1970s. The increased Soviet activities in the continent in the late 1970s have been the result of increased opportunities rather than a shift in policy.

G. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN AFRICA

On the practical level the motivations for Soviet policy toward Africa are broad. Policy aims since the mid-1950s have included a Soviet desire to undermine Western influence in Africa; to prevent the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) from expanding its role in the continent; to gain an increased voice in African affairs; to project itself as the chief outside supporter of African national liberation movements and the drives to end white minority rule; and to acquire logistic support in Africa for Soviet naval and air forces.

In an effort to undermine Western influence in Africa, the Soviet African specialists have traced the origin of underdevelopment back to the colonial period emphasizing that the poverty in Africa is being perpetuated by "imperialist exploitation." A 1969 article in Pravda emphasized this point stating,

We assume that the problem of 'poor countries' originated with the colonial plunder and is being aggravated by the policies of contemporary imperialism which continues to plunder peoples through its neocolonialist policy. Let us look at the...African...countries. Many of them possess enormous natural wealth, but they remain poor because of their being looted by imperialists and colonizers....³⁹

To Soviet policy-makers "neo-colonialism", which they define as the "economic dependence of newly independent states on the imperialist powers", has two dimensions.⁴⁰ The first results in the economic exploitation of underdeveloped countries by the neocolonial imperialists. The second dimension concerns the practice of "the imperialists" educating the elite of the underdeveloped countries thereby "gaining control of the minds of the African people."⁴¹

The Soviets do not deny the obvious contrast between the industrially developed "North" and the economically underdeveloped "South", but they reject the division of rich North and poor South because it places the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries in the same category as the "neocolonialist" states they seek to discredit.⁴²

On the practical level the Soviets have attempted to achieve this goal by providing aid and assistance to those nations which the West has refused. Commencing with Egypt

in 1955 and Guinea in 1958, the Soviets have supported a number of countries in this way.

In addition to aid, the Soviets have attempted to use propaganda to undermine the position of the West in Africa. In both Guinea and Somalia a radio station, a printing press, and technical schools (the curriculums of which included political indoctrination) were included in the initial economic assistance.

The struggle between the Soviet Union and the PRC for influence in Africa takes place on two distinct but inter-related levels. On the first level each seeks to "win friends and influence people" through formal and informal political interaction, economic aid, and military assistance. On the more abstract level each actor attacks the other's motives and role related to Africa.

Initial PRC interaction with Africa can be viewed in the context of the Sino-American confrontation and as an effort to break out of the American "political encirclement" of the PRC. With the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960s China's African policy became more and more directed at the Soviet Union.

In the political arena the Chinese made significant efforts in the early 1960s to gain African support for barring the USSR from participating in the "second Bandung" conference, scheduled for June 1965 (but later abandoned after an abortive attempt to convene it).

Throughout the 1960s the PRC ran a poor second to the Soviet Union in aid commitments to Africa. Between 1954 and

1966, the USSR extended \$US 1.9 billion in economic credits and grants to African countries compared to \$US 428 million from the PRC.⁴³ These credits and grants were extended to sixteen countries by the Soviets compared to just eleven countries by the Chinese. Not only were Chinese credits smaller, but they did not finance any grandiose "flagship" projects such as the Soviet Union did in Egypt when they built the Aswan Dam.

The Soviet Union delivered \$US 25,310 million worth of military equipment to Less Developed Countries between 1955 and 1968, compared to \$US 755 million from the PRC.⁴⁴

The Cultural Revolution in China temporarily halted China's budding African policy, and the PRC did not return to Africa as a major actor again until 1970. A major shift in emphasis was then evident in China's revived African policy.

China has now become the chief Communist economic aid donor to African countries providing aid to 29 countries compared to only 22 receiving Soviet aid.⁴⁵ Between 1970 and 1977 China extended \$US 1,882 million in aid while the Soviet Union extended only \$US 1,040 million in aid.⁴⁶ China has now extended her economic presence to most of Africa, while the Soviet Union has concentrated its aid in North Africa with only scattered commitments south of the Sahara. This fact is well illustrated by comparing the number of "Communist Economic Technicians" in Africa in 1978. The Soviet Union had a total of 43,805 technicians in Africa compared to 11,420 Chinese technicians.⁴⁷ A breakdown of the totals

reveals that whereas the Soviet Union has 36,165 technicians in North Africa and 7,640 in Sub-Saharan Africa, China has only 450 technicians in North Africa, but has 10,970 in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁸

Finally, China undertook two "flagship" projects in the 1970s, the Tanzania-Zambia railway and the Beledwein-Burao road project in Somalia.

Only in respect to military aid to African nations do Chinese activities appear limited. Between 1955 and 1978, 2,705 African military personnel were trained in China compared with 13,420 trained in the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ Further, in 1978 there were 6,575 Soviet and East European military technicians in African compared to a total of 590 Chinese military technicians.⁵⁰ Finally, between 1967 and 1976 the Soviet Union transferred \$US 4,424 million worth of military equipment to Africa compared to \$US 142 million by China.⁵¹ This disparity would be even greater if the 1978 Soviet military aid delivery to Ethiopia is included.

Clearly China has been able to bolster her position in Africa in the last ten years--at least in terms of establishing an economic presence and winning increased formal acceptance.

The Soviets charge the Chinese with "fanning anti-Soviet sentiments and undermining friendly ties" between African nations and the USSR while seeking to impose Chinese hegemony on Africa. The Chinese countercharged the Soviets with having three "less than noble" objectives with respect to Africa:

first, to gain access to valuable natural resources; second, to advance Soviet global strategic interests in an attempt to strengthen the Soviet position vis-a-vis the United States in the competition for world hegemony; and finally, to undermine African unity, interfering directly in the continent's affairs, setting Africans against Africans and thereby producing setbacks for Africa's struggle against imperialism.⁵²

Since China's limited capacity to support African causes in straightforward power terms will not likely increase much in the near future, China will not constitute a very formidable alternative to the Soviet Union when African nations seek "socialist" assistance. Yet the Soviet desire to limit PRC influence in Africa will continue to be a main Soviet foreign policy objective.

The Soviet Union's attempts to gain a voice in African affairs has had a checkered history. As early as 1961, Sekou Toure felt threatened by the influence he perceived that the Soviets exercised in Guinea. Former United States Ambassador to Guinea, William Atwood enumerates five major mistakes that the Soviets made in attempting to achieve this goal:

(1) they underestimated African nationalism and political sophistication; (2) Soviet aid programs neglected basic needs in favor of politically motivated projects; (3) Soviet barter agreements took advantage of the Africans and ended up antagonizing them; (4) Soviet bloc diplomats and technicians were unused to dealing with Africans, and friction resulted; and (5) African students invited to study in Communist countries usually came back disenchanted and envious of their friends who went to the West.⁵³

The Soviet Union experienced its first major setback in Africa in 1960 when it came out in support of Republic of the Congo Premier Patrice Lumumba, only to find him ousted by President Joseph Kasavubu. Further, the United Nations General Assembly, with major African backing, recognized a Kasavubu delegation as the legal representative of the Republic.

This reversal was followed a year later by the expulsion of the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea for allegedly being involved in a plot to overthrow Sekou Toure. Reversals continued throughout the 1960s with Soviet supported governments in Ghana, Algeria, and Mali being overthrown.

During the 1970s the Soviets have experienced their most significant reversals in Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia--in each case the result of the perception that the Soviet Union was attempting to exercise more control over the internal affairs of the respective nation than the government leadership cared to accept.

Since the mid-1970s the Soviets have made use of Cuban technicians and armed forces to assist in gaining an increased voice in African affairs. Since the Soviets have been accused of being "racists" by Africans, the Soviets have found that utilizing "fellow Third World forces" is more acceptable to the African nations (specifically Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia). The African alignment with Cuba further removes some of the stigma experienced by African nations for "aligning their nonaligned nation openly with the Soviet Union."

To strengthen their position in regional affairs the Soviets have throughout the 1970s diversified their approach. Unlike during the 1960s, the Soviets now have a strengthened, tested and projectable military force which they have shown a willingness and capability to use to effect the outcome of events in Africa. This was most recently demonstrated in 1978 in Ethiopia. Another means of influence has been the attempted portrayal of the Soviet Union as the chief outside supporter of the drive to end white minority rule on the African continent. This has recently taken the form of Soviet support during the Rhodesian civil war, for the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union led by Joshua Nkomo, and the continuing support of the Southwest African Peoples Organization in Namibia.

The Soviet Union has also supported a number of "wars of national liberation", such as those fought by the PAIGC in Portuguese Guinea, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and the MPLA in Angola.

The desire to acquire logistic and base facilities for its naval, maritime, oceanographic, and long range reconnaissance air forces has been a major goal of Soviet foreign policy toward Africa since the mid-1960s.

The Soviet leadership has come to recognize the important relationship between foreign policy and military power. Since Soviet analysts have long regarded the capability to intervene militarily as a key aspect of the United States'

ability to influence the Third World, the Soviets, with their recently acquired "power projection" capability, are now able to do the same. This new philosophy has promoted Soviet interest in supporting changes in Africa which will ease its access to facilities, and will in turn aid in the pursuit of Soviet foreign policy objectives in and around Africa.

The first objective, defensive national concerns, involves the imperative of protecting both the Soviet fishing and oceanographic fleets and the Soviet shipping routes especially the Indian Ocean route from Soviet Europe to Soviet Asia.⁵⁴ To achieve this the Soviets have expended considerable military and economic aid in a number of African nations to ensure access to port facilities in those nations to permit resupply and repair of, not only the fishing and oceanographic fleets, but also the Soviet's "blue water" navy which is tasked with protecting the former. The Soviets have been successful in acquiring significant access to facilities in Ethiopia, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia (until 1977), and Mauritius along with other nations.

The second objective, defensive strategic concerns, involves Soviet attempts to cope with the American nuclear deterrent in the Indian Ocean, and monitoring American, British, and French naval movements around Africa.⁵⁵ To accomplish the first goal the Soviets rely on the antisubmarine forces of their navy deployed into the Indian Ocean. To support these forces the Soviets constructed a naval base

in Berbera, Somalia, which included not only fleet support facilities, but also missile storage and assembly areas, a long range radio communication facility, and a 13000 foot runway.⁵⁶ To accomplish the second goal they utilize not only their naval forces in the African area but also their fishing, oceanographic, and merchant fleets to report sighting of Western warships. They additionally utilize long range reconnaissance aircraft flying out of Luanda, Angola, and had used facilities in Conakry, Guinea, until mid-1978 and in Berbera, Somalia, until late 1977, to achieve this goal.

The third objective, offensive national concerns, involves the Soviet Navy's ability, by operating out of African ports, to threaten Western sea lanes of communication (SLOC) such as the South African Cape route. It further includes the Soviet Navy's ability to menace Western hydrographic, oceanographic, and satellite tracking activities, and some day perhaps Western exploitation of marine resources around Africa.⁵⁷

The final objective, offensive strategic concerns, involves the ability of the Soviets by their "base agreements" to deprive Western nations of military infrastructure in Africa. To date the Soviets have achieved only short range success in this dimension as vividly illustrated by their expulsion from Egypt in 1972 and Somalia in 1977. Facilities

built with Soviet aid have been made available to the United States by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the United States is currently negotiating with the government of Somalia for the possible use of Soviet-built facilities in Berbera.

H. GUINEA'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION

Guinea's initial association with the Soviet Union was an alliance of necessity and was characterized by mutual trust and respect. In the wake of the 1961 coup d'etat attempt, however, an element of suspicion entered the relationship. Although Guinea has maintained extensive ties with the Soviet Union, an element of suspicion continues to permeate the relationship. What then have been Guinea's reasons for continued association with the Soviet Union?

First, Guinea has sought military security. With the French departure and the West's refusal to provide that equipment necessary to supply a national army, Guinea was forced to seek Soviet/Communist bloc military assistance. This has, as will be shown in a later chapter, grown into Guinean military dependence on Soviet equipment.

Second, Guinea has sought economic and technical assistance which would permit the rapid economic and infrastructure development of the nation. The Soviet Union, as will be discussed later, has been unable to meet this goal to Guinea's satisfaction.

Third, Guinea has sought the prestige of being associated with one of the "Great Powers". Not only did this provide them with prestige in world bodies such as the UN, but Guinean diplomatic delegations visiting the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc nations have received highly publicized "red carpet" treatment.

Fourth, Guinea at independence found itself to be a nation with an insufficient number of educated and trained citizens to govern the nation. The government therefore saw the Soviet offers to build schools and provide scholarships for study in the Soviet Union as a means to overcome this serious deficiency.

Finally, although this is no longer as important as it once was, Sekou Toure seeks Soviet recognition to legitimize his regime's rule. At independence, Guinea received no initial Western diplomatic recognition. As a result Toure needed a "big power" to recognize Guinea in order to legitimize the Republic. With Soviet recognition came Soviet military equipment. These acts by the Soviets broadened Toure's base of support as he was now the leader of a Republic recognized "in the international community" which possessed an Army. Subsequent to the Soviet recognition, a number of industrialized Western nations have recognized Guinea, thereby providing Toure's Guinea with true international legitimacy.

I. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN GUINEA

The Soviet Union came to Guinea's assistance in 1958-1959, after France and the West had cast the nation adrift at independence. This association has continued over the past two decades, yet it would be incorrect to label Guinea as a "Soviet pawn."

Early in the association the Soviet Union had two foreign policy goals in Guinea which are no longer being pursued: waging African revolution from Guinea and using Guinea's socialist development as a model for African political development. The first had to be abandoned as has been indicated when the Soviets realized that there was no African proletariat to mobilize for a class revolution. The second had to be abandoned when the Toure regime opted for a pragmatic approach to development which included nationalization of some segments of the economy while at the same time encouraging private foreign investment--not at all a socialist model of development.

The Soviets, it would appear, have a number of current foreign policy goals in Guinea. First, Guinea's strategic location on the west coast of Africa makes it an ideal logistics base for Soviet naval and reconnaissance forces to use in support of achieving their aims to monitor Western navy movements, and threaten Western SLOCs. The airport facilities in Conakry, until mid-1978, were also used as a stopover point for aircraft enroute to Cuba from the Soviet Union and vice versa. Although the Soviets have only port use

rights in Guinea at the present time, a continued goal of acquiring more significant base rights is one important element of Soviet policy toward Guinea.

Second, Guinea possesses important natural resources such as bauxite and diamonds which the Soviet Union would like to exploit, or barring the achievement of that goal to deny their access to the West.

Third, Sino-Soviet competition for influence continues. Although Soviet aid to Guinea in the past few years has been small, it has surpassed the aid China has provided. Further, the Soviet Union has more military and economic technicians in Guinea than does China and more Guinean military and academic personnel have received training in the Soviet Union than in China.⁵⁸

Finally, the Soviet Union remains determined to weaken Western influence in Guinea. These efforts are encountering significant obstacles, however, because in view of the decreasing economic aid being furnished Guinea by the Soviets, the Guinean government is turning to France and the West for assistance. Further, it was reportedly because of a Soviet attempt to pressure the Toure regime into permitting the Soviets to construct a naval facility on Tamara Island just off the coast of Guinea, that the Soviet's landing rights at Conakry were suspended. This was partially responsible for the Guinean government's decision to look to someone less insistent on reciprocation for assistance--the West.

J. SOMALIA'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION

Although Somalia no longer has close relations with the Soviet Union, their previous association was determined by many of the same factors seen in the Guinean situation.

First, the Somali government looked to Moscow for military assistance when the West failed to respond satisfactorily to Somalia's requests for military aid to counter the perceived "Ethiopian threat" following independence. This dependence increased significantly following the October 1969 coup d'etat, and continued until the Soviet expulsion in late 1977.

Second, Somalia urgently required economic and technical assistance. As will be discussed in detail later, the Soviet Union has not provided sufficient aid to result in any significant development or modernization.

Third, Somalia's association with Moscow has provided it not only international prestige, but also leverage which could be utilized in dealings with the West.

Finally, with the successful rise to power of Siad Barre in 1969 came a necessity to legitimize his "scientific socialist" regime. Since the coup d'etat had supplanted the former multiparty political system, it was important to Barre that he have Soviet acceptance on the world scene. Since the Soviet Union was beginning to recognize the strategic significance of Somalia, Moscow willingly provided political support for the new regime.

K. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS IN SOMALIA

In many respects the Kremlin's goals in Somalia were similar to those in Guinea. First, Somalia's location at the entrance to the Red Sea and in relatively close proximity to the West's crude oil SLOCs from the Persian Gulf made it an ideal location for a Soviet base facility. Besides providing logistic service to the Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean Squadron, Berbera provided long range reconnaissance aircraft with servicing facilities. Somalia further played a central role in the Soviet plans to create a trilateral alliance of Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen which would have given the Soviets, through their allies, virtual control of the Bab El Mandeb Strait, thereby menacing ship traffic utilizing the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

Second, the Soviets made their initial move into Somalia by way of a military aid agreement which was provided to counter a smaller Western offer. This assistance jumped dramatically in 1969 when Siad Barre assumed power through a coup d'etat and espoused "scientific socialism." This goal has at least been temporarily sidetracked as a result of the 1977 Soviet/Cuban expulsion from Somalia, and the "friendly" overtures being made toward the West by Somalia.

Third, although the Soviet Union was successful in countering the Chinese influence in Somalia prior to the Soviet expulsion, the Chinese now enjoy considerable influence in Somalia. In April 1978 Somali President Barre visited China

requesting emergency military and economic assistance. The Chinese responded with offers of training and technical assistance, but only delivered nominal amounts of military hardware to Mogadishu.⁵⁹ China further maintained the presence of its 3000 man economic technician delegation in Somalia and agreed to provide \$US 18 million in aid to finish abandoned Soviet projects.⁶⁰ As a result the Chinese are now the most influential socialist country having diplomatic relations with Somalia.

Finally, as in Guinea, the Soviets had hoped to foment unrest in East Africa. The initial economic aid package provided to Somalia included a radio station and a printing press, both potential propaganda tools.⁶¹ Although the Soviets may have made some short-term gains in this area, Eastern Africa has been relatively peaceful during the past ten years except for the Somali-Ethiopia war and the Eritrean movement in Ethiopia.

In sum, the Soviet's opportunistic African foreign policy has enjoyed only short-term success in Guinea and Somalia. The reasons for this will be analyzed more thoroughly later; however, there are three brief observations which can be made concerning the Soviet failures in Guinea and Somalia. First, the Soviets continue to underestimate the strength of African nationalism when dealing with these countries. Second, Soviet aid repayment programs and Soviet refusals to renegotiate them continue to antagonize the African nations. Finally,

in most cases, Soviet aid projects continue to neglect the basic needs of the peoples of Guinea and Somalia.

FOOTNOTES

¹These typologies are taken from William Welch, American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Yale University Press, 1970).

²Ibid., p. 64.

³Ibid., p. 77.

⁴Ibid., p. 87.

⁵Ibid., p. 113.

⁶Ibid., pp. 123-124.

⁷Ibid., p. 158.

⁸Frederick L. Shuman, The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), pp. 21-22.

⁹Ibid., p. 21.

¹⁰Welch, American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 135.

¹¹Ibid., p. 148.

¹²In the year 1001 Kievan Prince Vladimir is believed to have sent an ambassador as far south as Egypt. See Edward T. Wilson, Russia and Black Africa Before World War II (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Ltd, 1974), p. 305.

¹³Wilson, Russia and Black Africa Before World War II, p. 6.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁵Edward T. Wilson, "Russia's Historic Stake in Black Africa," in Communism in Africa, ed. David E. Albright (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 69-71.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁷Thirty Imperial Guard Reservists and a twenty-six man medical detachment saw service in South Africa. Further, a Colonel Romeiko-Gurko of the Russian General Staff was assigned as a liaison officer to the Afrikaners. He not only advised the Afrikaner's military command, but also collected intelligence on the contemporary military tactics of the British.

¹⁸George Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971), p. 7.

¹⁹Robert Legvold, Soviet Policy in West Africa (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 28.

²⁰Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Guinea (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 34.

²¹Roger E. Kanet, The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 23.

²²Ibid., p. 24.

²³Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, p. 14.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 15-16.

²⁵Ibid., p. 16.

²⁶Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 745.

²⁷William and Harriet Fast Scott, lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, April 24, 1980.

²⁸David E. Albright, "The USSR and Africa: Soviet Policy," Problems of Communism 27 (January-February 1978):22.

²⁹Ibid., p. 23.

³⁰W. W. Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973), pp. 160-161.

³¹Albright, "The USSR and Africa: Soviet Policy," p. 23. The Casablanca Group included Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic.

³²The Soviet Union has not accepted "African socialism" as being compatible with Marxist-Leninist theory and therefore continue to strive to gain acceptance for "scientific socialism." Although nations such as Somalia advocate "scientific socialism" it remains typically African in character. The late Ivan Potekhin, the leading Soviet African authority during the Khrushchev era argued that there could be no such thing as "African socialism," although he maintained that there might be an "African road to socialism."

³³Albright, "The USSR and Africa: Soviet Policy", pp. 24-25.

³⁴Pravda, June 28, 1968.

³⁵Pravda, July 11, 1969.

³⁶In the late 1960s and the early 1970s it was commonly known that Angola had valuable reserves of oil, iron ore and diamonds. Between 1970 and 1973, crude oil production rose from 5 million metric tons per year to 8.1 million metric tons per year. Iron ore production between 1970 and 1973 (with the exception of 1972 when production fell to 4.8 million metric tons per year) remained at the 6 million metric tons per year level. Diamond production maintained a 2 to 2.4 million metric tons per year level, during the same period. Source: Africa South of the Sahara 1975 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1975), p. 154.

³⁷Jiri Valenta, "The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angola", Naval Institute Proceedings 106 (April 1980):53.

³⁸This analysis draws on Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, 2nd ed. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), pp. 131-142.

³⁹Pravda, October 2, 1969.

⁴⁰Kulski, The Soviet Union in World Affairs, p. 158.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 158-159.

⁴²Ibid., p. 153.

⁴³George T. Yu, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa" in Communism in Africa, ed. David E. Albright (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 170-171.

⁴⁴Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 11.

⁴⁵Yu, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa", pp. 170-171.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷CIA, Communist Aid Activities 1978, p. 14

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 5.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 4.

⁵¹Yu, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa", p. 176.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 180-181.

⁵³William Atwood, The Reds and the Blacks (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1967), p. 77.

⁵⁴Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Strategic Stake in Africa" in Africa and the United States, ed. Jennifer Seymour Whitaker (New York: New York University Press, 1978), p. 167.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 168.

⁵⁶U.S. News and World Report 79 (July 21, 1975): 32 and Time 106 (July 21, 1975):29-30.

⁵⁷Legvold, "The Soviet Union's Strategic Stake in Africa", pp. 168-169.

⁵⁸CIA, Communist Aid Activities 1978, pp. 4-5, 8,14,17.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 24.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹New York Times, June 18, 1961, p. 34.

III. COMPARING TRADITION, MODERNIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES OF GUINEA AND SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

In the Epilogue to their book Africa and Africans, Paul Bohannon and Philip Curtin assert, "African leadership today is unanimous in wanting to 'modernize', and whatever else is included in modernization, this means creating a society that is capable of high per capita productivity and consumption. The question is no longer whether modernization is possible or desirable, but how to implement it. Modernization is impossible without culture change."¹ Yet, the modern African leader is faced with problems which would challenge even the most skillful leader, who has at his disposal a highly trained and educated civil service and government. A far from exhaustive list of problems faced by the leader of a newly independent African nation in the late 1950s and early 1960s included: insufficiently trained indigenous civil service personnel, low levels of education throughout the country, incompletely developed economics, non-existent infrastructure to support commerce, and social fragmentation due to a lack of national identity. Many, if not all, of these problems can be directly attributed to the poor quality of colonial administration.

As each former colony gained independence its leadership was forced to choose a plan for development. Some chose a socialistic pattern, arguing that traditional African culture provided a ready foundation for their socialist programs. This argument in retrospect was greatly overstated. Other leaders chose a capitalistic pattern of development, but were hampered in achieving their goals by the lack of investment (foreign and indigenous), a skilled work force, and an industrial base.

By and large these development efforts have failed to achieve the positive results promised by the African leadership and expected by the masses. In the domestic arena this has led to civil unrest, excessive repression to stifle opposition, and in some cases, coup d'etats. On the international front the result has been increased dependence on the developed world which has brought about a form of neo-colonialism.

The goal of this chapter will be to compare traditional societies, modernization techniques, and patterns of development in the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Somalia.

B. TRADITIONAL CULTURES

Guinea can be divided into four specific geographic regions: Lower Guinea, Middle Guinea, Upper Guinea, and the Forest Region, each region farther from the coast than its

predecessor. In all there are approximately two dozen ethnic groups in Guinea (each possessing its own language, traditions, and forms of social and political organization) some as large as a million people, others numbering in the thousands.² Each region, except the Forest Region, has a dominant ethnic group.

The Soussou is the dominant group in lower Guinea, with smaller concentrations of Baga, Coniagui, Landouman, Mayo, and Nalou.³ Throughout the area the Soussou have tended to assimilate the smaller groups, and the Soussou culture has supplanted some of the social traditions of the other groups, such as the matrilineal organization of the Landouman and the land tenure system of the Nalou. These ethnic groups are primarily cultivators, artisans, fisherman, and traders and dominate the trade between the coast and the interior. The majority of these ethnic groups have adopted the Islamic religion.

The Foulah, who comprise the nation's largest ethnic group, dominate Middle Guinea. The Foulah, originally nomads, eventually settled and became sedentary cultivators and stockraisers. Under the influence of sedentation and Islam, a social hierarchy developed among the Foulah which consisted of both hereditary nobility and hereditary slaves. The feudal state thus created, was ruled by a quasi-religious leader chosen every two years from the two strongest Foulah families.

The Malinke ethnic group dominates Upper Guinea. The Malinke are not only cultivators but also traders, and are further known to be good soldiers.⁴ Although almost all Malinkes are Muslim, some of their earlier religious practices, centering on a supernatural relationship with their ancestors and the land, are known to exist today.

The largest ethnic group in the Forest Region is the Kissi. Originally "slash and burn" farmers, they have now become rice cultivators. Another group engaged in cultivation are the Guerze, who rely on gathering root crops and on hunting. The ethnic groups of the Forest Region are largely animists.⁵

The small community of ten to one hundred families was traditionally the principal unit of social organization for the majority of Guineans. Within most villages the basis of organization was patrilineal, although in some smaller ethnic groups, such as the Coniagui, matrilineage was the rule. Typically an individual married outside his or her lineage, although there were endogamous groups found throughout Guinea.

The most highly stratified society in Guinea evolved among the Foulahs. In this society there were four main social strata: the territorial rulers, the free lineages (those which had participated in the holy wars [jihad] of the mid-18th century), the Foulah of the bush (those who had not participated in the jihad) who were forced to pay tribute

to the lineage chiefs), and serfs who were descendents of earlier non-Foulah residents of Middle Guinea or prisoners of war.

By way of contrast, the Somali, who constitute ninety-five percent or more of Somalia's population, are united by language, culture, devotion to Islam, and reputed geneological ties to a common ancestor. All Somalis trace their ancestry to two brothers Samaal and Saab, reputed to be members of the Prophet Mohammed's tribe (the Quraish of Arabia). There are six major clan-families (tribes) in Somalia, four which trace their ancestry to Samaal and two which trace ancestry to Saab.⁶ The four Samaal clan-families who constitute an estimated seventy-five percent of the Somali population, were historically and remain nomadic or seminomadic pastoralists; whereas, the Saab clan-families settled in the river regions of southern Somalia where they have relied on a mixed economy of cattle husbandry and cultivation.

The Samaal looked down on the Saab because of their sedentary ways, and both groups felt themselves superior to non-Somali groups. However, even within descent groups relations were characterized by competition and conflict. Among the Samaal competition for pasture and water pitted clan against clan. Although the Saab, once settled, were less likely to engage in physical conflict, they had a history of inter/intra clan warfare over religious matters. As a result of these cleavages kinship as the basis for group loyalty

was modified by the principle of contract--clan rights and obligations being explicitly made the subject of treaties or contracts between clans or lineages within a clan-family.

The Samaal and Saab evolved different social structures as they adapted to different ecological environments. The egalitarian and homogeneous Samaal were cautious about affiliating with strangers. The largest political unit was "the clan" which had a head called soldaan (sultan) who had largely honorary and ceremonial functions. The clans were segmented into primary lineages with the political and economic affairs of each segment managed by an informally constituted council consisting of all adult males in the group. Those males with the most prestige and experience were asked to judge disputes and act as leaders in political activity. This leadership role was not, however, ascriptive, "he who speaks poetically, or cogently, or cleverly has authority; and not he who has an ascribed authority role."⁷

Samaal marriages are exogamous, a secular contract having both economic and political importance in linking different clans and lineages.

The Saab developed a heterogeneous society living within clearly marked borders, which accorded higher or lower status to different groups depending on their origins and occupation. Descendents of the original clan were at the top of the social hierarchy and members of occupational groups such as hunters, leather dressers, and smiths were at the bottom. Most Saab

clans were subdivided into subclans which usually had a single head; others, however, had no clan heads and clan affairs were conducted by leading elders. The subclan was an important economic unit, which traditionally owned land and water rights which the headmen distributed to individuals.

The Saab typically marry within their descent group, frequently following the Arab practice of preferential marriage with a father's brother's daughter.⁸

C. THE COLONIAL LEGACY

Commencing with Lower Guinea in 1891, Guinea over a period of twenty years became a colony in French West Africa.⁹ The French then proceeded to superimpose their colonial governing mechanisms on the traditional political structures.

Two Guineans (who after 1925 were elected by an electoral college drawn from several categories of Africans, such as civil servants, persons with prescribed educational qualifications, or those who had been officially cited for loyalty to France) sat on the four man Council of Administration. The country was divided into districts and subdivisions which were administered by French administrative officials and civil servants. Below the subdivisions were provinces, cantons, and villages each of which normally was administered for the colonial administration by an African chief.

The primary responsibilities of the chiefs were to collect taxes, supply the colonial authority with laborers for public

work projects, and provide men for military service. Although provincial and canton chiefs were paid salaries, the village chiefs were remunerated with a share of the taxes they collected. The chiefs, as agents of an alien authority, were therefore distrusted by the Africans they were tasked to govern.

The French colonizers did not emphasize education. The chief task of the three to four year village school was to teach the student personal hygiene and spoken French. Regional schools offered five to eight years of more formal French, along with some vocational training. The academic content of the instruction, which was entirely in French, was of French origin and largely irrelevant to African life.

Following World War II the constitution of the Fourth French Republic established a new relationship between France and her colonies--a French Union, which was designed to permit France to lead the peoples of the French Union toward democratic self-government. This included allowing African deputies to serve in the French National Assembly. The deputies were elected by the Guinean General Council (later redesignated the Territorial Assembly) which served chiefly a regulatory and advisory function for the French government which possessed the exclusive right to legislate for overseas territories.

In June 1956 the French National Assembly passed the "loi-cadre" for French West Africa. This provided for universal

suffrage, and the devolution of legislative powers from the French National Assembly to the Territorial Assemblies. The changes approved implied that the Territorial Assembly would eventually evolve into the new sovereign government of Guinea, and control of the assembly became of paramount importance in the view of all Guinean political parties.

Although political parties were for the most part formed along ethnic lines, in 1947 the broad based socialist Parti Democratique de Guinée (PDG) was formed. The PDG's early years were marked by little strength because its diverse ethnic and political leaders each went their own way. In 1952, however, Sekou Toure became the Secretary General of the PDG, and began to actively recruit party members from the labor union. In 1955, the PDG adopted a new program of political action, which declared the peasant class to be the party membership base, and gave both women and youth active roles in party affairs. This organizing effort to make the PDG representative of all Guineans was successful and in the January 1956 election of deputies to the French National Assembly the PDG won two of the seats and narrowly lost the third.

The well organized PDG next turned its attention to the Territorial Assembly elections set for March 1957. Again the party's efforts paid handsome dividends, with the PDG receiving over seventy-five percent of the vote and winning fifty-seven of sixty seats (the remaining three seats being

won by socialists who ran as independent candidates).¹⁰

With control of the Territorial Assembly (Sekou Toure was elected Vice President and for all practical purposes fulfilled the role of prime minister) the PDG set about to take control of as much of Guinea's administration as possible, including the africanization of the civil service. One of the first actions taken was the elimination of the system of government-appointed chiefs. Every chief was evaluated, some were pensioned off and some (in order not to lose their governing experience) were reassigned to other duties. The chiefs were replaced by democratically elected village and district councils, whose membership consisted primarily of members of the PDG party. So effective was this effort that as of 1 January 1958, Sekou Toure reported that the "chief-tancy in Guinea was inactive."¹¹

With the return to power of Charles de Gaulle in June 1958, a new draft constitution was proposed replacing the French Union with a French Community--an association between France and its former colonies, in which the former would serve as the senior partner. The organs of this new French Community included a president (who would be the President of France), an Executive Council (composed of the President, the Prime Ministers of member states, and the French ministers concerned with the community's affairs), a Senate (with membership elected indirectly by each member state in proportion to its population), and a Court of Arbitration.

Sekou Toure expressed opposition to the proposed constitution for two reasons. First, it did not provide for a federal structure for French West Africa, which Toure felt was necessary to establish the French Community as a confederation of equals with metropolitan France. Second, he objected to the fact that the constitution did not provide for a federal legislative body of supranational character but left final control in the hands of the French National Assembly.

Sekou Toure encouraged Guineans to vote "no" in the referendum called to approve the proposed constitution. As a result, on 28 September 1958, Guinea became the only member of the French Union to vote not to adopt the new constitution. In a fit of pique General de Gaulle, declared Guinea an independent country--outside the French Community--withdrawing all French personnel, infrastructure, and records, leaving the Guinean Territorial Assembly to declare the independence of the Republic of Guinea on 2 October 1958.

The Territorial Assembly constituted itself as the National Sovereign Constituent Assembly and proceeded to draft a constitution. Sekou Toure as leader of the majority party assumed the task of forming a new government.

The conditions of the Guinean economy, infrastructure, and social structure at independence are a damning indictment of over half a century of French colonial rule. At independence coffee and bananas accounted for eighty percent of

Guinea's total exports.¹² Banana cultivation was dominated by French and Syro-Lebanese planters, using Guineans as cheap labor. Future coffee production was also compromised by the colonial administration which introduced a variety of coffee susceptible to destructive disease which between 1958 and 1964 reduced the number of coffee plants from seventy million to between forty and forty-five million.¹³ Other agricultural crops such as palm produce, groundnuts, and pineapples along with the raising of livestock were neglected by the colonial administration. "Perhaps the most eloquent testimony of the colonial administration's failure to promote agricultural development is the fact that Guinea was importing about 10,000 tons of rice between 1955 and 1958 in spite of repeated claims by successive colonial governors (from 1949 onwards) that Guinea could become the rice granary of French West Africa."¹⁴

Although the mining of gold, diamonds, iron ore, and bauxite started in the 1920s, no significant amounts were mined until the 1950s. By 1958 Guinea was exporting small quantities of these minerals, however, the colonial administration had made extraordinarily generous financial arrangements with the multinational mining corporations which provided Guinea with little revenue.¹⁵

Indigenous industry was limited and in 1958 consisted of the manufacture of such products as soft drinks, soap, canned fruits, and furniture.¹⁶

Transportation facilities in 1958 were grossly inadequate. Of the few hundred kilometers of all weather roads in the country only 187 kilometers were tarred. The 673 kilometer railway could not function in 1958 because of the bad state of repair of the rails. The country had one seaport at Conakry. A subsidiary port constructed in Benty was used to handle bananas. Finally, the country had only one airport located in Conakry.¹⁷

In 1958 in a country with an estimated population of 2.8 million there was one large hospital in Conakry, one "second rate hospital" and ninety-nine dispensaries managed by fifty-eight doctors throughout the rest of the country.¹⁸

Finally in 1956 it was estimated that only ten percent of the school age population of Guinea were actually attending school.¹⁹

To overcome this colonial legacy of neglect, to prove to General de Gaulle that they could survive on their own, and that they would not return to the French fold hat in hand asking to be readmitted into the French Community, was the challenge faced by Sekou Toure and the people of the Republic of Guinea on 2 October 1958.

Unlike the Guineans (who were exposed to one primary colonizer) the Somalis were exposed to the ambitions of four colonizers: the French, the British, the Ethiopians, and the Italians. Much of this colonizing effort took the form of acquiring "zones of influence" by making treaties with the

Somali soldaans (sultans), agreeing to provide the Somali clans protection from the better armed Ethiopians in exchange for annual cash payments and/or legal rights to Somali territory.

When the dust from the late 19th century scramble for the Horn of Africa had settled, the French had colonized the area around present day Djibouti, the British controlled an area along the Gulf of Aden, and the Italians controlled an area stretching from the Gulf of Aden south to present day Kenya. It is British Somaliland and Italian Somalia which eventually united to form the Republic of Somalia.

During the first phase of Italian rule (up until 1941), little was done to advance the Somalis politically or educationally.²⁰

When the initial plans of the Italians, to resettle Italian farmers from the poorer areas of Italy to Somalia, foundered, the Italians developed large commercial plantations for which they sought to recruit indigenous labor. When the recruitment efforts failed, the colonial government began compulsory labor recruitment.

In 1922, the first fascist governor was appointed to Somalia. Under the fascist regime some attempts at infrastructure construction were made, but some of these efforts such as a light railroad were destroyed during World War II.²¹

Development in British Somaliland between World War I and World War II was extremely limited for two reasons.

First, the British government required the Somaliland colonial administration to finance its colonial operations from indigenous resources. Because of Somali intransigence, direct taxation proved impossible to implement. As a result the British administrators imposed import and export taxes on the colony, which provided very limited funds for development. Second, attempts to establish a comprehensive education system failed when it met significant indigenous conservative religious opposition.

The British military administration which controlled both Somali colonies between 1941 and 1949 was able to make more social and political changes than either their British or Italian predecessors. It was during this period that the predecessors of the post independence political parties were formed. In the south the Somali Youth Club (SYC) was founded in 1943. The SYC gained popularity rapidly and had gained an estimated membership of 25,000 by 1946.²² The SYC's founding members represented five of the clan-family divisions in Somalia, and its members made strong efforts to promote the concept of a Somali nation over clan divisions. When it changed its name from the SYC to the Somali Youth League (SYL) in 1947 the party had branches not only in the south, but also in British Somaliland, and the Somali-populated sections of Kenya and Ethiopia. The party platform included planks calling for the unification of all Somalis over and above clan and tribal differences, increased opportunities for

modern education, the development of a written form of the Somali language, and opposition to the continued colonial fragmentation of Somalia and reimposition of Italian colonial rule.²³

A second political organization established during this period was the Somali Digil Clan Party (HDM). Representing the agricultural clan-families of the region between the Shabelle and Juba rivers, the leaders of the HDM saw their party as a counter to the increasing dominance of the SYL by pastoral interests. Because the HDM received considerable financial support from the Italians, they had little objection to the return of Italian rule.

In the north the chief political parties at this time were the Somaliland National League (SNL) which represented the Isaq clan-family, and the United Somali Party (USP) which represented the Dir and northern Darod clan-families.

In November 1949 the UN General Assembly entrusted Italian Somalia to the Italians as a UN Trust Territory, with the specific goal of preparing it for independence before the end of 1960. As a result of this, and because of close UN supervision of the process, the indigenous peoples of the Trust Territory of Somaliland (under Italian administration) were provided the impetus to work purposefully toward independence. In the north on the other hand, although the development process was somewhat accelerated following World War II, the process progressed haphazardly, and this disparity between

the north and the south continued until independence.

In the concerted effort to prepare the Trust Territory of Somalia for independence, allowances had to be made for the traditional elements of society. In the first national election held in 1956 to elect a Legislative Assembly, those eligible voters (universal male suffrage) in the settled areas cast secret ballots. Because this method of voting was impractical in the nomadic regions, each nomadic clan met in a shir (traditional clan assembly) and decided jointly on the candidate for whom all clan votes would be cast. The clan leaders then informed the authorities of the shir's decision. A total of 600 shirs were held, and the total number of votes cast in the shirs far exceeded the estimated size of the actual electorate in the nomadic areas.²⁴

As a result of this national election the SYL emerged dominant in the Legislative Assembly. One of the first acts of the new SYL-dominated assembly was to make it illegal for a political party to bear the name of a clan or tribe, thus forcing the second largest party in the Assembly (the HDM) to change its name to the Somali Independent Constitutional Party.

Other attempts to break with the traditions of society prior to independence included decreasing the powers of the traditional clan/tribe leaders by increasing the powers of the central and local governments, outlawing the arifato (customary law in which one clan is bound by a client

relationship to another), and attempts to abolish the tradition of "the claim to collective property."²⁵

The first national election in British Somaliland was held in 1958 to select members to the National Council. As in the Trust Territory, the election was by secret ballot in the urban areas and by shir acclamation in the rural areas. British Somaliland received its independence on 26 June 1960, and merged with the Trust Territory to form the independent Republic of Somalia on 1 July 1960.

The Somalis gained independence with a mixed legacy. Although in many ways they had received more preparation for independence than any newly independent nation of that time, the new government was faced with a paucity of natural resources in the nation, large deficits in the public budget, a political system which with independence saw a strengthening of clanism and a fragmenting of the political parties, and an unresolved boundary dispute with Ethiopia.

In the economic sphere, bananas, livestock on the hoof, and hides and skins were the Republic's major exports. Although some mineral wealth did exist, it did not provide a viable economic base because the quality of the deposits was poor, the skilled manpower base was low (if not nonexistent), and the required infrastructure was inadequate. Further, because "about 80 percent of the population was regarded as being 'outside the cash sector' of the economy"

the tax base remained extremely low.²⁶ In an effort to offset the impact of this poor economic position, the Republic was successful in its attempts to acquire foreign aid and technical assistance which by 1962 was worth approximately \$ US 94.5 million.²⁷ This aid was designed to improve Somali infrastructure and explore new sources of industrialization suited to the new Republic.

In the area of education independence found the Trust Territory with a total of 135 primary schools (attended by 16,000 students), four secondary schools, five vocational schools, one Islamic studies school, a school of public finance and commerce to train indigenous civil servants, and one higher level school (the University Institute of Somalia).²⁸

In the north there were a total of 38 primary schools for boys attended by just over 2000 students, three primary schools for girls, twelve intermediate schools for boys, two secondary schools, and two vocational schools.²⁹ A total of 45 trained Somali teachers taught in the north compared to approximately 470 in the south (290 with teaching diplomas, the remainder were qualified as teacher's assistants).³⁰

Although provided with considerably more preparatory training than that provided to the Republic of Guinea by France, the Republic of Somalia faced many of the same problems: lack of a skilled/educated population, small/underdeveloped economic base, and an inadequate infrastructure.

D. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND THE IMPACT OF TRADITIONAL CULTURE ON MODERNIZATION

The development task faced by the leaders of both Guinea and Somalia appeared overwhelming, yet each government was determined not to fail in its efforts to bring the country to modernity. The enormity of the task can be seen in the fact that even after over a decade of independence both countries were still classified in United Nations General Assembly Resolution Number 2768 (XXVI) as being among the least developed countries in the world.

A number of development strategies have been suggested by political scientists to explain the transition of traditionally oriented independent societies to modern societies. Donald Rothchild and Robert L. Curry, Jr. have posited a development strategy which they call a "transformation strategy." They suggest that the transformation strategy "has at its essence a commitment to break the inherited pattern of structural dependency [on the previous colonial power] and to reconvert the society to certain traditional ideas, values and life-styles."³¹ They see the transformationalist states as determined to end their dependence on the Western-dominated world economic system and substitute in its place a "communo-cratic" system which emphasizes collective living and social solidarity. Although the transformationalists are not necessarily Marxist, they find some of the Marxist theory and rhetoric attractive because of its rejection of Western

capitalism on one hand and its collectivist inspiration on the other. In principle at least, the transformation model involves a complete rejection of the links to the world capitalist economy, because otherwise the transformationalists see their country having no choice but to "co-operate with external capitalism, as a very junior partner."³² The transformationalists stress simultaneous multiple goals, such as social equality, self-reliance, economic and social transformation, and African economic integration. Of these goals self-reliance is the most significant, as it permits the transformationalist state to pursue an independent foreign policy. Finally, the transformationalists view alternative strategies which rely on the international capitalist system as morally repugnant because they are inequitable (in favor of the larger nation), demean the dignity of the smaller country, and limit the smaller country's options for self-determination.

Rothchild and Curry have suggested six dynamic system goals which a country must continually work to achieve no matter what development strategy it chooses. These are: ensuring systemic survival; establishing a national identity by fostering an awareness of common ties; integrating the society to facilitate growth of community-wide interaction, primarily through the expansion of the central institutions of government; creating an acceptable authority system, by acquiring public acceptance of the legal and political

structure; mobilizing and distributing resources efficiently, by increasing productive capacity and the sharing of output among members of the community; and securing freedom from external control, by reducing economic, political, and social dependence on any external actor.³³

According to Rothchild and Curry, both the Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Somalia fit into the transformationalist pattern of development. The remainder of this chapter will deal with a comparison of Guinea's and post revolutionary Somalia's political and economic development strategies using the Rothchild and Curry framework.

E. CREATING AN ACCEPTABLE AUTHORITY SYSTEM

According to Rothchild and Curry to achieve this system goal involved at least four elements. These included legitimizing governmental authority with a strong ideology combined when necessary with extensive discipline to ensure compliance, establishing a hierarchical authority throughout the nation, and having an inspirational (charismatic) leader at the apex of the hierarchy.

Upon gaining independence, Sekou Toure and the PDG assumed control of governing Guinea. According to Toure, the notion of nation building "involves the pursuit of three major objectives: the establishment of a political, institutional framework for nation building, the promotion of socio-economic development and the search for a national identity."³⁴ There

are further, three major factors in the Guinean approach to nation building, "a mobilization-oriented single party, an inflexible party ideology and a flexible charismatic leader."³⁵

To achieve the first factor, at independence the doctrine of party supremacy was adopted. Accordingly, the PDG has had a mass membership, and the PDG continues to encourage mass participation in the political process. In practice, membership in the PDG is automatic for every adult Guinean as he pays the party dues as an integral part of his state tax. Guinean leaders point out that this mass party membership helps bring the population together thereby eliminating, in part, the elite-mass gap. To further ensure that this dichotomy does not emerge the PDG has attempted to discourage the growth of indigenous private enterprise since it believes that such development would lead to the emergence of antagonistic classes of "the exploiters" and "the exploited." Since the Guinean government has been forced by economic circumstances to accept a certain degree of indigenous private enterprise, it has instituted a policy which excludes the entrepreneurs from holding party posts, reasoning that they are making no contribution to the nation's development process.

To complement the priority of the PDG party organization, at independence a democratic constitution was adopted. Article One states that Guinea is to be a democratic, secular, and social republic. Sovereignty is vested in the people, to be exercised through the election of deputies to the National

Assembly, and through election of a chief executive by universal suffrage. In practice, however, deputies are elected from a single list of candidates, by majority ballot, which gives the party polling the most votes, all of the National Assembly seats, and makes it impossible for an opposition party to challenge the PDG monopoly. Toure defends the "single nationalist list" system by asserting that the system is necessary to ensure that deputies are not influenced by any regional, ethnic, racial, or religious considerations, but have as their major goal to serve the national interest as "trustees of the nation."³⁶

The government is closely linked to the Party even at the lowest levels of government in the villages/wards. The basic unit of government, the Local Revolutionary Power (PRL) has merged with the local Party committee. This organization headed by a mayor is responsible through the regional government for local economic development, local administration, local social development, and local public works and communications. This organization was designed to provide the PRL a communication link to the central government decision-makers, and although theoretically a two way link, it works most effectively as a one way link from the central government to the PRLs.

At independence the PDG saw its position as insecure unless it accomplished four tasks: to prevent the rise of Foulah opposition; to contend with the divisive tendencies

of the Moslem, Christian, and Animist religions; to destroy the power of the chiefs; and to mobilize the nation's youth and women.³⁷

To accomplish the first task the PDG leadership made Diallo Saifoulaye (a Foulah) Vice President of the Republic and Political Secretary of the PDG, and brought a number of Foulahs into the government and the PDG, giving them prestigious positions. Foulah women and youth were brought into the PDG and given active political roles. Foulah children were sent away from their homes to attend school in non-Foulah regions to expose them to other ethnic groups. The central government awarded the Foulah their full share of funds for welfare projects. Finally to ensure the effectiveness of these measures, the Regional Executive position was assigned to an "alien" non-Foulah, this designed to inhibit the formation of ethnic opposition.³⁸

Although women's organizations existed before independence they were mainly regional, ethnic, religious, or social in nature with virtually no political influence. With the founding of the PDG in 1947, women were encouraged to become active in politics, and during the 1950s exercised a powerful political force by their vote in the elections. Following independence women retained their political status. This has included both the acquisition of high governmental positions (including membership in the National Political Bureau) and the expansion of employment opportunities for women. Guinean women today

still have a most powerful weapon in "the power of the vote," a weapon upon which Sekou Toure is dependent.

Neglected by the colonizers, the youth of Guinea became a PDG focus at the time of independence. The Party began to organize the youth and bring them into the political system as active participants--in 1959 it was decided to make the youth organization a functional arm of the Party. As a result of this, Toure ensures that the youth are represented at official functions and during his state visits (as members of the official party). "A natural by-product of this confidence which the Party has placed in its youth has been youth's trust in the Party."³⁹

The problem of the chiefs was officially ended prior to independence; however, following independence the PDG gave the traditional chiefly functions to the PRLs.

In addition to a hierarchical authority system, Toure has over the years taken for himself a wide variety of titles designed to enhance his own personality cult as a charismatic leader. These have included "Faithful and Supreme Servant of the People," the "Doctor of Revolutionary Sciences," and the "Liberator of Oppressed Peoples."⁴⁰ Further although no African leader denies the role of chief more fervently than Toure, it is hard to imagine one who fills it more fully.

Another tactic used by Toure to enhance his leadership has been the "discovery of plots against the nation." Since independence the government has uncovered some fifteen plots.

The conspirators have included teachers, merchants, former PDG and cabinet members, Guinean exiles, the Portuguese, physicians, and in 1976 the National Soccer team.⁴¹ In short "Toure has become the embodiment of the nation, the only theoretician of the state, the ultimate law-giver and interpreter. He has written about 20 books which are compulsory readings in the country...He is an expert in all fields from agriculture to philosophy, including religion and soccer... All national and regional officials are appointed by the president [Toure], and none can make any major decision without consulting him."⁴²

Toure is committed to the ideology of "scientific socialism" to guide the development of the nation. This ideology has been defined as meaning:

the social ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange and the establishment of a society where all citizens are assured of minimum requirements of food, shelter, and clothing, equal access to essential social services and political freedom.⁴³

This is to be accomplished through the Party/State hierarchical government and a "non-capitalist way to development." A major part of the economic development involves nationalization of the economy and state planning, which to date in Guinea has been far from successful. As a result of this Guinea's socialist ideology has not been transformed into practical realities.

Despite a hierarchical government authority system, a charismatic leader and a strong ideology, Guinea still must

use considerable coercion to maintain the authority system. This coercion can be seen in the statistic that more than one million Guineans (about one sixth of the total population) are living in exile, mainly in neighboring countries. Although Toure was extremely careful to appease tribal feelings immediately following independence, today the Foulah make up the bulk of the political exiles. Amnesty International estimates that there are between 2000 and 4000 political prisoners in Guinea. This number included (until his recent release) the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Conakry who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for his supposed role in the 1970 Portuguese invasion of Conakry.⁴⁴

Toure's support among the nation's youth is also being eroded. He is receiving growing pressure from young cadres to reduce the emphasis on the political and ideological goals of the past two decades and to set more practical and realistic targets.

Toure's standing among the women was also shaken when in August 1977 there were nationwide protests by women over the inadequacies of the state distribution system, and the abuses of the economic police who were tasked with regulating internal trade, but were in fact involved in smuggling and extortion. Following the riots Toure disbanded the economic police.

Although Guinea for the past twenty years has conformed to the transformation strategy, recent events make it appear

that Toure may be reassessing his development strategy and tending toward the reorganization strategy with its moderate ideology, bargaining relationships, and limited discipline.

To assess the development strategy of the Somali government from independence to revolution and the causes for the 21 October 1969, revolution, are beyond the scope of this chapter. The following assessment will evaluate Somalia's development strategy since the revolution.

Upon assuming power, the military commanders who comprised the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), abolished the nation's constitution (promising a new constitution) and outlawed all political parties (an effort primarily aimed at disbanding the SYL). The stated objectives of the SRC in staging the revolution were to end corruption and nepotism in government, establish a written Somali language and end illiteracy, and bring about rapid social, economic, and cultural development. To accomplish this, Law Number One assigned the SRC the functions previously performed by the president of the republic, the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, as well as some duties of the Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice.

With the enactment of the local government reform law of August 1972, the SRC established a hierarchical structure of regional, district and village councils. The village councils were chosen annually through elections. The regional and

district councils which were largely appointed by the SRC were required by law to form six committees: economic development, social affairs, public security, finance, political orientation, and mediation and conciliation. The last two committees were charged with educating the people concerning the SRC's ideology and with attempting to settle disputes between various segments of the community.

On 1 July 1976, the SRC announced the creation of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). The SRSP's specific duties were to correct and streamline the efficiency of the party cadre, assist with national economic development, and lay the groundwork for a productive and socialist nation.⁴⁵ The practical aspects of the creation of the SRSP have been similar to those in Guinea--the creation of a party state, with a rigid hierarchy to ensure the authority of the ruling government.

Although somewhat less blatant than in Guinea, attempts have been made to portray Siad Barre, the president of the republic, as a charismatic leader. He is referred to as Comrade in most official publications. He has attempted to gain stature among his people by his support of the continuing "war of liberation" being fought in the Ogaden. One interesting sidelight on this attempt to portray Barre as charismatic was his refusal "because of modesty" to accept the title of "Marshal" when it was offered to him by the SRSP upon its formation.

Barre has attempted to mobilize the Somalis to his ideology of "scientific socialism", which literally translated means "livestock sharing which is built on knowledge."⁴⁶ In practice the ideology is confused. For example, although the banks have been nationalized, Barre has assured businessmen of a good investment climate. What has evolved from it has been a form of pragmatism which is found in many countries with scarce resources, and has as its goal the reduction of Somalia's dependence on foreign states through self-help projects and increased educational opportunities for its citizens.

The most recent effort to legitimize the rule of the SRSP was the mid-1979 ratification of the new Somali Constitution which provides that the SRSP is the country's sole political party and its supreme ruling body. It further establishes a national People's Assembly, whose members are elected by popular vote. Yet despite this apparent easing of autocratic controls by the military regime in power, opponents of the regime dismiss the new constitution as a farce, pointing out that the powers enjoyed by President Barre are as wide under the new constitution as they were under military rule. The President remains the head of state, the head of the SRSP, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and chairman of the High Judicial Council which disciplines judges.⁴⁷

The creation of an acceptable authority system has not been without its difficulties. There have been a number of purges of high level government officials. To Somalia's credit, however, is the fact that in a 1978 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report it was stated that Amnesty International had identified few reports of torture of political prisoners although more than 50 were said to have been detained without charge or trial. One reason why more organized political opposition has not been observed is that even today sixty to seventy percent of the Somali population is nomadic and therefore is not fully effected by government policy decisions.

There has, however, been increasing evidence of opposition to the Barre regime. Barre has been accused of attempting to strengthen his power through nepotism. Disenchanted pro-Soviet military personnel unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the government in April 1978. Finally, a guerilla movement intent on overthrowing Barre, the Somali Salvation Front, is training in Ethiopia.

It would appear that Barre, at least for the time being, finds the transformationalist strategy in the realm of creating an acceptable authority system to be meeting his needs and I foresee no impending change to his strategy.

F. ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL IDENTITY

Rothchild and Curry's transformation strategy to achieve

this system goal involved the engenderment, by the government, of a high nationalistic and high pan-African consensus among the population.

At independence, Toure was faced with a significant problem that of establishing a Guinean national identity. Although the new nation's effort to develop a nationalism was facilitated by a lack of irredentism, the nation did contain significant ethnic and religious disparities, and each ethnic group had its own language, traditions, and forms of social and political organizations. Further, those few people who had received an education, had received a colonial based Euro-centric education which had little bearing on the problems of Guinea.

Toure took some immediate steps to establish a national identity. He adopted a Guinean flag and national anthem. He assembled a national youth orchestra. He had the educational curriculum revised to teach Guinean history, geography, and language. He encouraged interregional and national competition in native songs, dances, sports, and even public works projects. Those who excelled in these competitions were hailed as Guinean champions.

An effort to establish nationalism based on the traditional bases was "investissement humain" which is "the use of unpaid volunteer labor for the construction of public works projects for the welfare of the general community."⁴⁸ The theory

underlying this effort was that besides constructing needed public works projects, Guineans involved would be imbued with a common sense of national purpose.

To lessen the religious division in the country Toure organized a religious "debunking campaign." This effort not only downplayed the utility of religion, but also included the africanization of the clergy and nationalization of all parochial/religious schools. An interesting footnote to this campaign was written in 1979 when in a speech Toure enjoined the Muslims in the Faranah region not to forget "that being a true Moslem means to increase production."⁴⁹

Besides being highly nationalistic, Toure continues to be a strong supporter of pan-Africanism. He is so committed to the philosophy that the Guinean constitution contains reference to the willingness of Guinea to give up a certain amount of national sovereignty to further pan-Africanist goals.⁵⁰

In Somalia Barre was not faced with quite so formidable a task when developing a Somali national identity. Somalis have long considered themselves Somalis, despite the residual tribalism existing today. The task, however, has not been an easy one because with so much of the population living a nomadic lifestyle they migrate from area to area with little concern as to whether they are in Kenya, Somalia, or Ethiopia.

To counter this the Somali government has emphasized the doctrine of pan-Somalism, with the aim of reuniting the five

Somali enclaves: Djibouti, the Ogaden, and northern Kenya with the Republic of Somalia (British Somaliland and Italian Somalia). In this regard Somalia does not follow the transformation strategy's emphasis on a pan-African ideology. There are some indications that a change in philosophy may be taking place with regard to pan-Somalism. The recently approved Constitution calls for the right of self-determination of Somalis "under foreign rule" rather than urging the use of force to reunite Greater Somalia.⁵¹

G. INTEGRATING SOCIETIES

As defined by the transformation strategy, the integration of societies required unitary control of the population, thereby providing them with a single focus for their loyalty. As a result the strategy was antitraditional in its policies and goals.

In Guinea, much of the government rhetoric has been anti-traditional in nature, and many of the actions taken have been designed to break from the traditional mold. These include the abolishment of the chieftancy, the granting of rights to women, pronouncements in opposition to polygamy, and the prohibition of marriages between persons more than twenty years apart in age.⁵²

Toure has further moved to integrate Guinean society using the PDG, equating membership in and loyalty to the PDG as synonymous with being a patriotic Guinean. Since all

Guineans are members of the party by definition, this provides the Party with control of its members, and gives the Party members a single focus for their loyalties. Those who do not show sufficient loyalty run the risk of being singled out as "Fifth Columnists" or otherwise punished for their deviation from the Party line.

Article 45 of the Guinean Constitution states that any act of racial discrimination as well as propaganda of a racial or regional character shall be punishable by law. The punishment has been defined as two to five years imprisonment or a 70,000 to a 700,000 franc fine. The law is considered a valuable deterrent since no one has been convicted of this crime to public knowledge.

The Supreme Revolutionary Council in Somalia has broken with the traditional values in a number of ways. Women have been urged to take an active part in government, in sports, and in self-help projects. In 1975 Barre announced the decision of the SRC to give equal rights to women, including equal inheritance rights. It was later announced that limitations were being imposed on polygamy, and that men would no longer be permitted to divorce their wives at will. These efforts at the emancipation of women were opposed by some conservative Islamic leaders. So vociferous was the opposition that Barre arrested and executed ten religious leaders for being agents of a foreign power and violating the security of the state.

Laws passed in 1973 banned weddings, burials, and religious rites held on a tribal basis. Wedding ceremonies were to be held in public places such as hotels, and money could no longer be collected from lineage members for the burial of dead members. The purpose of these antitraditional actions was to transform society. The SRC believed that the traditional structures, although adequate for preindustrial society, were a hindrance to their modernizing efforts.

With the 1976 founding of the SRSP as the state party, the Somali leaders were attempting to integrate society, as the Guineans had, by creating a monolithic party state. The SRSP has a vision in which all citizens are expected to give their best for the common welfare in exchange for basic needs, and as the economy progresses for some personal extras.

Another tactic used by the Somali government to engender a single loyalty to the state has been the formalization of a written Somali language. Within two years of the revolution a standardized system of writing Somali had been devised and was in use. An initial campaign to teach the new language to those living in urban centers was followed by a mass literacy campaign in the countryside between August 1974 and March 1975.

Finally, an environmental factor which the government has put to good use in their continuing program to integrate the society was the drought of the mid-1970s. The severity of the drought prompted relocation of starving nomads into

government operated relocation camps. The government made a concerted effort to relocate peoples of diverse clans together, and then teach them a new trade (fishing, cultivation) in hopes of preventing their return to their nomadic ways. These efforts are reported to have been fifty percent successful.

The efforts of the Somali government to more fully integrate their society seem at this time to be meeting with relative success.

H. MOBILIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

This system goal was characterized by the desire for substantial economic growth, emphasizing high equity in the distribution of the resulting resources throughout the population. This growth was to be accomplished using moderate private and high public investment. Rapid africanization of all facets of the government, economy, and society was to be pursued.

Guinea has experienced significant difficulties in this area. The appalling economic conditions left by the French colonizers have been discussed previously. Sekou Toure had little choice but to africanize the government immediately upon gaining independence. Yet those persons thrust into government positions had neither the education nor the experience needed to mobilize and distribute resources efficiently. To overcome this deficiency, by late 1960 an estimated 100

to 150 East European technical assistants were working in Guinea and "virtually every Ministry has some Czech advisors attached to it..."⁵³

In socialist fashion "nationalization and the economic plan" were utilized to mobilize the economy. The first Three Year Plan (1960-1962), due to a lack of qualified indigenous personnel, was drawn up by a team of French economic experts. The French economic team established agriculture as the plan's priority. They further made an estimate of anticipated investments for the period, then worked out the "proportions for the different sectors including the details of the activities to be carried out within each sector."⁵⁴ As might be expected, the plan did not achieve its goal because the investment was not forthcoming and the indigenous infrastructure to carry out the plan was nonexistent.

A second Seven Year Plan (1964-1970), devised by the Ministry of Economic Development and described as a "wish list," was no more successful than the first plan. The third Five Year Plan (1973-1977) which took about a year and a half to develop, on initial analysis appears no more successful than its predecessors. Agricultural production continues to fail not only to meet the needs of the population, but also the needs of foreign financed industries, such as fruit juice and meat canning factories.

As a result of the failure of indigenous economic planning, Guinea has become indebted and dependent on foreign capital and technology to develop/exploit her mineral wealth.

For example, the Japanese have entered an iron ore enterprise, and the Soviets and other multinational corporations (MNC) have entered joint bauxite enterprises.⁵⁵ The problem has been further exacerbated by the fact that Guinea has obligated itself to various countries so deeply that she is forced to give them favorable terms on raw material exports. For example, the Soviet-built Kindia bauxite project "aims at producing 2.5 million tons per year of bauxite for shipment to the U.S.S.R. over a 30-year period as a repayment of Guinea's debts."⁵⁶ To make matters worse the Guineans are getting only one fourth the world price per ton from the Soviets for this bauxite.

In an effort to ensure equitable distribution of agricultural land, the state assumed legal title to all land in 1959. As the title holder, the state is entitled to take over neglected land; however, the government has insufficient resources to improve this land. As a result, in most areas of the country landholdings still conform to the customary patterns of small-scale family tenure.

Besides taking title to all Guinean land, the government has over a period of time nationalized the education system, health facilities, radio telecommunications, transport (air and rail), electric power, diamond mining, forestry, trawling, banking, insurance, and foreign and domestic trade. These efforts have met with mixed success, with the greatest success found in the socio-cultural areas.

Because the state framework for marketing agricultural products and consumer goods was so poorly planned and managed, the new institution did not work as planned, especially in the supply of consumer goods. As a result a large parallel black market has grown up which markets agricultural products and in return provides consumer goods to the population.

Africanization in the industrial/business sector is still handicapped by a lack of trained, skilled personnel. One bright spot in the economy has been the new financial terms Guinea has been able to work out with the MNCs. Through patient negotiation Guinea has been able to negotiate deals with a number of MNCs which call for Guinea to own 49% of the company and receive 65% of the taxable profits.⁵⁷

Rather than conforming to the transformation strategy model in this area, Guinea--in spite of the desire to develop more independently--is limited to slow africanization (accommodation strategy) and dependency on high private/foreign investment combined with moderate public ownership (reorganization strategy).

The problems of mobilizing and distributing resources efficiently are even more severe in Somalia. Somalia's main exports (71% live animals, 19% bananas, 9.6% hides and skins)⁵⁸ are not big money exports, and Somalia has no real raw material potential. Further, with only five percent of her population employed in industry, commerce, and transportation, she is

severely limited with regard to africanization of the economic sector.⁵⁹

The SRC's first effort at economic planning, the Three-Year Development Plan (1971-1973) was not met because of a lack of local resources, especially trained manpower, and the weakness in the planning apparatus.⁶⁰

The most recent development program, the Five-Year Development plan (1973-1978) envisioned the creation of a fishing industry, the opening of thousands of acres of land to cultivation, and the establishment of some thirty-five new industries. However, the severe drought in 1974-1975 and the Ogaden War have destroyed any hope for fulfilling the Plan. The status of the follow-on Five Year Development Plan is in jeopardy because the Soviets (who were expelled in 1977) were supposed to draw up the plan.⁶¹

Like Guinea, Somalia is becoming dependent on foreign investment capital. In fact, "according to the government's planning department, long-term objectives envisage an increasing role for foreign private capital, notably in the manufacturing sector."⁶²

To ensure the equitable distribution of what little arable land there is, the government enacted a Land Tenure law in 1975. According to the law (which has as its base, state ownership of all land) arable land may be held by individuals only under a ten-year concession granted by the Ministry of

Agriculture. The size of the concession varies depending on whether it is irrigated or non-irrigated land; a farmer may sublet his land to another only because of physical disability and with government permission. Mortgage, sale, or lease of the land is prohibited; however, the concession is renewable for a second ten year period. The law further restricted the size of large plantations to 247 acres.⁶³

In principle pasture land not owned by a specific clan is open to grazing by all Somali nomad herds. In practice, there has been a high degree of customary clan usage.

Besides the nationalization of the land, the Somali government has, since the Revolution, nationalized banking, insurance, electric power, oil distribution, most large manufacturing establishments, medical service, education, printing, and those commercial enterprises involved in import and export.

In the final analysis Somalia does not fit completely into the transformation framework in this area. With its slow africanization, high private investment, and low public investment it reflects the accomodation strategy. Although it seeks economic growth and an equitable distribution of resources, Somalia is becoming more dependent on foreign capital and technology, with self-sufficiency even a questionable long term goal.

I. ENSURING SURVIVAL AND SECURING FREEDOM FROM EXTERNAL CONTROL

Because I feel that these final two system goals are so closely interrelated I have chosen to discuss them as complementary goals.

Rothchild and Curry characterized these system goals as leading to a high desire on the part of the country to retain its sovereignty; however, this was tempered by a flexible, pragmatic approach to continental federation. The developing country further strives to maintain a closed economy in order to limit its links with Western capitalism. In addition its foreign policy is characterized by some form of "positive nonalignment."

Despite rhetoric to the contrary, Guinea is ruled by an autocratic leader who over the past twenty years, has created a mentality within the nation which sees his personal survival closely linked with that of the party and the nation. In practice there is no established mechanism for succession. As a result, in spite of initial attempts at ensuring wide ethnic representation in high governmental circles, Toure began to remove those whom he perceived as threats to his political survival. These "Fifth Columnists" became traitors to the nation, and Toure began to encircle himself with family, friends, and clan members who stand to gain much as long as Toure remains in power.

In addition to the personal survival aspect of the leader, Guinea at independence had as an added incentive to ensure their national survival, their determination to prove to General de Gaulle that they did not need French help in their national development. This tendency also contributed to the limited links which Guinea established with other Western capitalist nations, fearing association with these nations would lead to economic neo-colonialism. This desire to ensure independent survival secure from external control, I believe accounts, at least in part, for the cooling of relations between Guinea and the world socialist states to which Guinea had become deeply indebted economically.

Although Guinean socialist ideology advocates a self-sufficient closed economy, the nature of that economy--raw materials requiring high investment and high technology to exploit--makes a pragmatic course more appropriate. While talking a socialist line Guinea can encourage outside investment and technology to develop her resources. This pragmatic approach is illustrated in a comment by Toure when, in response to criticism from the Eastern European press that he had abandoned the Guinean revolution, he responded that "I will deal with anyone for the sake of Guinea."⁶⁴ This is consistent with Guinea's newly revived policy of positive nonalignment which rests on scrupulous adherence to four principles: "equal friendship for all peoples; respect for all countries;

non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; and active cooperation with countries and individuals desiring to aid in the evolution of Africa on the basis of justice, effective solidarity and respect of human dignity."⁶⁵

Finally, Guinea by her constitution supports the concept of continental federation (Pan Africanism), including a Pan-African Army "to deal with the problems which now bring in foreign intervention."⁶⁶ Although Toure rhetorically supports the federation, I feel that if it were to result in diminishing his power, he would oppose the implementation of the philosophy.

In Somalia, as in Guinea, the survival of the head of the Party and the State is linked with the survival of the nation. Although Somalia reportedly has fewer political prisoners than Guinea, Barre has not been reluctant to eliminate opposition, not only from within the military, but also the government, Islamic leadership, and the general population. Further, to strengthen his rule Barre has begun to rely heavily on his close relatives. In late 1979, Barre's son-in-law, half-brother, and two uncles occupied the posts of Security Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and Party official for mobilization respectively.⁶⁷

The new Somali Constitution is seen by many as merely a device to legitimate Barre's rule. Therefore, despite constitutional provisions allowing the People's Assembly, under

certain circumstances, to dismiss the President, it appears highly unlikely that this will ever occur.

There is no overwhelming Pan-African sentiment in Somalia. The strongest sentiment is reserved for the Pan-Somali movement. Historically the aim has been to reunite all Somali peoples, by force if necessary. Additionally, the Somalis are disenchanted with their OAU associate's lack of acceptance/support for their position concerning the reuniting of all Somalis.

To the degree that Somalia has nationalized numerous social services and industries, Somalia possesses a relatively closed economy. The nation is, however, like Guinea--notwithstanding socialist rhetoric--forced to accept large quantities of foreign investment and technical aid. To further emphasize this point, the Somali Minister of Higher Education and Culture, Omer Arteh Ghalib, in a 1977 interview stated:

We have an investment law inviting all countries in the world, particularly those friendly to us, to invest in our country. But as a revolutionary government we are security conscious. We must be absolutely sure that the companies, or individuals, who want to come to our country to invest have no ulterior motives. When we are sure of their sincerity and pure commercial interest of the organization or company or individual, I can assure you they will be most welcome.⁶⁸

Somalia, like Guinea, has become deeply indebted to the Soviet Union, and this fact along with the dynamics of the Soviet involvement in the Ogaden War (which is beyond the

scope of this study), has culminated in Somali disenchantment with her "socialist ally" and, of necessity, forced closer economic ties to the West, a pattern more in line with the accomodation or reorganization strategy.

Chapter One of the new Somali Constitution specifies that Somalia is to pursue a policy of nonalignment and to cooperate with all the peoples and nations of the world. In practice this involves developing relations with whichever country can meet Somalia's immediate needs.

J. CONCLUSION

The diverse ethnic, cultural, religious, economic and ecological backgrounds found in African nations, when combined with the dissimilarities of their colonial heritages make it impossible to neatly fit Guinea and Somalia into a single developmental strategy framework. Although the Rothchild and Curry framework for explaining development strategies is somewhat simplistic, and as such contains deficiencies, it does provide a useful tool with which to analyze the development strategies of the less developed countries of Africa.

In Guinea and Somalia, modernization will continue to be the primary goal of the ruling elite. Closely related will be the goal of ensuring the survival of the State as a sovereign nation, and as a corollary the survival of the head of state.

Ethnic, religious and clan-family cleavages will not be overcome in the foreseeable future in Guinea and Somalia. It has also been proved, I believe, that in both nations, "scientific socialism" is not, and will not be accepted as, a modern expression of the traditional African communal way of life. As a result the leaders of the nations studied will continue their antitraditional efforts both rhetorically and practically, but will not hesitate to fall back on tradition as a mobilizing vehicle when it suits their purposes.

With the one party state, and the absence of the concept of the "loyal opposition", extensive discipline will continue to be used in Guinea and Somalia. This is further exacerbated by the fact that in neither country has a formalized succession system been established; this will undoubtedly result in some degree of fragmentation upon the death or removal of the present head of state.

Although ideology will continue to receive rhetorical emphasis, it would appear that in the long-term, pragmatism rather than ideology will guide the decisions made by the leaders of Guinea and Somalia. As a result neither country will break completely with the capitalistic world economy, and patient negotiation can result, as it did in Guinea, in the improvement of the terms of trade so that they are more favorable toward the nation than toward the MNC.

The problem of ensuring the equitable distribution of wealth in Guinea and Somalia has no short-term solution, and I am pessimistic as to whether there is any potential long-term solution to the problem.

Finally, the leaders of Guinea and Somalia will continue to strive to maintain a "positive nonalignment" policy in dealings with the capitalistic and socialistic world economic systems. Although I feel that at the present time there is insufficient evidence to prove the hypothesis, it would appear that the vacillation seen in Guinea and Somalia from dependence on the socialist world to dependence on the capitalist world may be the vehicle chosen by these nations' leaders to maintain their neutrality.

FOOTNOTES

¹Paul Bohannon and Philip Curtin, Africa and Africans (Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press, 1971), p. 368.

²Ethnic groups found in Guinea include: Soussou, Nalou, Baga, Landouma, Mmani, Foulah, Tenda, Malinke, Ouassoulounke, Kissi, Toma, Guerze, Mano, Kono, Dialonke, Mikhifone, Diakhanke, Tyapi, Kouranko and Konianke.

³Victor David DuBois, "The Independence Movement in Guinea: A Study in African Nationalism" (Ph.D dissertation, Princeton University, 1962), p. 3.

⁴Ibid., p. 5.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Irving Kaplan et al., Area Handbook for Somalia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 61. The Dir, the Darod, the Isaq and the Hawiya trace their descent to Samaal. The Digil and the Rahanwein trace their descent to Saab.

⁷David D. Laitin, "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia", The Journal of Modern African Studies 14 (1976): 451.

⁸Much of the background analysis for this section on Somali traditional life came from the Area Handbook for Somalia, see footnote 6.

⁹Middle Guinea came under French sovereignty in 1897, Upper Guinea between 1895 and 1899 and the Forest Region in 1911.

¹⁰Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Guinea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 36.

¹¹DuBois, "The Independence Movement in Guinea", p. 346.

¹²Ladipo Adamolekun, Sekou Toure's Guinea (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd, 1976), p. 43.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 44-45.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Al Castagno, "The Republic of Somalia: Africa's Most Homogeneous State?", African Special Report 5 (1960):2.

²¹Kaplan, Area Handbook, p. 26.

²²Ibid., p. 29.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 33.

²⁵Castagno, "The Republic of Somalia: Africa's Most Homogeneous State?", p. 9.

²⁶Alphonso A. Castagno, "The Somali Republic in Transition", African Report 7 (1962):7.

²⁷Ibid., p. 8.

²⁸Kaplan, Area Handbook, pp. 119-120. The Higher Institute of Economics and Law, founded in 1954, became the University Institute of Somalia in January 1960.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 120-121.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 119 and 121.

³¹Donald Rothchild and Robert L. Curry, Jr., Scarcity, Choice and Public Policy in Middle Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 134-135.

³²Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Development (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 382.

³³Rothchild and Curry, Scarcity, Choice and Public Policy in Middle Africa, p. 97.

- ³⁴Adamolekun, Sekou Toure's Guinea, p. 6.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 7.
- ³⁶Nelson, Area Handbook, p. 151.
- ³⁷DuBois, "The Independence Movement in Guinea", p. 161.
- ³⁸Ibid., pp. 164-165.
- ³⁹Ibid., p. 211.
- ⁴⁰Christian P. Potholm, The Theory and Practice of African Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 195.
- ⁴¹Lasine Kaba, "Rhetoric and Reality in Conakry", African Report 23 (May-June 1978):44-45.
- ⁴²Ibid., p. 43.
- ⁴³Ladipo Adamolekun, "The Socialist Experience in Guinea", in Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy (Berkeley: University of California, 1979), p. 77.
- ⁴⁴Desmond Davies, "Accusing Finger Points to Toure", New African, August 1978, pp. 26-27.
- ⁴⁵Colin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record 1976-1977 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Ltd, 1978), pp. B325-B326.
- ⁴⁶Laitin, "The Political Economy of Military Rule", p. 463.
- ⁴⁷Ahmed Rajab, "New Constitution, Old Powers", New African, October 1979, p. 59.
- ⁴⁸DuBois, "The Independence Movement in Guinea", pp. 246-247.
- ⁴⁹Joint Publications Research Service, Sub-Saharan Africa Report, no. 74987(January 23, 1980), p. 53.
- ⁵⁰The Preamble to the Guinean Constitution states: "It [Guinea] affirms its will to try its utmost for the realization and consolidation of unity in the independence of the African Motherland. For this purpose, it shall fight any tendencies or manifestations of chauvanism which it considers

as serious obstacles to the realization of this objective."

"...It [Guinea] supports without reserve, any policy tending to the creation of the United States of Africa, to the safeguard and consolidation of peace in the world."

Article 34 of the Guinean Constitution further specifies: "The Republic may conclude, with any African State, agreements for association or for the purpose of forming a community, including partial or total surrender of sovereignty for the realization of African unity."

⁵¹Rajab, "New Constitution, Old Powers", p. 60.

⁵²Africa Report 12 (November 1967):46.

⁵³Africa Report 5 (October 1960):6.

⁵⁴Adamolekun, Sekou Toure's Guinea, p. 49.

⁵⁵Africa Report 23 (May-June 1978):46.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Adamolekun, Sekou Toure's Guinea, p. 60.

⁵⁸Africa South of the Sahara 1978-1979(London: Europa Publications Limited, 1978), p. 858. Source: Central Statistics Department, Ministry of Planning and Co-ordination, Mogadishu, Somalia).

⁵⁹Overseas Business Report, OBR 78-20, (June 1978):37.

⁶⁰Africa Report 22 (March-April 1977):47. .

⁶¹Colin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record 1977-1978 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Ltd, 1979), p. B396. Information contained in the African Contemporary Record 1978-1979 reveals that the SRSP adopted a new national Three-Year Development Plan in January 1979. The new Plan gives priority to agriculture, livestock, fisheries, industry and transport.

⁶²Africa Report 22 (March-April 1977):41-42.

⁶³Kaplan, Area Handbook, p. 246.

⁶⁴New African, April 1979, p. 32

⁶⁵DuBois, "The Independence Movement in Guinea", pp. 293-294.

⁶⁶New African, September 1978, p. 35.

⁶⁷New African, October 1979, p. 60.

⁶⁸Africa Report 22 (March-April 1977):44.

IV. PATTERNS OF SOVIET MILITARY AID TO GUINEA AND SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

Although serious Soviet attention to Africa dates back only to the mid-1950s, between 1967 and 1976 the Soviet Union was the predominant supplier of military aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.¹ What accounted for this rise in Soviet participation in the affairs of Africa? What are the determinants that result in African nations becoming reliant on the Soviet Union for military aid?²

The goal of this chapter is to examine the following three interrelated hypotheses. First, Soviet influence in Africa is dependent on the willingness of the Soviet Union to supply the lesser developed African nations with military aid. Second, African nations will become solely or predominantly reliant on the Soviet Union only in the event of Western unwillingness or failure to provide the desired military aid. Finally, relations between the Soviet Union and her African clients will begin to deteriorate when: African demands for more and better military equipment exceed the level which the Soviet Union is willing to supply; or the Soviet Union attempts to exercise greater control over the deployment and use of Soviet-supplied military equipment than the African nations are willing to accept.

The chapter will focus on two Sub-Saharan nations which have had longstanding ties with the Soviet Union--the Popular and Revolutionary Republic of Guinea and the Republic of Somalia.

B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Post-World War II Soviet attitudes toward the less-developed countries (LDCs) reflected either a cautious indifference, or a lack of understanding of the situation in which nationalist and communist movements found themselves. The Soviet Union was preoccupied with the communization of Eastern Europe, the problem of Germany, and Russian relations in the Turkish and Iranian areas. The LDCs received only cursory attention, and this was characterized by the Zhadanov two camp doctrine which held that even the revolutionary leaders in the LDCs, such as Sukarno in Indonesia and Nehru in India, were "imperialist lackeys" because they were not totally committed politically to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet attitude started to change in the early 1950s. At the 19th Communist Party Congress held in Moscow in 1952, shortly before Stalin's death, future prime minister Malenkov "urged a stronger role for non-communist nationalist leaders in the less developed world and stressed the contributions which their opposition to the western powers could make to the overall position of the Soviet Union."³

After Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the dominant Soviet leader in 1955, the Soviet government began to emphasize that

through peaceful coexistence, which included economic, social, and ideological competition with the Western world, the Soviet Union would emerge as the supreme world power. In the wake of the 1955 Bandung Conference, Moscow became convinced that a major restructuring of the world political scene was underway. The 1955 transfer of military equipment from Czechoslovakia to Egypt was the first use of Soviet military aid in Africa.

The use of Czechoslovakia to consummate Soviet military aid deals became the primary Soviet "modus operandi" through the remainder of the 1950s, and was next seen in Africa in 1959 when between late March and early April, Polish ships delivered three shipments of weapons and vehicles from Czechoslovakia to Guinea, describing them as "gifts to this new African republic from countries behind the Iron Curtain."⁴ By using Czechoslovakia, the most self sufficient arms manufacturer in the Warsaw Pact with the exception of the Soviet Union, as a proxy the Soviet Union could overcome two potential problems in dealing with the LDCs.⁵ First, it provided an avenue for providing military assistance to LDCs who did not want to deal openly with the Soviet Union. Second, it provided the Soviet Union a cover, albeit rather transparent, to counter the charge that they were arming the newly emerging Third World.

The past two decades have seen this facade disappear and the Soviet Union emerge as an arms supplier in her own right.

As Soviet policy-makers came to realize that nuclear war was an unacceptable alternative in their competition with the United States (US), they were faced with the problem of competing with the Western powers in ways that limited the chance of nuclear/general war. Military assistance filled the bill. The Soviet Union in the 1950s had a stockpile of obsolete/obsolescent military equipment that it could provide as military aid, which was designed to enhance Soviet influence, power, and prestige in the Third World. As an added bonus military aid appeared to the Soviets as an ideal means to break Western "containment arrangements" such as CENTO and SEATO. Yet despite the apparent safety of military aid as a foreign policy tool, the Cuban missile crisis showed the Soviets that even military assistance was fraught with danger.

There were a number of discernable patterns of Soviet military aid in Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Nations which were most likely to receive Soviet military aid were identified as "militant nations", had leaders with "Marxist" tendencies in domestic policies, and maintained pan-African and anti-West postures in their foreign policies. Nations did not necessarily have to be pro-Communist to receive Soviet military aid, they just needed to be anti-West.

The period 1961 through 1963 was a period of reappraisal for the Soviet Sub-Saharan Africa policy-makers. Soviet

military aid overtures during the 1960 Congo crisis had resulted in unfavorable reaction from most African nations, giving the Soviets a bad name in Sub-Saharan Africa. Initial ties with Guinea had been strained resulting in the expulsion of the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea in 1961 for alleged subversive efforts against Sekou Toure. Further eighteen Soviet technicians accused of diamond smuggling were expelled from Guinea. Besides these problems the Soviets, because of their unfamiliarity with Africa, had made a number of mistakes which resulted in aid recipients' unhappiness.

Somalia presented the Soviets with their next military aid opportunity when in 1963 it accepted a \$US 35 million "no strings attached" arms package from the Soviet Union instead of a \$US 15 million package offered by the West.⁶ The Soviets had begun to take a pragmatic approach to military aid transfers--standing ready to "jump in" wherever the US or its western allies refused military aid. Gone were some of the ideological trappings which first influenced Soviet military aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact a "basic characteristic of Russian arms aid policies was the relative ease with which the Soviet Union was prepared to dispense with ideological principles in taking on another military hardware customer."⁷

Following the 1966 overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, the Soviet Union undertook another more fundamental reexamination of its policy toward LDCs, and reached two key

conclusions: first, that "'revolutionary democratic' leaders in the Third World suffered from such monumental faults that they would probably never effect a transition to 'genuine' socialism;" and second, that "the Third World offered no promise of great revolutionary advances in the discernable future."⁸

As a result of this reassessment a new Soviet foreign policy approach toward LDCs appeared. On the political plane, it placed emphasis on states and political groups which could be of some inherent importance to the Soviet Union, rather than on those which happened to qualify as progressive by Soviet standards. Tied to this new pragmatism was a geopolitical feature which resulted in the Soviet Union concentrating its attention on the countries in "a broad arc to the south of the Soviet borders, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, and included even states formally aligned with the West such as Iran and Turkey."⁹

The practical result of this new emphasis was that although the Soviets still valued contacts with all African countries willing to deal with them and continued to woo those nations they felt to have some intrinsic value to overall Soviet policy goals, aid to Africa in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular fell drastically between 1965 and 1974.¹⁰

Although since 1974 the Soviets have increased military aid to a number of Sub-Saharan Africa nations, there is

insufficient evidence to prove that this was the result of any major shift in Soviet policy, rather it would appear to be a reflection of increased opportunity in the area.

C. DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET ARMS TRANSFER POLICY

Much has been written attempting to analyze the determinants of Soviet arms transfer policies. In a paper presented at a Naval Postgraduate School conference on the Communist States and Africa, Edward J. Laurance enumerates ten foreign policy objectives which are served by Soviet military aid.¹¹ Of the ten, eight are specifically applicable to Sub-Saharan Africa in general, and Guinea and Somalia in particular.

The first objective is the establishment of a Soviet presence in order to gain a voice in LDC affairs. The Soviet Union came into Africa as the champion of national liberation movements, portraying herself as a non-colonial power, untainted by a past of colonial excess. Although this has been and continues to be a policy goal, the Soviets have been far from successful in Guinea and Somalia. The first Soviet attempts to gain influence in Guinean affairs in 1961 resulted in the expulsion of the Soviet ambassador to Guinea who was accused of conspiring to overthrow the Toure regime. In 1962, the Soviets were refused landing rights in Guinea during the Cuban missile crisis; in 1977 they were again refused permission for Soviet advisers and Cuban troops to assemble in Guinean enroute Ethiopia; and more recently (May 1978)

the Soviets have been denied the use of Guinean airfields to conduct long range reconnaissance flights over the Atlantic Ocean.¹² In Somalia the Soviets, after some fourteen years of close association and investment, found themselves expelled when they attempted to inject themselves into Somali affairs concerning the Somali-Ethiopian war in the Ogaden.

The second objective is the undermining or neutralizing of Western influence in LDCs. In both Guinea and Somalia the Soviet Union stepped in to fill a vacuum when the Western countries failed to provide the LDCs with desired military aid. This has in turn provided the Soviets with short term gains; however, the requirement in both African nations for broad based economic and technical support, which only the West can provide, has worked to counter this Soviet objective in the long term.

The third objective is the breaking of Western arms supply monopolies. Although this has been a major objective in some African countries, most recently Ethiopia, it has not been a significant Soviet objective in her dealings with Guinea and Somalia. Neither country had been heavily dependent on Western sources of military aid before reaching initial agreement with the Soviet Union. According to a 1970 study conducted by Amelia Leiss and her colleagues, between 1955 and 1970 the Soviet Union had been Guinea's sole supplier of combat aircraft, training aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and

armoured personnel carriers (APC), and had supplied over sixty percent of Guinea's transport aircraft. In the case of Somalia, the Soviets were her principal supplier of all classes of equipment except helicopters (which Somalia did not have in her inventory until after 1970 at which time the Soviets became her sole supplier).¹³ Subsequent to 1970 the Soviet Union continued to be the principal arms supplier to Guinea, and also to Somalia until mid-1977.

The fourth objective is the extension of the Soviet capability to project military power. Both Guinea and Somalia are strategically located, and provide the Soviets with potential airbases for long range reconnaissance aircraft, and port facilities for the growing Soviet navy. Soviet military presence in these two countries made it significantly easier to support the Soviets' growing worldwide military presence, and provided potential bases from which the Soviet Union might threaten Western sea lanes of communication. Again as in the achievement of a number of previous policy objectives, the achievement of this objective was short term, and even then subject to the hospitality of the host country.

The fifth objective is the enhancement of the internal security of allies and clients. Both Guinea and Somalia have highly centralized governments, dependent on coercion to retain power. In both countries Soviet military assistance provides the leaders of the nations with the means to keep

the military relatively well equipped, therefore satisfied. A satisfied supportive military is a necessary ingredient to the maintenance of power in many Sub-Saharan African nations.

The sixth objective is the support of insurgencies and wars of national liberation consistent with Soviet ideology. In Guinea this took the form of supplying military aid for further transfer to the PAIGC guerillas who were fighting the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau. In Somalia until 1977 the Soviets were indirectly supporting the Western Somalia Liberation Front which was fighting to reunite the Ogaden region of Ethiopia with the Republic of Somalia.

The seventh objective is the reduction of Chinese (Peoples Republic of China) influence in Africa. To a large degree the Soviets have been successful in achieving this objective as it concerns Guinea and Somalia. Chinese involvement in Africa since the Cultural Revolution has lost some of its impetus. There are reports from Guinea that in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Chinese were involved with training Guinea's Peoples Militia.¹⁴ The Guinean Navy was also reported to have received four Shanghai class patrol gunboats in early 1973.¹⁵ Further, some 200 Chinese "military technicians" were estimated to be in Guinea in 1978.¹⁶ Chinese military aid to Somalia has been negligible, and the Chinese have provided most assistance to Somalia in the form of economic aid.

The final objective is the improvement of the Soviet balance of payments. Although called aid, Soviet military aid takes the form of long term loans, repayable in convertible currencies, commodities, or local funds. These loans have usually been ten to twelve year loans at a two and one half percent interest rate.¹⁷ The willingness of the Soviet Union to accept commodity repayment for military aid was tempting to the LDCs, and superficially appeared to favor the recipient who was afflicted with a single crop economy, with their major export commodity usually being buffeted by fluctuations in an uncertain world market.¹⁸ Actually such arrangements were fraught with dangers for the recipient, as crops or mineral wealth would have to be mortgaged for years ahead to provide a means to repay the Soviet Union.

The predictable result was that the whole direction of trade of the recipient would shift toward the Soviet Union. This resulted because, as the Soviet capacity to absorb the produce was limited, the Soviet Union would dump the excess produce on the world market in order to acquire foreign exchange. As a result, the world market would become glutted with the particular commodity, thus eliminating or severely reducing the Soviet military aid recipient's Western markets and its only source of hard-currency income. In its military barter agreements the Soviet Union insisted that commodity repayments be evaluated in current (and normally depressed)

world market prices, which were readjusted annually to ensure that the Soviet Union would receive the full benefit from any further reduction in the world market price of the commodity. The Soviet Union insisted that a debt which could not be covered by produce at current market prices, would be repaid in fully convertible currency. Thus, the recipients of Soviet weapons could find themselves drained of foreign exchange, not only because of the artificial diversion of their trade, but also because of direct Soviet calls on their dollar or sterling balances.

Guinea was caught in this dilemma when the Soviet Union was receiving bauxite at \$US 6 a ton when the world market price was \$US 24. Since Somalia's export base consists of little that the Soviets could absorb or dump, this has not been as significant a problem for the Somalis.

D. SOVIET MILITARY AID TO GUINEA--THE BEGINNINGS

Following Guinea's "no" vote in the 28 September 1958, French Community referendum, French President de Gaulle ordered the French out of Guinea. In order to punish the Guineans for their affront to the French, de Gaulle ordered all removable French infrastructure removed from the country. As a result of this on independence day, 2 October 1958, the new Guinean republic found itself militarily with only an ill-equipped Gendarmerie.

In order to alleviate the immediate problem of a lack of a national army, the Guinean government formed a two thousand man army made up of some members of the French-trained Gendarmerie and indigenous French Army veterans selected for their political reliability.¹⁹ This was only one of a number of significant problems faced by Guinean President Sekou Toure and his government. The French colonial legacy was appalling. Although for nine years before independence French colonial governors claimed that Guinea could become the "rice granary of French West Africa," between 1955 and 1958 Guinea imported 10,000 tons of rice. Although rich in mineral wealth (gold, diamonds, iron ore, and bauxite) in 1958 Guinea was exporting only small quantities of these minerals. Indigenous industry was limited to the manufacture of soft drinks, soap, canned fruit, and furniture. Transportation facilities were grossly inadequate. Only 187 kilometers of roads were tarred. The country's 673 kilometer railway could not function because of the poor state of repair of the rails, and Guinea had one port and one airport--both in Conakry. Although the population of Guinea was estimated to be 2.8 million in 1959, there was only one large hospital in Conakry, and one "second rate hospital" and ninety-nine dispensaries managed by fifty-eight doctors throughout the rest of the country. Finally, it was estimated in 1956 that only ten percent of the school age population of Guinea were actually attending school.²⁰

The outlook for Guinea was bleak. Guinea was in dire need of assistance of all kinds, especially economic and technical. The Western nations, including the US, were not forthcoming with the needed aid, for fear of offending President de Gaulle. This hesitation provided the Soviet Union with its first opportunity to assist a Sub-Saharan African state.

Since the Soviet Union perceived that Guinea's move gave the country popular appeal with independence movements elsewhere, the Soviet government established diplomatic relations with Guinea almost immediately. However, despite this recognition the Soviet leadership initially chose to remain in the background letting its Eastern European satellites do the "spadework."

By 7 January 1959, East Germany had already signed a trade and cultural agreement with Guinea, which was to be repaid under a partial barter arrangement of agricultural produce. A Czechoslovakian trade delegation had also finalized an aid agreement with Guinea.²¹ Additionally by 4 April 1959, trade and diplomatic missions had arrived in Guinea from Bulgaria and Poland.²²

It has been suggested that the Kremlin's most urgent purpose in establishing relations with Guinea was to establish a base for "the political subversion of an awakening continent." Guinea was to be the African Cuba with dynamic and

popular Sekou Toure cast in the role of Castro. Guinea, it was postulated, was to be the heart of a Soviet master plan to Sovietize Africa.²³ There is some physical evidence to support this argument. Some of the initial projects undertaken in Guinea by the Soviet Union and her allies included the building of a 100KW radio station, a printing press, hotels for use by visiting delegations, a huge stadium to be used for political rallies as well as sporting events, and the establishment of a technical training school (which it was conjectured had some ideological education in its curriculum).²⁴

First reports of the arrival of military aid in Guinea came in late March 1959 when a second shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia arrived in Conakry in a Polish ship. Newspaper accounts of the delivery also alluded to the arrival of a first shipment of arms from Czechoslovakia which had arrived "several days ago."²⁵ A third shipment of arms arrived from Czechoslovakia in early April 1959. In addition, during this time frame, an eighteen man military delegation headed by a Czech general, arrived in Guinea to train the Guineans how to use the "gift cargo of weapons."²⁶

Sources conflict on what composed the "gift cargo," but in any case the "gift" shipments comprised many more weapons than a two thousand man army could possibly need. The reports indicate that the shipments consisted of between three and

eight thousand rifles (unofficial Guinean government sources reported that only two to three thousand rifles were delivered), 150 thousand tons of ammunition, light artillery weapons (bazookas and machine guns), numerous antitank and antiaircraft guns, three armoured cars, two light tanks, and radio communication equipment. One reporter reported the visual sighting at a military camp of about fifty small field kitchens designed to be horsedrawn, although Guinea has no horses because of the prevalence of the tsetse fly in the country. Some neutral observers reported that much of the military equipment received by Guinea was obsolete.²⁷

As could be expected, the Guinean government was unhappy because the Western media had not reported the receipt of non-military "gifts" of tractors and plows with the same zeal with which it had reported the arrival of the military aid. Guinea further charged the French "colonialists" with using the reportage of the Czech arms deliveries to alienate Western sympathy from the country. In two April 1959 news conferences held by Guinean Ambassadors at the United Nations in New York, and in Paris, Guinea further articulated her position on the Czech military aid. They rightfully claimed that Guinea needed military aid because the French had withdrawn or destroyed all military equipment prior to independence. They further claimed that the "gifts" had been unsolicited and were given within the framework of friendly

relations between countries, and were not nearly as large as had been reported. Guinea's foreign relations appeared one sided, they said, because no Western nation had proposed any agreements with Guinea. The Guinean UN Ambassador charged that the effort to discredit Guinea for accepting Czechoslovakian military aid was an attempt by the "colonial powers" to create the impression that the removal of colonialism would inevitably open the way to infiltration from the outside, by which they meant communism. Both ambassadors, stating that Guinea was ready to conclude commercial, technical, or cultural agreements with any nation, appealed for ten thousand tractors, fifty thousand plows, one thousand transportation vehicles, fifty ambulances, and five hundred classrooms.²⁸

In late 1960 Sekou Toure visited Moscow and signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union. At the time Soviet Premier Khrushchev told Toure that he could depend on the Soviet Union's "selfless economic and political support."²⁹

Relations with the Soviet Union cooled considerably about a year later and culminated in the expulsion from Guinea of Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod in December 1961. This strain in relations was caused by a number of problems. First, the "Teacher's Plot" to overthrow Toure was viewed by Toure as an attempt by Moscow to install a more pliable leader in his place. The Guineans were also becoming disenchanted by the poor quality of Soviet aid and their poor performance

in development projects. Finally the Soviets were perceived to harbor racist sentiments against the Guineans.³⁰

Guinean reaction to this disenchantment, besides the expulsion of Solod, included expulsion of 60 French Communist teachers, closing of the communist bookstore in Conakry, joining the International Monetary Fund and inviting the US Peace Corps to Guinea against Soviet wishes, voting against the Soviet Bloc at the UN, and keeping the new Soviet Ambassador waiting six weeks to present his credentials.³¹

During the hiatus with the Soviets, West Germany instituted a \$US 2.5 million military aid program with Guinea. This program consisted of equipping and training three engineering companies, building military roads, and improving the nation's communication infrastructure.³²

To reestablish better Guinean-Soviet relations Moscow sent First Deputy Premier Mikoyan to Guinea in January 1962. During his visit Toure again emphasized Guinea's willingness to accept aid from any country. Two months after Mikoyan's visit Pravda announced a new Soviet loan for Guinea, believed to be in excess of \$US 10 million, to be used to cover the costs of Soviet personnel and equipment sent to Guinea to build hangars, fuel storage tanks, and aircraft servicing facilities at Conakry airport; warehouses in five cities; and a rail line between Conakry and the inland city of Mamou.³³

E. THE CONTINUING ASSOCIATION--1962-1969

The renewed aid did not gain all of the influence that the Soviets desired. In October 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, Moscow requested landing rights at Conakry for reinforcement airlifts enroute to Cuba. Toure, pleading neutrality, politely but firmly resisted the Soviet entreaties.³⁴

During the remainder of the 1960s Soviet and Soviet Bloc aid, consisting primarily of training assistance, remained at a low level and Guinea maintained a 2000 man army and a 3300 man paramilitary force throughout the remainder of the decade (see Figure One).³⁵ However the Guinean economy stagnated and the Soviet and Soviet Bloc barter deals which appeared so tempting, locked Guinean trade into a straight-jacket, depriving the government of needed foreign exchange while enabling the Communist bloc to sell Guinea's produce on the world market for hard currency. Soviet barter merchandise shipped to Guinea was inferior and overpriced.³⁶

In late 1967 Portuguese intelligence reports were made public which suggested that in September of that year Guinea and the Soviet Union had signed a secret agreement which, in exchange for an unspecified amount of arms, supposedly delivered in mid-November, gave the Soviets the right to establish a submarine base and radio installations in Guinea.³⁷ Subsequent information and data have shown the report to be erroneous on both counts. At this time there were, however,

Figure 1
Guinean Armed Forces Major Equipment Inventory

GUINEA	1966*	1968	1970-1971	1972-1973	1974-1975	1977-1978	1978-1979	1979-1980
Total Armed Forces	2000	2000	5400	6100	5500	5850	8850	8650
Army Manpower	2000	2000	5000	5000	5000	5000	8000	8000
Navy Manpower	Being Formed	Being Formed	200	300	200	350	350	350
Air Force Manpower	Unknown	Unknown	200	800	300	500	500	300
Paramilitary Force	3300	3300	7500	7700	8000	8000	8000	8000
Army Organization	Infantry units 3 Engineer companies	Infantry units 3 Engineer companies	5 Infantry 3 Engineer Battalions 1 Artillery Battalion	5 Infantry Battalions 3 Engineer Companies	4 Infantry 1 Armoured 1 Engineer Battalions	4 Infantry 1 Armoured 1 Engineer Battalions	4 Infantry 1 Armoured 1 Engineer Battalion	4 Infantry 1 Armoured 1 Commando 1 Engineer Battalion
Major Army Equipment	Composition Unknown	Included Tanks ¹ APCs Light Ar-tillery	12 T-34 tnk BTR152 APCs 105/122mm Artillery	12 T-34 tnk 8 BTR152 APCs 85/105mm Artillery	20 T-34 tnk 20 BTR152 APCs 40 85/105/122mm Ar-tillery	30 T-34/54 tns 10 PT-76 tns 40 BTR152/40 APCs 76/85/105/122mm Artillery Antitank & AA weapons	30 T-34/54 tns 10 PT-76 tns 40 BTR152/40 APCs 76/85/105/122mm Artillery Antitank & AA weapons	30 T-34/54 tns 10 PT-76 tns 40 BTR152/40 APCs 76/85/105/122mm Artillery Antitank & AA weapons
Major Navy Equipment	None	None	7 Patrol Boats (ex-Soviet)	6 Patrol Boats	2 PT Boats 4 Motor Torpedo Boats 4 MGB ²	2 PT Boats 4 Shanghai PT Boats (ex-PRC)	6 Shanghai PT Boats 6 PT Boats (ex-Sov)	6 Shanghai PT Boats 7 PT Boats (ex-Sov)
Major Air Force Equipment	Unknown	Unknown	8 MIG-17 6 ex-Sov transport aircraft	10 MIG-17 4 ex-Sov trans a/c Ex-Sov trainer a/c	8 MIG-17 10 ex-Sov trans a/c Ex-Sov trainer a/c	10 MIG-17 3 MIG-21 10 trans a/c 12 trnr a/c	5 MIG-17 10 trans a/c 12 trnr a/c	10 MIG-17 3 MIG-21 10 trans a/c 12 trnr a/c

*All data taken from The Military Balance except 1966 and 1968 which was taken from The Reference Handbook of the Armed Forces of the World by R.C. Sellers.

1 Armoured Pers Carrier
2 Motor Gun Boat

two hundred Guineans reported to be studying in various Soviet military academies.³⁸

The Soviet Navy made its first appearance in Guinea, when a task group of Soviet warships paid a highly publicized visit to Conakry in February 1969. This was the first visit by Soviet warships to a West African nation south of Morocco.

F. THE INCREASING ASSOCIATION--1970-1979

The size of Guinea's Army increased dramatically following the November 1970 invasion of Conakry by Portuguese and anti-Toure forces. As can be seen in Figure One, the army was enlarged and reorganized. Although reports of specific deliveries of military aid are incomplete, analysis of Guinean weapons inventories would indicate that the Soviets and/or their allies provided Guinea with additional tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery. In addition to this aid to the Army, a two hundred man Navy was formed and supplied with six ex-Soviet patrol boats, and a two hundred man Air Force was formed and supplied with eight MIG-17 fighters, two IL-18, and four IL-14 transport aircraft.³⁹ The paramilitary forces were also increased to include a five thousand man "Chinese trained" People's Militia.⁴⁰

The early 1970s saw a reorganization of the armed forces structure brought about not only by the unsuccessful Portuguese invasion, but also by a 1969 "military plot" against Toure. The reorganization was characterized by a shift from

training the army for a role of strictly military nature to a role which was overshadowed by the Army's civic action. This effort included a campaign to eliminate widespread illiteracy in the army ranks.⁴¹

Radio Conakry in a 23 February 1970 report stated that the Guinean Army had inherited a colonial structure, and this encouraged colonialist attempts to reconquer Guinea using lackeys among the lesser officers. "The reorganization of the armed forces was planned for their rational usage in the consolidation of political independence and the acceleration of the struggle for economic liberation in the country."⁴² The new organization would consist of "militants in uniform." Finally, the armed forces would no longer be concentrated in the urban centers but would be distributed throughout Guinea. The Marxist/Leninist influence in this reorganization was evident, and the redeployment of forces stemmed from Toure's desire to keep the military as fragmented as possible in order to prevent challenges to his power. In late 1970, in a move designed to further increase the military indoctrination of the non-military Guinean population, militia instruction was made compulsory at all educational institutions, in order to make the struggle against "imperialist threats" more effective. The Soviet Bloc was happy to lend their support to these efforts because this portrayed them as the champion of the nationalist movements in opposition to imperialism.

These efforts fed Toure's grandiose schemes and in April 1971 he announced a plan to provide 300,000 to 500,000 Guinean men and women with military training, after which "arms depots" would be put at the disposal of the people for use in case of foreign aggression. A component of this scheme was to form a 1000 to 2000 member militia in each of the country's 210 administrative districts.⁴³ The fact that at no time has the paramilitary force strength exceeded 8,000 members would indicate the failure of this grandiose scheme.

Initial reports of Soviet warships regularly using Conakry as a base of operations for the West African coast came in late 1971. According to US observers this presence was meant to show Soviet support for Toure, and increase Soviet influence in West African affairs. In addition, Soviet support of Guinea provided them with landing rights in Conakry for their long range reconnaissance aircraft, used to reconnoiter the South Atlantic.

Some reports indicate that Cuban military advisers arrived in Guinea as early as 1972.⁴⁴ Conakry was also used as an assembly location for Russian advisers and Cuban troops enroute to Angola during the 1975 crisis in that country.

Despite this heavy Soviet/Soviet Bloc influence in Guinea during the mid-1970s, Toure began to seek to normalize relations with a number of Western nations and with several of Guinea's neighbors with whom Guinea had had strained relations.

Relations were reestablished with West Germany in May 1975, established with Japan in January 1976, and reestablished with France in February 1976. The reason these diplomatic moves were taken was to establish economic ties with some of the Western countries who had the potential to invest in Guinea on non-barter terms of trade.⁴⁵

The Soviet Union and Cuba still retained considerable influence in the military. In early 1977 three hundred Cubans were reported to be serving as a "palace guard for Toure," as well as advisers to the Army.⁴⁶ Late 1978 reports suggest that in addition to some "400 Cuban advisers" there were also approximately one thousand Soviet military advisers in Guinea.⁴⁷ Yet Soviet influence was not exclusive in the military area because the People's Republic of China again delivered two Shanghai class gunboats to Guinea in 1977.⁴⁸

The years 1977-1978 saw a three thousand man increase in the Guinean Army's strength. Additionally, the Army received new T-54 medium and PT-76 light tanks and doubled their inventory of armoured personnel carriers.⁴⁹ The Air Force also was reported to have received two MIG-21 aircraft.⁵⁰

There are a number of possible causes for this increase in strength and support. In addition to reestablishing/establishing relations with the developed countries during the mid-1970s, Guinea had also mended her fences with a number of her neighbors. In 1977 Guinea sent a peace keeping force

to Liberia to help restore order there following "rice riots." A peace keeping force was also sent to Senegal in mid-1978, again to calm civil unrest. These threats to the Liberian and Senegalese governments may well have caused Toure some concern because he may have felt no more secure than the leaders in Liberia and Senegal--therefore strengthening his army for protection. A corollary reason may have to do with Toure's desire to present Guinea as a military power (albeit relative) prior to embarking on a renewed Pan-Africanist crusade. Finally, Toure may just have been setting himself up with a large Army preparatory to an anticipated cooling of Soviet-Guinean relations, and a reemphasis of Guinea's nonaligned independence.

The Soviets on their part may have been driven by the desire to ensure the continued use of Guinean air facilities to support their resupply efforts in Angola and Ethiopia, and to "sweeten the pot" before asking for authorization to build a naval base in Guinea. If these were their motivations, neither bore fruit.

In May 1978 Sekou Toure cancelled the right of Soviet military aircraft to use Conakry airport as a base for Atlantic surveillance flights.⁵¹ Toure did, however, continue to permit Soviet warships to use Conakry as a port of call. Two plausible reasons have been suggested for this shift in Guinean attitudes toward the Soviet Union. The first reason

was the blunt refusal of the Russians to renegotiate their contract for the purchase of bauxite which permitted them to acquire this valuable resource at prices well below the world market price. A second reason was that Toure felt himself under pressure from the Soviets to allow them to construct naval facilities on the Guinean island of Tamara, but did not want to permit the construction of the facilities.⁵²

In mid-1978 it was reported that in 1977 Toure refused to permit Russian advisers and Cuban troops to assemble in Guinea enroute to Ethiopia. The Soviets responded to the prohibition by cutting off crude oil exports to Guinea and temporarily recalling her Ambassador in Guinea. The US filled the crude oil gap.⁵³

Militarily Guinea is still dependent on the Soviet Union and her allies for support.

G. THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP

Between 1955 and 1978 a total of 1290 military personnel from Guinea were trained in communist countries.⁵⁴ A total of 330 communist military technicians were also reported to be in Guinea in 1978.⁵⁵ Therefore Guinea finds itself supplied, trained, and advised by communist countries. To shift support at this time is economically infeasible. A possible shift in dependence may result from Guinea's new ties with France, who is capable of supplying Guinea with military aid. Any possible transition will be slow, taking perhaps a decade

unless there is a severe Communist-Guinea break in relations, which appears unlikely at this time.

Although landing rights for reconnaissance flights have been cancelled, to be able to use the port facilities in Conakry still provides an important strategic capability to the Soviets. They further have an economic stake in Guinea which must not be jeopardized. The Soviet Union is not expected to sever relations with Guinea and will continue to train Guinean military personnel. In fact People's Republic of Guinea decree number 17 of 9 January 1979 reported the names of twenty Guinean Air Force personnel who were being sent to the Soviet Union for three years to receive pilot and maintenance training in the MIG-21 and MIG-17 aircraft.

In her foreign relations Guinea will continue to pursue her non-aligned, Pan-African policies. In a Paris Radio interview conducted in November 1978, Toure stressed that Guinea was experiencing no interference from the Soviet Union, emphasizing that the trust shown other countries by Guinea is based on that country's attitude toward Guinea. "Africa must opt for non-alignment, preserve its personality, cooperate on an equal footing with the continents which may wish to work with it."⁵⁶

H. SOVIET MILITARY AID TO SOMALIA--THE BEGINNINGS

Somalia, unlike Guinea, was relatively well prepared for independence on 1 July 1960. The new government was, however,

faced with a paucity of natural resources in the nation, large deficits in the public budget, an unresolved boundary dispute with Ethiopia, and irredentist designs on Ethiopia, Djibouti, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. In the economic sphere bananas, livestock on the hoof, and hides and skins were the Republic's major exports. Although some mineral wealth did exist, the quality of the deposits was poor, the skilled manpower base low (if not nonexistent), and the required infrastructure was inadequate. Further, about eighty percent of the population was nomadic and therefore outside the cash sector of the economy making the nation's tax base extremely low. The nation's literacy rate was below five percent. To say that the new Republic of Somalia was in need of immediate economic, social, and cultural aid would be an understatement.

Somalia, however, further felt that it needed military aid in order to build its five thousand man army into a fighting force which would be capable of countering the US supplied Ethiopian Army. In early 1961 there were a number of anti-American demonstrations in Somalia protesting US military aid to Ethiopia.

In early June 1961 Somali Prime Minister Shermarke made a ten day visit to Moscow. At the conclusion of his visit he signed an aid agreement with the Soviets, in which the Soviets "promised to build without compensation two hospitals,

a high school, a printing plant, and a radio station. It also will send without compensation groups of Soviet physicians and teachers and to train Somali doctors in Soviet schools."⁵⁷ This initial assistance was similar to that given to Guinea.

In addition to this aid, in 1961 and 1962 Somalia received varying amounts of aid from Italy, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, the European Common Market, West Germany, the US and the United Arab Republic (UAR). The US also provided equipment to the Somali Police Force, while the UAR provided substantial arms to the Somali Army.⁵⁸

Somalia was not happy with the amount of military aid they were receiving to support their five thousand man army. Somalia wanted aid to support a ten thousand man army. Prime Minister Shermarke, during his initial visit to the US in November 1962, asked President Kennedy for increased military aid--weapons to match the four US equipped divisions in Ethiopia, and to arm an internal security force. A primary factor in this request was the Somali government's need to keep irredentism alive as a unifying force within the nation, and keep its promise to reunite "Greater Somalia," by force if necessary.

Initial anti-Western sentiments were exacerbated in March 1963 when Somalia broke diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom over the failure of the British to recognize the desire of the population of Kenya's Northern Frontier District

to secede and join Somalia. The fact that this break cost Somalia an annual loss of \$US 3.64 million in aid from Britain only made matters worse.⁵⁹

The US finally responded to Shermarke's earlier request for military aid in August 1963, while the Somalis and Soviets were negotiating a military aid agreement in Moscow.⁶⁰ The US offered to immediately ship "certain defensive weapons," however, the US specified that this aid was not meant to "offset the annual American contribution of \$US 10 million in arms to Ethiopia as rent for a communication base in Asmara."⁶¹ The US aid package was reported to have been designed to supply between five and six thousand men, and provide engineering equipment which could be used for internal development.

On 15 November 1963, a Somali UN spokesman announced that his country had accepted military aid from the Soviet Union rather than the US because Somalia's "longstanding request for US military assistance was not met." The spokesman emphasized that this acceptance did not mean that Somalia was "going communist" or that she was preparing to fight her neighbors, and expressed a hope of receiving economic and military aid from the US in the future.

The Soviet Union was able to seal this agreement for a number of reasons. First, she was prompt in agreeing to the deal which was set up between August and November 1963.

Second, she provided the Somalis with more than they needed. The deal was reported to be worth \$US 32 million, with the objective of raising a ten thousand man army.⁶² Finally, the Soviets could view the aid as supporting a national liberation movement, since that is how the Somalis characterized the Somali/Ethiopian war in the Ogaden. Even Ethiopian Emperor Selassie charged that Soviet military aid would permit the Somalis to release small arms to the guerillas fighting on the Ethiopian frontier.⁶³

Somalia defended its choice of suppliers by arguing that the Western offer was not only too late, but was inadequate quantitatively and qualitatively, and was further unacceptable because of the political conditions accompanying it (that Somalia could acquire military aid from no other source). The Soviet proposal was on the other hand "unconditional." Although refusing to provide the specifics of the Soviet package, Shermarke complained that the Western powers had tried, since Somalia won her independence, to persuade Somalia to concentrate on economic development and hold military spending to the minimum required for internal police protection.⁶⁴

As early as February 1964 fear was being expressed by Somalia's neighbors about the possibility of the establishment of a Soviet military base in Somalia. Somali President Osman denied that the military aid agreement with the Soviet

Union provided for the construction of a Soviet base. The Somali Republic, he said, "will not allow anyone to build a base on its territory."⁶⁵ A year later in an interview over Radio Mogadishu, Somali Defense Minister Adan stated that "[those Russian instructors] who serve under us...train our Army in the use of the arms we receive from the Soviet Union. They follow our orders and do nothing on their own."⁶⁶ Yet despite these assurances, the Soviets with this initial military aid package laid the groundwork for what was to become a significant Soviet presence in Somalia a decade later. Some 500 Somalian military officers went to Russia for training and the Soviet Union sent an estimated two hundred to one thousand military experts to Somalia to help train and reorganize the armed forces. They also commenced work on improving the port facilities in Berbera to permit the handling of ships with displacements of up to ten thousand tons.⁶⁷

Somalia, at this time, was not totally dependent on the Russians for military aid. Some Somali officers were still sent to Italy for training and Italy, along with West Germany and the US, provided assistance for the training of the police and a commando battalion.⁶⁸

Reports of early Soviet arms deliveries to Somalia are sketchy. An early 1966 report by "an authoritative source" asserts that deliveries up to that time had included sixty-five tanks, sixty-five armoured personnel carriers, antiaircraft

and field artillery weapons, a squadron of MIG-15s, and a "considerable quantity" of infantry weapons. Additionally two hundred fifty officers and non-commissioned officers, along with about six hundred Somali cadets were in the Soviet Union for training.⁶⁹ Somalia finally showed off some of her "new" Soviet equipment during the Sixth Anniversary Independence Day Parade when thirty-three T-34 tanks, twenty-five armoured personnel carriers, antiaircraft guns, mortars, rangefinders, and mobile radar units passed in review as seventeen MIG aircraft flew overhead.⁷⁰

A number of other factors which came to light during the mid-1960s showed growing Soviet influence in Somalia. In mid-1965 the Russians turned a new 50KW radio station in Mogadishu over to the Somalis. Cultural agreements were signed providing numerous scholarships for Somalis to study in Soviet/Soviet Bloc schools. The Soviet Union gave the Somalis oil to the value of \$US 7 million--"enough for a whole year." (When the Soviets were expelled from Somalia in late 1977, as in Guinea previously, they stopped providing oil to Somalia. Saudia Arabia entered the breech to supply Somali with the required oil.) Finally, in mid-1966 Radio Mogadishu reported that twenty thousand students were training at military camps following a government order that all Somali students over the age of eighteen must undergo military training.

The Soviets made use of proxies to a lesser degree in Somalia than in Guinea. Somali military personnel were reported to be receiving training in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, and the Egyptians were reported to be providing the Somalis with weapons, including two ex-Soviet Skory class destroyers.⁷¹

The end of the decade found Somalia with a military manpower strength of slightly less than ten thousand. The goal that the military reach the twenty thousand man level had lost much of its urgency because of a relaxation of the militant irredentist sentiment that had characterized newly independent Somalia. This policy of detente was contributory to the October 1969 coup d'etat, which saw the military gain power. This assumption of power opened a new chapter in Soviet-Somali relations.

I. THE STRENGTHENING ASSOCIATION--1969-1976

Politically, the new Somali government with its centralized Supreme Revolutionary Council and its socialist rhetoric, was even more appealing to the Soviet Union than was the previous government. As a result of this new rhetoric, much of the Western world looked at Somalia skeptically; however, the Soviet Union embraced the new government.

One of the clearest indications of the Soviet commitment to the new government was its increased supply of military aid. The size of the Somali Army almost doubled in the first two years following the revolution. The amount of major

Soviet military equipment reported to be in the Somali inventory showed a dramatic rise (See Figure 2).

There was also an apparent shift in emphasis as the Soviets became more desirous of utilizing bases in Somalia to support their growing presence in the Indian Ocean. In early 1972 Soviet Defense Minister Grechko paid a four day visit to Somalia, and expressed Soviet satisfaction "with respect to the relations of friendship and broad cooperation between the Armed Forces of the two countries and to an agreement on practical measures for their further consolidation."⁷²

This visit was followed shortly thereafter by a shift in emphasis on the role of the military in Somalia which was obviously Soviet inspired and resembled the "militant in uniform" philosophy of Guinea. In a message to the National Army on the twelfth anniversary of its founding Somali President Barre described the Army as the "vanguard of the socialist revolution in Somalia." He continued that he was convinced that the "National Army will play a key role in the construction of the country..." Finally, he called on the Army to redouble its efforts in the contribution they were making in the social, economic, and political spheres and in defense against Somalia's enemies--reaction and imperialism.⁷³

Relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union improved still further with the July 1974 visit to Somalia by Chairman of the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Podgorny.

Figure 2

Somalian Armed Forces Major Equipment Inventory

SOMALIA	1966*	1968	1970-1971	1972-1973	1974-1975	1977-1978	1978-1979**	1979-1980
Total Armed Forces	6000	9430	12000	13500	23050	31500	51500	46500
Army	5000	8000	10000	11200	20000	30000	50000	45000
Navy	None	180	250	300	300	500	500	500
Air Force	1000	1250	1750	2000	2750	1000	1000	1000
Paramilitary Force	4800	4800	500	500	3500	4000	21500	21500
Army Organization	Infantry & Armoured cavalry units	Infantry & Armoured cavalry units	7 Mechanized 3 Infantry 1 Mobile Scout Battalions	9 Mechanized Infantry 4 Tank 1 Commando Battalions	9 Mechanized 6 Tank 2 Commando 5 Fld Artill. 5 AA Battalions	8 Mech Infantry 7 Tank 2 Commando 14 Motor Infan. 13 Fld Artill & 10 AA Battal.	Same as 1977-1978 plus 16 Infantry Battalions	7 Div HQ 2 Tank Brigade 20 Infan Briga 1 Commando Brg 13 Fld Artill & 10 AA Battal.
Major Army Equipment	Tanks Artillery Armoured cars	Tanks Artillery Armoured cars	150 T-34 Tanks 60 BTR-152 APC 100mm Artillery	150 T-34 Tanks 250 BTR-152 & 60 BTR-40 APC 100 mm Artillery	150 T-34 Tanks 70 T-54 Tanks 250 BTR-152 & 60 BTR-40 APC 100 76/100mm Artillery 122mm Howitzer Various AA weapons	200 T-34 Tanks 100 T-54 Tanks 250 BTR-152 & 100 BTR-40 APC 100 76/85mm Artillery 80 122mm Howit. SA-2/3 SAM Various other artillery	50 T-34 Tanks 30 T-54 Tanks 100 BTR-152 & 50 BTR-40 APC 100 76/85mm & 80 122/130mm Artillery SA-2/3 SAM Various other artillery	50 T-34 Tanks 30 T-54 Tanks 100 BTR-152 & 50 BTR-40 APC 100 76/85mm & 80 122/130mm Artillery SA-2/3 SAM Various other artillery
Major Navy Equipment	None	4 Patrol Boats	6 Patrol Boats	6 Patrol Boats	2 SOI coastal escorts 6 Patrol & 4 Motor Torp. Boats	3 OSA Missile Boats w/Styx 6 Patrol Boats 4 Motor Torp. Boats	3 OSA w/Styx 6 Patrol & 4 Motor Torp Boat 4 Patrol Boats w/Torpedoes	3 OSA w/Styx 7 Patrol & 4 Mr Torp Bt. 4 Patrol Boats w/Torpedoes
Major Air Force Equipment	Some MIG-15 2 F-51D	12 MIG-15/17 4 F-51D	18 MIG-15/17	2 MIG-15 19 MIG-17 4 ex-Sov trans a/c	4 IL-28 2 MIG-15 19 MIG-17 6 MIG-19 5 ex-Sov trans	3 IL-28 40 MIG-17 12 MIG-21 6 Transport a/c	3 IL-28 15 MIG-17 7 MIG-21 6 Transport a/c	3 IL-28 15 MIG-17 7 MIG-21 6 Transport a/c

* All data taken from The Military Balance except 1966 and 1968 which was taken from The Reference Handbook of the Armed Forces of the World by R.C. Sellers.

**Drop in Army and Air Force inventories due to Ogaden War losses.

This visit culminated in the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries.

From the Somali perspective, they saw the Treaty as providing them with more military equipment. In fact as can be seen in Figure 2 this took not only the form of quantitative improvements, but also qualitative improvements. Podgorny's visit was followed by the disclosure that among other military equipment the Soviets would supply the Somali Air Force with seven MIG-21 aircraft.⁷⁴ The Somalis needed this new equipment because relations with Ethiopia were deteriorating.

From the Soviet perspective Somalia and base rights in the country had taken on a new strategic significance following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and Arab oil embargo. They also saw it as something of a "quid pro quo" to the US development of base facilities at Diego Garcia. The Soviets were, however, only cementing a "fait accompli" because although post treaty signing reports suggested that the Soviets had provided the Somali military with additional equipment in return for bunkering and resupply facilities in Berbera, the fact was that the Soviets already had a base facility in Berbera--a section of the port completely controlled by the Soviets. Additionally there were an estimated 2500 Soviet military advisers in Somalia at this time.⁷⁵

Additional Soviet interest in Somalia was exhibited by Commander in Chief of the Soviet Fleet Gorshkov's December

1974 visit to Somalia to discuss questions concerning "increased Soviet-Somali cooperation."

Considerable controversy arose in late 1974 and 1975 over US accusations (accompanied by intelligence photos) of Soviet bases in Somalia. Somali President Barre flatly denied US accusations that bases had been granted to the Russians, stating "Somali ports are open to all nations for peaceful purposes."⁷⁶ Somali Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ghalib also denied the presence of the bases, stating that Somalia objected to the presence of foreign controlled bases in their country because it compromised a part of Somalia's sovereignty; it meant accepting the domination of neocolonialism; and foreign bases were detrimental to international peace and security.⁷⁷ He further accused the West of using the base issue to attempt to justify the US-British presence in Diego Garcia and the French presence in Djibouti, and to provide justification for establishing a Western base on Masira Island of Oman.⁷⁸ Soviet denials were not as vehement but did describe US accusations as "wild speculation."

To reinforce their denials, the Somalis invited the US to inspect the Berbera facilities to see for themselves that there were no "bases." Several reasons for this invitation are plausible. First, the Somalis may not have considered the Russian installations to be "bases" in the strict military sense. Second, Somalia was experiencing a severe drought

and Barre may have hoped that this openness would secure badly needed US aid to help with resettling and feeding the 265,000 refugees from the drought. Third, the Somalis may not have known the extent of Soviet facilities in Berbera. Fourth, Barre himself may have been misinformed of the extent of the facilities by pro-Soviet officers in the military. Finally, Barre may have wanted to show his independence from the Soviets, proving to the world that Somalia was not becoming a Soviet outpost. In an interview Barre stated "There is no Soviet military equipment in my country under Russian control. Berbera is our port..." He continued "I deny that Russian planes ever landed here during naval exercises. Berbera does not have an airfield big enough to take planes that size. I am not sure how many [Russian advisers] are here, but certainly under a thousand. There are more Chinese here building roads than Russians."⁷⁹

What the US House and Senate delegations found when they visited Berbera only confirmed previous US intelligence reports. The facilities in Berbera included a fuel storage capacity of 140 thousand barrels, three 1000 foot bunkers for missile storage, a missile arming center, a 13000 foot runway, and two Soviet-manned radio stations designed for long-range multi-directional communications.⁸⁰ The complex was protected by surface to air missiles.

J. THE WEAKENING COMMITMENT--1976-1977

Soviet and Somali relations remained cordial through 1975 and 1976 with the Soviets providing Somalia with continued military aid including MIG-21 aircraft, SA-2/3 surface to air missile systems, T-54 medium tanks and OSA missile boats, and a supply of at least thirty Styx (SS-N-2) missiles.⁸¹ The Soviets in early 1976 were reported to be building a missile base in Kismayu, about sixty miles from the Kenya border. Reports indicated that the Soviets intended to transfer the base to the Somali Government upon its completion.⁸² However, the overthrow of Emperor Selassie in Ethiopia and the breakdown in relations between Ethiopia and the US presented the Soviets with another target of opportunity in Sub-Saharan Africa. The problem, however, was how to gain influence in Ethiopia without alienating Somalia.

The Soviets serious courtship of the new Ethiopian government commenced in 1976. The courtship was made difficult, beginning in January 1977, when the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) began a drive into Ethiopia through the Ogaden, assisted unofficially by regular army officers on leave (most probably Soviet trained) and using Soviet made and provided equipment.

In an attempt to keep a foot in both the Somalian camp and the Ethiopian camp, the Soviets had Fidel Castro visit Somalia, Ethiopia, and South Yemen in an effort to forge a

trilateral alliance and thereby hopefully diffuse and stop the WSLF drive into the Ogaden, and to further form a "radical alliance" at the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

Castro's unsuccessful 16 March 1977, visit to Somalia was followed by an effort by moderate Arab League states to woo the Somalis and South Yemenis out of the Soviet camp through the good offices of Sudanese President Numeiri who met with the leaders of North Yemen, South Yemen, and Somalia on March 23. It was reported that Saudi Arabia had also offered Somalia \$US 300 million in military and other aid if they broke with the Soviet Union.⁸³

The Castro failure did not discourage the Soviets from attempting one additional diplomatic effort to resolve their dilemma in the Horn, with a two day (2-3 April 1977) visit to Somalia by Podgorny. When these diplomatic efforts failed the Soviets began an attempt to stymie Somali efforts in the Ogaden by slowing resupply of required military equipment to Somalia. Yet despite the apparent strain in Soviet-Somali relations, Somali President Barre, when asked about the possibility of breaking with the Soviets, claimed in a late June 1977 interview that "we are not thinking in terms of divorce and remarriage." Stating that four thousand Russian advisers were in Somalia to advise the army down to the company level, Barre said that "I can assure you there will be no conflict between Somalia and the Soviets. They never interfere in the exercise of our sovereignty, and by the

same token we cannot influence Soviet policy."⁸⁴ Shortly thereafter Barre openly committed regular Somali troops to the Ogaden War. By August 1977 the Soviets had closed the Somali military aid pipeline.⁸⁵ The Soviets continued to increase their military aid to Ethiopia, preparatory to a massive supply of aid commencing in November 1977.

Somali unhappiness with the Soviet tilt toward Ethiopia was expressed on a number of occasions by Siad Barre. In a nationwide radio broadcast on October 21 he said that "the continuation of the present all-out armed support of the Ethiopian regime by the USSR and the influx of Cuban troops" put the relations between these countries and Somalia "in great jeopardy."⁸⁶ At a November 2 press conference in Mogadishu, Barre stated "The Somali Democratic Republic has never been anybody's stooge. I hereby declare that Somalia pursues a non-aligned foreign policy."⁸⁷

On October 19, the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia announced that his country had "officially and formally" ended supplying arms to Somalia. He followed this, four days later, with a pledge of total Soviet support for Ethiopia.⁸⁸

Somalia reacted on 13 November 1977, to this shift in Soviet support by abrogating the Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation; ordering all Soviet military and civilian advisers stationed in Somalia to leave the country within one week; ordering the Soviets to immediately withdraw

from all military facilities granted them by the Somali government, and calling for the Soviets to reduce their embassy staff to eight persons. In addition to these sanctions against the Soviet Union, the Somali government ordered the expulsion of all Cuban advisors within forty-eight hours, followed by the severing of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

K. ANATOMY OF THE SPLIT

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had been opposed to Somali aggression in the Ogaden as this aggression violated the OAU policy of the inviolability of the "colonial borders" of African nations. Therefore, faced with a general lack of support among African nations for her expansion, following her split with the Soviets Somalia began seeking support from her Arab League associates, and a number of Western nations.

Her Arab League partners were able to provide only limited military aid, and the two members who were willing to provide the most aid, Saudi Arabia and Iran, were prevented from doing so by the US restriction on the retransfer of US military equipment to third parties.

Although the US was reported in June 1977 to have been prepared to "reduce Somali dependence on the Soviet Union" by providing her with defensive military equipment, the entry of the Somali Army into the Ogaden War resulted in the US making her aid dependent on the Somali's withdrawal

from the Ogaden. Attempts to procure arms from Great Britain met with a negative response; a position which would not change, British spokesmen stated, as long as Somalia maintained its irredentist claim to the Northern Frontier District of Kenya.

Why did Somalia expel the Russians? First, the Soviets upon whom they were militarily dependent, had stopped resupply, and therefore Somalia was forced to decide that the time had come to diversify its sources of military aid. They anticipated that the West and Arab League would be most willing to jump in and fill the vacuum left by the Soviet departure. This has not been the case.⁸⁹

Second, prior to the split Somalia was becoming closely associated with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet bases placed her nonaligned status in jeopardy. The Soviet expulsion provided Somalia a means of reestablishing her nonaligned credentials.

Third, the Somalis were unhappy with Soviet attempts to meddle in Somali internal affairs. Following the Soviet/Cuban expulsion, Somali government officials, in various forums, accused the Soviet Union of "imperialism" and "opportunism." The decision to expel the Soviets was made, it was claimed, in order to safeguard the sovereignty, unity and existence of the Somali people. President Barre stated at a news conference that Somalia "could not have its policy dictated

to it," and added that "independence and liberty were preferable to any amount of material aid." The Cubans were also accused of being tools of the "neocolonialists."⁹⁰

Whatever the anticipated payoff, Somalia did not receive the support she anticipated prior to her break with the Soviets, and as a result lost the war in the Ogaden after massive Soviet and Cuban aid and assistance was provided to the Ethiopians.

What determined the Soviet willingness to shift camps? First, it was apparent to the Soviets from the Castro and Podgorny failures that Russia in the near term was not going to be able to create the desired alliance, and the major stumbling block to the plan was Somali intransigence.

Second, ignoring Somali accusations that they were turning their backs on support of a war of national liberation, the Soviets by their support of Ethiopia could, by extension, be viewed by the leaders of OAU countries as being supportive of the OAU's "status quo" position with regard to international boundaries in Africa.

In his book War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, Tom Farer suggests three salient costs to the Soviet Union that their break with Somalia would entail: the loss of access to air and naval facilities in Somalia; loss of credibility as an ally; and involvement in a military quagmire threatening great cost and little hope of success.⁹¹

The Soviets considered that the facilities in Somalia for bunkering and maintenance of their naval forces were not essential, at least in a time of low tension, since these facilities were available to some degree in Aden, Iraq, Mauritius, and Mozambique. The loss of the air base and communication facilities was, however, more critical. Based on Soviet resupply efforts in Ethiopia it would appear that significant aircraft handling capability exists at least in Addis Ababa, and communication facilities could be constructed in Ethiopia if desired. Furthermore, the Soviet loss is not necessarily irreversible. To date no Western power or coalition of powers has stepped in to fill the vacuum left by the Soviet expulsion.

The Soviets are not burning their bridges behind them as shown by the message of congratulations received by Barre from Brezhnev on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Somali revolution. In the message Brezhnev sent his "cordial congratulations" and wished the Somali people "prosperity and progress."⁹² Furthermore, after the break with the Soviets Barre reaffirmed the fact that Somalia is and will remain a socialist state.⁹³

Considerations of credibility should not have weighed heavily on the Soviets. After all, the Somalis had initiated the conflict, and once the Somalis had violated the inviolate colonial boundaries accepted by the OAU, the Soviets could

invoke its respect for regional and international norms to justify its shift. Furthermore, after what appeared to be good-faith efforts to conciliate the dispute, the Soviets could invoke the parochial norm of fraternal assistance among Marxist states to shed a positive light on the alliance shift.

The quagmire question was more serious but not alarming. Since the Soviets controlled the military effectiveness of the Somalis by refusing to provide them with military spares, they were capable of slowing the Somali offensive by "doing nothing." Furthermore, while the Somalis were, even under the best of circumstances, hard-pressed to strike at the Ethiopian heartland, the Ethiopians could ignore the wastes of the Ogaden and press on to critical Somali targets. Therefore, given sufficient assistance the Ethiopians would be able to gain the upper hand in the conflict and bring it to an end.⁹⁴

In retrospect the Soviet Union was able to make a major shift in alliances with minimum negative repercussions.

L. CONCLUSIONS

What of the hypotheses? The Guinean and Somalian case studies show that although Soviet economic aid to these countries might have resulted in a limited amount of influence, military aid provided the Soviets with significantly more leverage with which to achieve their policy objectives.

Second, in both cases Western failure to be forthcoming with military aid provided the Soviets with golden opportunities

to become the arms supplier. In the case of Guinea, despite her desire for Western aid, the West ignored her. In the case of Somalia, the West was given the first opportunity to provide military aid, but because of self-imposed restrictions, lost the Somalis to the Soviets.

The case studies do not conclusively prove the third hypothesis. Although Soviet-Guinean and Soviet-Somalian relations have deteriorated during the last few years, the linkage between African demands for qualitative and quantitative improvements, the Soviets failure to meet these demands, and the deterioration of relations cannot be proved. In the case of Guinea, after some initial problems, the Soviets have provided the Guinean military with the amount of equipment that their poorly educated military can absorb. Since the Guineans perceive no significant exterior threat to their security they have been satisfied with the modest improvements in military aid. In the case of Somalia, up until 1977 when the Soviets realized that they would have to choose either Ethiopia or Somalia, her military aid had most probably been quantitatively greater than the Somalis could absorb. However, because much of the equipment was permitted to fall into disrepair, the Somalis most probably absorbed as much as they were capable of operating. The fact that the Soviets provided the Somalis with so much equipment was determined in great part by their desire to maintain the strategically

located bases in Somalia. Other than the combat aircraft most of the military aid provided Somalia was of post-World War II vintage and therefore should have been qualitatively simple enough for the Somalis to absorb. The fact that so many foreign military advisers were required in Somalia, however, would tend to refute the assumption.

With regard to that portion of the hypothesis which attributes the deterioration of relations to Soviet attempts to exercise greater control over the deployment and use of the military aid provided, the case studies did not prove this conclusively. In Guinea, although this may have been a secondary determinant in the decision to cancel Soviet landing rights, the request for permission to construct naval facilities cannot be used as sufficient evidence to prove the hypothesis. The primary determinants of the cooling in Soviet-Guinean relations were economic (dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid and repayment agreements) and political (desire to reassert national sovereignty and nonalignment). The Somali case supports the hypothesis to the extent that the Soviets attempted to control the deployment and use of Soviet supplied military aid by cutting off logistics support in 1977. In the final analysis, however, the primary determinants of the break in Soviet-Somali relations were political (the shift of Soviet political and military support to Ethiopia and the desire to reassert national sovereignty and nonalignment).

The cases studied do not provide a definitive analytical framework to use when studying the relationship between military aid and the continuation of relations between the Soviet Union and a Sub-Saharan Africa nation.

FOOTNOTES

¹Michael Mihalka, "Supplier-Client Patterns in Arms Transfers: The Developing Countries 1967-76", in Arms Transfers in the Modern World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), p. 63.

²For the purpose of this paper "military aid" is defined to include the supply of military hardware (guns, armoured personnel carriers, tanks, aircraft, motor torpedo boats, etc), provision of military training for Africans in the Soviet Union or other Soviet Bloc nation, and the provision of assistance by Soviet or other Soviet Bloc military personnel or technicians within the recipient African nation.

³Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, Arms for the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 3.

⁴New York Times, April 22, 1959, p. 4. Other transfers of military aid by Czechoslovakia for the Soviet Union included the 1956 transfers to Syria and Yemen. The 1958 arms deal with Afghanistan was the first time that the Soviet Union was a party to an arms transfer agreement with a LDC. Joshua and Gibert, Arms for the Third World, p. 99.

⁵Czechoslovakia manufactures high quality small arms and produces aircraft, tanks and armoured personnel carriers under license from the Soviet Union.

⁶The Western military assistance offer in addition to being significantly smaller than that offered by the Soviet Union, also contained a stipulation that would prevent Somalia from acquiring arms from any other source.

⁷Joshua and Gibert, Arms for the Third World, p. 152.

⁸David E. Albright, "Soviet Policy", Problems of Communism 27 (January-February 1978):24-25.

⁹Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 26. Between 1954 and 1964 Sub-Saharan Africa received \$US 477 million in Soviet aid, whereas between 1965 and 1974 Sub-Saharan Africa received only \$US 194 million in Soviet aid.

¹¹Edward J. Laurance, "Soviet Arms Transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa: Patterns, Purposes and Effects", paper presented at a Naval Postgraduate School conference on Communist States and Africa, Monterey, California, July 1979.

¹²William D. Patterson, "The Ugly American in Dark Africa", Saturday Review 46 (June 22, 1963):49; Africa Research Bulletin 15 (May 1978):4869; Colin Legum, ed. African Contemporary Record 1978-1979 (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1980), p. B645; New York Times, December 24, 1978.

¹³Amelia C. Leiss, et al., Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 86-92.

¹⁴Time, December 7, 1970, p. 46.

¹⁵The Military Balance 1973-1974 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 43.

¹⁶Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978, Publication ER 79-10412U, September 1979, p. 4.

¹⁷Joshua and Gibert, Arms for the Third World, pp. 102-103. Lewis A. Frank, The Arms Trade in International Relations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), pp. 168-169.

¹⁸The following economic analysis of Soviet military aid is taken from Uri Ra'anani, "Soviet Arms Transfers and the Problem of Political Leverage", in Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries, ed., Uri Ra'anani, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Geoffrey Kemp (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1978), pp. 133-135.

¹⁹In 1958 there were some 22,000 Guineans serving in the French Army. Of these 10,000 elected to remain in the French Army, the remaining 12,000 were demobilized and sent back to Guinea.

²⁰Lapido Adamolekun, Sekou Toure's Guinea, (London: Methuen and Company, Ltd, 1976), pp. 44-45.

²¹New York Times, January 7, 1959, p. 13.

²²New York Times, April 4, 1959, p. 1.

²³Patterson, "The Ugly American in Dark Africa", p. 18.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ New York Times, March 28, 1959, p. 5.

²⁶ The New York Times, April 4, 1959 edition reported that the general had obviously been sent to Guinea to "impress the Guineans". By extension it can be assumed that he was also meant to impress all Sub-Sahara African states with the importance the Soviet Bloc gave to their area of the world.

²⁷ New York Times, March 28, 1959, p. 5; New York Times, April 4, 1959, pp. 1 and 4; Newsweek, April 6, 1959, pp. 58-60; New York Times, April 22, 1959, p. 4; Time, May 4, 1959, p. 23.

²⁸ New York Times, April 4, 1959, p. 4; New York Times, April 16, 1959, p. 10. The official US State Department response to why the US had not responded to a Guinean request for "one or two thousand rifles" was that the request had been informally passed through Liberia--and Washington does not like dealing through a third party. The unofficial response was that not wanting to offend France and President de Gaulle, the US offended Guinea. One US Government official also suggested that the Czech arms transfers to Guinea had been set up before the referendum, in which Guinea voted to break with France, was held. This, however, is highly unlikely.

²⁹ New York Times, September 9, 1960, p. 5.

³⁰ New York Times, October 12, 1962, p. 5.

³¹ Ibid.; New York Times, May 24, 1962, p. 5.

³² Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, African Problems and Prospects, Publication DA PAM 550-17-I, December 1977, p. 143.

³³ New York Times, March 5, 1962, p. 2.

³⁴ Patterson, "The Ugly American in Dark Africa", p. 19.

³⁵ Laurence L. Ewing and Robert C. Sellers, The Reference Handbook of the Armed Forces of the World (Washington, D.C.: Robert C. Sellers and Associates, 1966) and Robert C. Sellers, ed. The Reference Handbook of the Armed Forces of the World (Garden City, New York: Robert C. Sellers and Associates, 1968).

- ³⁶Patterson, "The Ugly American in Dark Africa", p. 20.
- ³⁷New York Times, December 8, 1967, p. 1.
- ³⁸Ibid.
- ³⁹The Military Balance 1970-1971 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), pp. 48-49.
- ⁴⁰Ibid.; Time, December 7, 1970, p. 46.
- ⁴¹Harold D. Nelson et al., Area Handbook for Guinea (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 334.
- ⁴²Africa Research Bulletin 7 (1970):1678.
- ⁴³Africa Research Bulletin 8 (April 1971):2083.
- ⁴⁴Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 1977, p. 3.
- ⁴⁵Guinea's investment code establishes 49% Guinean ownership of joint foreign/Guinean ventures, and provides Guinea with 65% of the taxable profits.
- ⁴⁶Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 1977, p. 3.
- ⁴⁷New York Times, December 24, 1978.
- ⁴⁸Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1977 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977).
- ⁴⁹The Military Balance 1977-1978 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 49.
- ⁵⁰Ibid.
- ⁵¹Colin Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record 1978-1979 (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1980), p. B647.; Africa Research Bulletin 15 (May 1978):4869.
- ⁵²Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record 1978-1979, p. B 647. On June 20, 1978 the Republic of Cape Verde Embassy in Lisbon issued a statement denying that Soviet personnel were in their country conducting a study to ascertain the possibility of building a naval base in Cape Verde. The statement also denied that their Sal International Airport was being used by Soviet aircraft transporting Cuban troops and Soviet material to Angola.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴CIA, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978, p. 5. 870 were trained in the USSR, 60 in Eastern Europe and 360 in the PRC.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 4. 100 from the USSR and Eastern Europe, 30 from the PRC and 200 from Cuba.

⁵⁶Foreign Broadcast Information Service--Sub-Saharan Africa (FBIS-SSA) 8 (December 1, 1978):D3

⁵⁷New York Times, June 18, 1961, p. 34.

⁵⁸Alphonso A. Castagno, "The Somali Republic in Transition", Africa Report 7 (December 1962):8.

⁵⁹New York Times, April 7, 1963, p. 11.

⁶⁰New York Times, August 18, 1963, p. 18.; New York Times, December 11, 1963, p. 9.

⁶¹New York Times, August 18, 1963, p. 18.

⁶²Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Publication DA PAM 550-17-1, p. 171.

⁶³New York Times, November 15, 1963, p. 2.

⁶⁴New York Times, December 1, 1963, p. 25.; New York Times, December 17, 1963, p. 11.

⁶⁵Africa Research Bulletin 1 (March 1964):45.

⁶⁶Africa Research Bulletin 2 (April 1965):266.

⁶⁷Al Castagno, "Somalia Goes Military", Africa Report 15 (February 1970):26.

⁶⁸Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Publication DA PAM 550-17-1, p. 171.; Africa Research Bulletin 1 (October 1-31, 1964):176.

⁶⁹New York Times, March 13, 1966, p. 20.

⁷⁰New York Times, July 3, 1966, p. 27.

⁷¹Headquarters, U.S. Department of the Army, Publication DA PAM 550-17-1, p. 171.; Africa Research Bulletin 4 (January 1967):704.

- ⁷²Africa Research Bulletin 9 (February 1972):2393.
- ⁷³Africa Research Bulletin 9 (April 1972):2450.
- ⁷⁴Africa Research Bulletin 11 (July 1974):3315.
- ⁷⁵Ibid., p. 3316.; USSR and Third World 4 (June 10-July 28, 1974):328.
- ⁷⁶Africa Research Bulletin 11 (September 1974):3356.
- ⁷⁷FBIS-SSA 8 (June 11, 1975): B2.
- ⁷⁸Ibid., p. B3.
- ⁷⁹U.S. News and World Report 79 (July 21, 1975):32.
- ⁸⁰Ibid.; Time, 106 (July 21, 1975):29-30.
- ⁸¹SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook 1975 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975), p. 237.; SIPRI World Armaments and Disarmament Yearbook 1976 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976), p. 273.
- ⁸²FBIS-SSA 8 (February 17, 1976):B1.
- ⁸³Washington Post, March 24, 1977, p. A21.
- ⁸⁴Newsweek 89 (June 27, 1977):45-46.
- ⁸⁵Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, 2nd ed. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), p. 125.
- ⁸⁶Keesings Contemporary Archives 24 (January 6, 1978):28760.
- ⁸⁷Ibid.
- ⁸⁸Legum, ed., African Contemporary Record 1977-1978 (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Ltd, 1979), p. B381.; Africa Research Bulletin 14 (October 1977):4592.
- ⁸⁹New York Times, November 14, 1977, p. 4. Reported that some military aid had come from the conservative Arab states and France (rifles and machine guns) but it was insufficient to carry out a protracted conflict.
- ⁹⁰FBIS-SSA 8 (December 7, 1977):B3; (December 13, 1977):B3; (November 25, 1977):B6.

⁹¹Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, p. 132.

⁹²FBIS-SSA 8 (November 1, 1978):B6.

⁹³FBIS-SSA 8 (December 7, 1977):B4.

⁹⁴Some of the preceding analysis can be found in Tom J. Farer's War Clouds on the Horn of Africa.

V. PATTERNS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO GUINEA AND SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

Since World War II the disbursing of economic and technical aid to less developed countries (LDCs) has been a major theme of United States (US) foreign policy. This policy was initiated immediately following the war to assist in the rebuilding of a devastated Europe. In early 1947 economic aid was used for the first time as a political tool to stave off the spread of communism, when President Harry Truman requested that Congress authorize economic aid donations for Greece and Turkey which were portrayed as being threatened by Communism.

The postwar period found the Soviet Union preoccupied with reconstruction and the developing cold war. As a result of this the Soviet Union failed to work out positive economic policies toward the developing nations. It vigorously supported indigenous Communist parties, to the exclusion of emerging nationalist regimes. An example of Moscow's negative attitude toward non-Communist regimes in the LDCs following the war can be seen in its refusal to contribute to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program when it was established in 1948. One of the earliest indications of a change in Soviet attitudes toward the Third World was

the unexpected July 1953 Soviet announcement that the Soviet Union was prepared to contribute to the United Nations Technical Assistance Program.

As will be discussed later in this chapter, the mid-1950s saw the evolution and expansion of economic aid as a central focus of East-West competition in the Third World. An example of this focus can be seen in Soviet economic aid to Egypt. Between 1956 and 1958 the US government withdrew and refused to reinstate the economic assistance desired by Egypt to construct the Aswan High Dam; in response the Soviet Union stepped in to offer Soviet economic assistance to allow its construction. An additional development that will be discussed will show how the Soviet Union, during the past decade, has modified its philosophy of economic and technical aid resulting in a drastic reduction in the quantity of non-military economic and technical aid it has provided LDCs, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Two related hypotheses will be evaluated in this chapter using the Soviet experience in Guinea and Somalia. First, African nations will become solely reliant on the Soviet Union only in the event of Western unwillingness/failure to provide the recipient desired economic aid.

Second, the Soviet Union is unable and unwilling to provide sufficient economic aid and assistance to ensure the agricultural and industrial development of African nations.

What is aid? Technical and economic cooperation is a more descriptive term than aid; however, technical and economic cooperation occurs between developed countries and need not incorporate aid. Aid only occurs when the economic cooperation contains a "gift" element. This "gift" element can be an outright grant of assistance with no repayment required, or it can be the charging of a lower rate of interest on a credit than the marginal rate of return on its other possible investments. Therefore for the purpose of this chapter aid is defined as a grant or a credit provided to a LDC. Aid can include the financing of industrial/agricultural projects, provision of food supplies, and the provision of technical expertise.

B. SOVIET AID--AN OVERVIEW

With the death of Stalin and the Soviet Union's abandonment of its hostile policy toward non-communist nationalist-led nations, came a new era in the Soviet use of aid as a foreign policy tool. This new policy was attuned to the aspirations of the LDCs and entailed both rendering diplomatic support against the West and catering to the desires of the LDCs for economic independence by granting them economic and technical aid for development.

It was apparent that political objectives were the dominant goals in this new drive. This was made possible by the fact that the Soviets were well on their way to complete postwar

recovery. This effort by the Soviets was viewed soberly by the West who perceived this shift from Russia's hitherto prevailing autarky to participation in the international economy as "yet another Soviet effort at subversion designed to steer the new nations in the direction of economic, political and diplomatic radicalism, an effort that was to be capped eventually by Soviet dominance of the new nations' domestic and foreign policies."¹

This change in policy was heralded by the first Soviet contribution to the UN Technical Assistance Program in 1953, and the 1954 signing of a credit and trade agreement with Afghanistan. By 1955 the Soviets could boast of only two economic cooperation agreements (Afghanistan and India). The first such agreement signed with an African country was concluded with Egypt in January 1958. By 1960 the African ranks had swelled to four nations, and by 1966 they had increased to sixteen. In 1971 the Soviets had technical and economic aid agreements with forty developing nations--twenty of them with African nations.

Under Krushchev the Soviet aid program appeared opportunistic, with aid provided wherever it appeared to have the most chance for gaining Soviet influence. This aid often involved grandiose schemes, such as stadiums and powerful radio stations, which provided the recipient with a measure of prestige, but committed the LDC to a debt which did not

contribute materially to the true economic development of the new nation. Since Khrushchev's fall from power Soviet aid relations have lost their opportunistic character and seem to be somewhat less politically motivated. They have become better integrated and economically more justifiable, however, not necessarily more successful.

A most significant feature of Soviet aid is that it is normally 100 percent tied in the strictest sense of the word.

Normally, the economic and technical assistance agreement does not, in the final analysis, bind the Soviet Union to provide anything, and funds promised will only be made available in their entirety if the recipient can put forward a sufficient number of acceptable projects and an adequate amount of finance to cover local costs of construction, although the Soviet Union may supply additional assistance to help with these. Since both these limitations are time consuming, the amount of aid committed by the Soviet Union is normally in excess of the amount actually disbursed.²

This is clearly shown by comparing the total value of economic credits and grants extended to LDCs by the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1978 which amounted to \$US 17,088 million, with the total credits and grants from the Soviet Union drawn by the LDCs which total only \$US 7,595 million.³

The Soviet Union provides two forms of credit to the LDCs for the acquisition of capital goods: state credits and commercial credits. State credits which in Africa have been reserved for governments, are normally available for the acquisition of complete factories and related services, and typically are repayable at 2½ percent interest over

twelve years. Commercial credits which have been available for both government and private concerns are generally used for individual sales of machinery and equipment, and usually require a 10 to 20 percent down payment with a 4 percent interest rate repayable over five to eight years.⁴

Soviet credits for particular development projects normally cover three items: machinery and equipment not available in the recipient country, technical assistance needed for the construction of the projected works, and the training of local personnel.

Several new departures in Soviet relations with LDCs in the last decade have demonstrated Soviet efforts to introduce elements of integration and profitability into these associations. These have been characterized by coordinated planning, joint production of raw materials, cooperation in industrial production and manufacturing, and mixed companies.

Coordinated planning ensures the establishment of regularized bilateral channels for planning. If an LDC is not entirely sure what it wants, the Soviet Union can be asked to conduct a feasibility survey, although this has not guaranteed the success of the selected project. For example, the Soviet project report for a meat factory in Somalia estimated a capital return period of approximately two years; it did so by assuming three hundred working days per year and an eight-hour work shift. In fact, the plant lost over \$US 720,000 in its first year of operation because it was operating at

only 5.3 percent of full capacity due to the unavailability of sufficient cattle, coupled with a low demand for the finished product.⁵

Geological prospecting figures prominently in Soviet aid projects and the discovery of valuable mineral deposits usually results in additional aid in the form of joint production for its extraction and commercial exploitation. In return for this aid the Soviets receive as payment a share of the output. A recent example of this type of aid involved the construction of a bauxite mining enterprise near Kindia, Guinea, for which the Soviets will be repaid with two million tons of bauxite annually for thirty years (1970 to 2000).⁶

Cooperation in industrial production and manufacturing has proceeded at a much slower pace. The Soviets use this type of aid to acquire products specifically geared to their domestic needs, and repayment for such assistance is normally made by the LDC in the form of the finished products of the factories set up with Soviet aid.

Soviet economists have been urging the formation of mixed companies (Soviet/LDC) as a more advantageous form of utilizing credits, arguing that this would not only earn profits for the Soviet Union, but would also assure a steady supply of needed raw materials and industrial goods. The economists however face stiff opposition from the political leadership who assert that the Soviet Union (unlike the West) supplies

"disinterested" aid and "does not seek to hold any assets on the territory of other countries or to derive profit at their expense..."⁷

In 1963 the first signs of a reappraisal of aid policies appeared, and instead of granting new credits for new projects, the Russians began to insist on completing projects already started. By 1965 several factors made it mandatory for the Soviets to start demanding that aid recipients take measures to put their "houses in order."

October 1964 saw Khrushchev's ouster. A factor contributing to the ouster was his largess in continuing to grant credits to LDCs despite the growing economic difficulties of recipient regimes upon whom he had lavished aid, and their inability to repay these debts.

Second, a number of radical regimes, which had received significant Soviet aid, were overthrown. In each case the new regime cited overambitious government schemes and chaotic economic conditions as contributing factors leading to the coup.

Finally, about this time (mid-1960s) repayments fell due on the first series of credits provided by the Soviets. Despite the Soviet claims that their aid, particularly the large industrial projects, would prove more effective than Western aid in generating income, a number of LDCs sought to reschedule debt repayment because predicted income had not met expectations.

As a result of these considerations economic advice offered by the Soviets to LDCs became less doctrinaire, and more pragmatic. It concentrated not so much on the requirement for a large public sector, but more on performance. It should not, however, be assumed that the Soviets have abandoned their belief in public ownership as the proper organizational form, rather it appears that they are seeking ways to make public ownership function more efficiently in the LDCs.

Throughout the past decade Soviet economic and technical aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has significantly diminished as Moscow has shifted its attention to concentrate on states in an arc around the Soviet Union's southern border. Since 1954, Moscow has extended economic credits and grants to over 29 Sub-Saharan African nations.⁸ This has diminished to the point that in both 1977 and 1978 the Soviet Union extended economic credits and grants to only 6 Sub-Saharan African nations.⁹

A further shift in Soviet policy can be seen in the increasing role of Eastern European nations in providing economic aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1954 and 1978, over 17 Sub-Saharan African nations received Eastern European economic grants and credits.¹⁰ In 1977, significant economic credits and grants totalling \$US 100 million were extended by Eastern European nations to 5 nations.¹¹ In 1978, Eastern Europe extended a total of \$US 165 million in significant

economic credits and grants to 8 Sub-Saharan African nations.¹² Although Eastern European aid has played an important role in Guinea, Eastern European aid to Somalia has been negligible.

At the present time Sub-Saharan Africa is no longer a major focus of Soviet economic and technical aid.¹³

C. SOVIET AID TO GUINEA

Because Guinea was ignored by the West at independence, the Soviet Union was presented a golden opportunity to establish close economic ties and attempt to gain influence in the newly independent nation. As previously discussed Moscow permitted her East European allies to establish initial economic contacts with Guinea. The Soviet Union and Guinea did however sign their first agreement on economic and technical cooperation on 24 August 1959.¹⁴ In a 1964 interview Guinean Ambassador to the USSR M. Camara recalled the aid given to Guinea by the USSR during "the difficult time during independence" calling it "tangible examples in Guinea of Soviet friendship." He continued to recount the specifics of the aid which had consisted of the construction of a radio station, an international airport, a polytechnic institute, a refrigeration depot, the Hotel Camayenne, a 25,000 seat stadium, and "other works either built or under construction."¹⁵

Since Guinea was the first Sub-Saharan African nation to receive Soviet aid, a number of initial problems were experienced. The Russians (and their East European allies)

wanted to make a quick impact but lacked local experience. The Guinean administration, weakened by the mass departure of the French, was ill-equipped to deal with such highly bureaucratized partners. As a result of this inadequate organization and planning, cement arrived in Conakry just before the rains and because of a lack of covered storage and adequate transportation hardened on the quays, matches became damp and would not light, and sugar arrived which was so effectively damp-proofed that it would not dissolve.¹⁶ Other stories are told of thousands of dollars' worth of electrical equipment and nearly a hundred light tractors deteriorating dockside in Conakry, along with a large shipment of bathroom equipment--sinks, toilet bowls, and bidets--for a country with little indoor plumbing.¹⁷

The mid-1960s saw the Soviet aid to Guinea shift away from the "frivolous aid of the late 1950s" to more significant aid. This new aid took the form of credits and grants for industrial and infrastructure projects, from which the Soviet Union could gain some tangible return in the way of manufactured goods from Guinea. However, even this aid was not without its problems.

A 7 May 1965 newspaper report in Horoya gives an account of the opening of a new factory complex built with Soviet financial and technical aid in Mamou, Guinea. Included in the complex were a slaughterhouse and a meat cannery and

processing plant. An orange juice cannery was planned for construction at a later date. The complex was built at Mamou because it had been chosen by the government as the "food processing center of Central Guinea." A subsequent Horoya report published in November 1970 recounts the economic problems of the Mamou "tomato" cannery, which possessed an annual production capacity of 5 million tins, but was only producing 3.5 million tins. This shortfall was accounted for because of a lack of raw material (tomatoes grown in the Mamou area). The reason for the shortfall was explained in monetary terms. The local peasant had little incentive to sell his tomatoes to the cannery. Although the peasants received 25 Guinean Francs per kilo from the cannery for his tomatoes, the cost of a can of tomatoes processed by the cannery was 400 Guinean Francs. Consequently, the peasants kept the tomatoes they wanted for their own consumption and sold the rest to others.¹⁸

Nor did all Soviet aid plans come to fruition. Upon their return from a mid-1965 trip to the Soviet Union, a Guinean government delegation reported that among other assistance the Soviets had agreed to provide Guinea with a small boatyard at Conakry for the construction of fishing boats.¹⁹ In April 1967, however, it was reported that the West German government had signed an agreement to construct a boatyard "to permit the local building of fishing boats."²⁰

Guinea, upon being accepted by the world community, diversified its sources of economic and technical assistance quickly and effectively. Besides joining the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the early 1960s, Guinea also became a member of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in August 1964. In addition to receiving aid from international organizations, Guinea has at one time or another received economic and technical aid from private or government sources in the United States, West Germany, Peoples Republic of China, Great Britain, Australia, Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, Spain, Switzerland, Japan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, and since 1977 from France. In addition Guinea has received assistance from a number of international organizations and banks, including the IMF and IBRD, the World Bank, US Import-Export Bank, Societe Financiere Europeene, International Development Association, World Food Program, Afro-Arab Bank, Saudi Arabian Development Fund, European Economic Community, Islamic Development Bank, and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa.²¹

Guinea has also diversified its economic associations in mineral exploitation and infrastructure construction. The country's main resource bauxite is exploited by companies which are jointly owned by Guinea and private or public concerns in at least five nations. Two mines are operated by

joint Government of Guinea and private US companies, two by Guinea and the Soviet Union, one by a joint Guinean-Nigerian company, and one by a Guinean-Swiss company. Plans are now underway for a joint bauxite venture in association with Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrein.²²

Iron ore deposits are being exploited by joint efforts which include Guinea and Italy, Australia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the US.

An April 1979 African Business article reported the relaunching of Guinea's diamond industry which had laid dormant since the early 1960s when the Soviets had ceased operating the concession. The new mining was to be carried out by a joint Guinean, British, and Swiss company. A smaller less valuable diamond concession was also being mined by an American company.²³

Finally, hydroelectric projects have been financed with assistance from the US, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia, and the Peoples Republic of China.²⁴

Soviet lack of interest in providing additional aid to Guinea is reflected in the amount of economic credits and grants extended to Guinea in 1977 and 1978. In 1977, \$US 1 million in credits and grants were extended to Guinea, while in 1978 the Soviet Union extended no economic credits or grants to Guinea.²⁵ This decline in Soviet interest is being countered by increased interest in Guinean development by France and the Arab oil producing nations.

In view of Sekou Toure's desire to strengthen Guinea's nonaligned image, it seems unlikely that there will be any significant increase in Soviet economic aid to Guinea in the near future. It has become apparent to the Soviets that military aid garners more political influence than do trade agreements whereby the Soviets export machinery, petroleum products, vehicles, cement and textiles to Guinea in exchange for items for use in the Soviet Union, such as bauxite, high quality wood, tropical fruits, and coffee. Economic and technical aid to Guinea has provided the Soviets with little in the way of long term influence or other political or economic gain.

D. SOVIET AID TO SOMALIA

Somalia by any standards is a poor country. By UN estimates it has a per capita income averaging only \$US 80 a year.²⁶ It is a country lacking exploitable mineral resources (although the feasibility of exploiting Somalia's uranium deposits is now being studied), a sedentary population, and an educated nucleus of sufficient size to manage the nation's affairs efficiently. Yet despite this bleak condition, Somalia's strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea has brought a number of suitors to her doorstep bearing offers of economic and technical aid. Somalia's ex-President Shermarke summed up his country's attitudes towards its economic suitors in the aphorism, "if a hungry man is offered food, it is useless

to warn that he risks indigestion. First he will sate himself, then consider how to avoid possible digestive trouble."²⁷

This national attitude was displayed when Somalis unveiled its first Five Year Development Plan (1963-1967) which called for a public sector development expenditure of \$US 196 million financed entirely out of aid. The ambitiousness of the plan may be judged by considering that the nation's ordinary budget, which averaged \$US 23 million during the first two years of independence, could only be balanced by using grants-in-aid, mainly from former colonial power Italy.²⁸

The Soviet Union and Somalia signed their first aid agreement in June 1961.²⁹ Although this agreement called for the construction of a radio station and a printing press, it did not contain the type of grandiose projects undertaken in Guinea.³⁰ Much of the initial Soviet economic aid was earmarked for the construction of agri-manufacturing concerns, a meat processing factory, a milk processing factory, and a fish processing plant. In fact by the end of 1969 over 45 percent of Soviet aid to Somalian projects had been spent on these three processing plants.³¹

This pattern of investing in agri-manufacturing continued through the first decade of the Soviet-Somali association and included a flour mill, a bakery, a leather tannery, and an agricultural project constructed in the Jelib. One project which was to have unexpected strategic significance for the

Soviets was the expansion of Berbera Harbor. This was one of very few infrastructure projects undertaken by the Soviets.

Somalia further tied herself to the Soviet Union when it decided in 1966 to import petroleum and subsidiary products from the Soviet Union.

By 1967, Somalia was experiencing severe economic difficulties. There were a number of reasons for these difficulties, not the least of which was the inability of the Somali government to realistically plan and efficiently execute economic development. In a May 1967 radio broadcast Somali Prime Minister Hussein gave the official Somali account of the causes of the economic difficulties. Among the reasons he cited were the 1963 loss of aid from Great Britain (\$US 3.64 million per year); payment of loan interest to the Soviet Union; payment for goods received from the US and Peoples Republic of China; and incomplete planning for those projects already constructed which had resulted in there being insufficient supplies of meat, fish, and milk to ensure that newly built factories could operate at capacity.

Although there was considerable truth in some of the arguments, some of the others were weak. The Chinese made up the shortfall in British aid in 1964, and West Germany did likewise in 1965, so the loss was not as severe as it could have been.³² In June 1964, Radio Mogadishu reported the signing of a Soviet-Somali protocol which converted an unspecified Soviet loan into a free grant as had been requested

by the Somalis.³³ There was also evidence of government mismanagement of agricultural resources as shown by a 1966 UN survey carried out in the southern section of the nation which revealed that out of 20 million acres of fertile agricultural land only 94 thousand acres were under cultivation.³⁴

During the decade of the 1960s Somalia received aid from a wide cross-section of nations and international organizations. Besides the US, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Italy, Great Britain (until 1963), and the Peoples Republic of China, Somalia received aid from France, the World Bank, the European Fund for Overseas Development, UN Special Fund for Technical Assistance, European Economic Community, and the International Development Association.³⁵

The mismanagement of the aid received was a contributing factor in the October 1969 revolution, and rapid economic development was a cardinal goal of the new Supreme Revolutionary Council.

One of the initial problems faced by the new Somali government was the loss of both US and West German aid in mid-1970. The US stopped aid because Somalia refused to de-register Somali ships observed trading with North Vietnam. West Germany cut off aid because Somalia recognized East Germany. Somali President Barre justified both Somali actions as being in keeping with the nation's nonaligned policy. As a result of this loss of aid the Soviet Union, increasingly

aware of the strategic location of Somalia, became its main supplier of economic aid..

Soviet aid during the early 1970s continued to be aimed at the agri-manufacturing and fishing industries, along with the construction of that infrastructure necessary to support Soviet military requirements in the country. The 1970s also saw the appearance of a new actor on the "aid stage" in the form of North Korea who undertook to aid Somalia with agri-manufacturing projects.

The Somali debt burden to the Soviet Union was eased considerably in July 1974, when the Soviet Union cancelled \$US 100 million debt upon the signing of the Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.³⁶

During the early 1970s Somalia continued to receive aid from Italy, and such international organizations as the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), European Development Fund, and the IBRD. 1974 also saw the Somali entrance into The Arab League, and the commencement of the Saudi Arabian led conservative Arab attempt to woo Somalia away from the Soviet Union through the use of their new oil riches.

The 1974-1975 drought had a devastating effect on the Somali economy, from which it has still not recovered. Additionally, the unsuccessful Ogaden War in 1977 and 1978 further burdened the economy. As a result of the split in relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union in November 1977, Somalia no longer receives any aid from Moscow. This loss was to some

degree absorbed by the European Economic Community and the Peoples Republic of China who agreed to provide aid to permit completion of the uncompleted Soviet projects.³⁷ Additionally, Somalia continues to receive support from her Arab League associates. As noted previously the Somali government envisions an increasing role for foreign private capital in the manufacturing sector. The problems in Somalia, however, remain severe and it is therefore not without justification that Somalia has been called "the graveyard of foreign aid."³⁸

E. CONCLUSION

The Soviet use of economic and technical aid in Guinea and Somalia has not met with great success. Its initial failures can be contributed to inadequate planning while in the 1970s the Soviets obviously made a conscious decision to deemphasize the use of this type aid in Sub-Saharan Africa and utilize military aid to garner political influence.

In countries like Guinea and Somalia not only assistance in establishing industrial and agricultural projects is needed, but also financial aid to keep the projects functioning after they have been established until local expertise and backward and forward linkages in the economy have developed. The Soviets are singularly ill-equipped to give this type of economic aid. It is therefore unlikely that any significant increase in economic and technical aid will be forthcoming from Moscow to Guinea or Somalia.

What then of the hypotheses? The two cases studied reveal that it is unlikely that any African nation will become solely reliant on the Soviet Union for aid, even in the event of Western unwillingness/failure to provide the desired economic aid, not only because the Soviet Union is unable to provide sufficient economic and technical aid, but also because an "aid embargo" by the "entire West" is unlikely to occur. Additionally, there are a number of international organizations, socialist states, and oil producing states capable and desirous of providing economic and technical aid to LDCs.

The case studies further reveal that the Soviets are unable, and since the mid-1970s have been unwilling, to provide sufficient economic aid and assistance to ensure the sustained agricultural and industrial development of African nations.

FOOTNOTES

¹Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "Soviet Economic Relations With The Developing Nations," in The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations, ed. Roger E. Kanet (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 216.

²Christopher Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976), p. 74.

³Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 11.

⁴Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa, p. 75.

⁵Ibid., p. 89.

⁶Valkenier in Kanet, The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations, p. 222.

⁷Ibid., p. 223.

⁸CIA, Communist Aid Activities 1978, p. 7-8.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid. In 1978 there were only 7,640 Soviet and Eastern European economic technicians in Sub-Saharan African nations, in contrast there were 36,165 technicians in North Africa. Further in 1978 the Soviet Union extended \$US 2000 million in economic credits and grants to North Africa (all of them going to Morocco).

¹⁴Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa, p. 70

¹⁵Africa Research Bulletin 1 (1964):157-158.

¹⁶Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa, p. 80.

¹⁷Victor Lasky, The Ugly Russian (New York: Trident Press, 1965), p. 111.

- ¹⁸Africa Research Bulletin 7 (1970):1880-1881.
- ¹⁹Africa Research Bulletin 2 (1965):375.
- ²⁰Africa Research Bulletin 4 (1967):725.
- ²¹Various issues of Africa Research Bulletin.
- ²²Various issues of Africa Research Bulletin.
- ²³Africa Research Bulletin 16 (1979):5109.
- ²⁴Various issues of Africa Research Bulletin.
- ²⁵CIA, Communist Aid Activities 1978, p. 8.
- ²⁶Africa Research Bulletin 16 (1979):5232.
- ²⁷New York Times, December 16, 1962.
- ²⁸Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa, p. 98.
- ²⁹Ibid., p. 73.
- ³⁰There were reports in 1978 that the Peoples Republic of China was building a sports stadium in Mogadishu.
- ³¹Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa, p. 89.
- ³²Africa Research Bulletin 2 (1965):293.
- ³³Africa Research Bulletin 1 (1964):101.
- ³⁴Africa Research Bulletin 3 (1966):468.
- ³⁵Various issues of Africa Research Bulletin.
- ³⁶Africa Research Bulletin 11 (1974):3326.
- ³⁷CIA, Communist Aid Activities 1978, p. 24, and Africa Research Bulletin 15 (1978):4588.
- ³⁸Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa, p. 89.

VI. AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN GUINEA AND SOMALIA

A. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapters a number of hypotheses regarding Soviet relations with the Sub-Saharan African nations of Guinea and Somalia have been reviewed. It has been shown that although Soviet economic and technical aid may have provided limited influence, the Soviets were neither willing nor able to match the development aid available from the West, international assistance organizations, or newly rich oil-producing Third World nations. It has been shown that the provision of military aid to Guinea and Somalia has provided the Soviets with significantly more leverage in these nations with which to achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives. Finally, it has been shown that the West's refusal to provide either military or economic and technical aid has been a primary factor in both Guinea and Somalia's looking away from the West for assistance.

After about two decades of experience in Sub-Saharan Africa, what lessons have United States (US) policy-makers learned regarding broadening and strengthening the association between the US and African nations? Have the lessons of the past resulted in the US pursuing more realistic policies in Africa? If so, what form do these interests take?

In the discussion that follows an attempt will be made to determine what the American national interest is with regard to Guinea and Somalia.

B. THE CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Although much has been written concerning the concept of the national interest, it remains a concept only vaguely defined. The literature exhibits little consensus, and this coupled with its lack of definition makes national interest a concept which is difficult to use precisely in policy making.

In principle, the criterion of national interest should help policy-makers cut through the multiplicity of competing values and interests and improve judgments regarding the proper ends and goals for foreign policy.¹ In practice, however, national interest has become so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is problematic and controversial.²

The concept of the national interest goes back several centuries, and the idea of national interest appears to have played a significant role at times in the determination of policy in the classical system of democracy before the French Revolution. "The essential characteristic of the period was the identification of the nation with the person of the sovereign."³ The national interest was therefore relatively simple to determine, since it was considered to be merely the interest of the ruler.⁴

With the "democratization" of nationalism the relative simplicity of the concept was eroded, as the state came to be viewed as composed of different interests. "The national interest came to reflect a weighing of various diverse interests within the state, held together, somewhat tenuously at times, by the doctrine of nationalism."⁵

With the transition from the laissez-faire to the social service state after 1914, more groups saw their interests affected by foreign policy, as foreign policy expanded into the realm of economics. The concept has been further confused by the erosion during the past several decades of the traditional distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" policy.⁶ As a result national interest to be utilized in the formation of foreign policy must encompass the interface between the foreign and domestic sides of each policy issue in question.⁷ Consequently, the determination of the national interest has become both more complicated and more unpredictable than it was historically.

This dilemma has prompted many modern analysts to conclude that the concept is a generally useless concept, mired in semantic chaos. "Today the student of international relations finds numerous definitions of national interest, most of which are not conducive to precision in the making of foreign policy."⁸

Many students of foreign policy have written about "the national interest", but few have done more than criticize the

attempts of their colleagues to define the concept. Even fewer authors have attempted to precisely define and operationalize the concept. This is unfortunate since the expressed function of the concept "is to specify a means [by] which policymakers can make disciplined choices among interests and therefore among policy alternatives."⁹

Since World War II the problem of defining the concept has been approached in two ways. Some analysts have attempted to define the national interest of a given state by looking at the state's actual policy output, looking for repetitive behavior patterns, and after finding them inducing from them the national interest.¹⁰ For example, John Chase in 1956 suggested four aspects of the American national interest which guided the development of its foreign policy:

(1) to deprive potential aggressors of bases from which they might launch attacks against the United States; (2) to support self-government and democracy abroad; (3) to protect and advance commerce; and (4) to help establish and maintain a favorable world balance of power.¹¹

Other analysts approached the task of defining the concept by basing their analysis on logical reasoning and deduction, framing their conclusions in less tangible and more conceptual terms.¹² Robert Osgood put national survival at the head of the list of national interests "because everything else would clearly depend on the achievement of this goal."¹³ He defined survival in terms of territorial integrity, political independence, and maintenance of fundamental governmental institutions.¹⁴ George and Keohane define national interest

in terms of "irreducible national interests." These interests consist of physical survival (by which they mean survival of the citizens, not necessarily the preservation of territory or sovereignty); liberty (by which they mean the ability of the inhabitants of the country to choose their form of government and to exercise a set of individual rights defined by law and protected by the state); and economic subsistence (by which they mean the maximization of economic welfare).¹⁵

Finally, Hans Morgenthau has defined the national interest as "the survival of a political unit...in its identity as the irreducible minimum of a state's interest vis-a-vis other units, encompassing in this the integrity of a state's territory, its political institutions, and its culture."¹⁶

Despite differences in the various definitions of the national interest, there is a degree of similarity in the various descriptions of the concept. Most of the descriptions refer "to tangible interests--to concrete conditions or advantages, concretely experienced."¹⁷ There are, however, a few interests (culture and liberty) which are intangible--these encompass how a society feels about itself, and how a nation maintains and strengthens its morale.¹⁸

A significant difficulty with the concept of national interest is the challenge of operationalizing the concept. Who determines the national interest? Is the national interest merely the aggregation of specific interests? How does one determine priorities when faced with conflicting interests? These questions have no easy answers.

The best and perhaps the only procedure for determining the national interest may be to accept that definition provided by the nation's highest officials and policy-makers. There are, of course, a number of problems and shortcomings with this procedure. First, efforts are complicated by the intrusion of the policy-maker's ideological values, his image of the opponent, his view of the nature of the conflict with the opponent, and his beliefs about the character of the international system.¹⁹

Second, many of the decisions made concerning the national interest are made in crisis situations which result in the policy-maker being forced to make a decision based on incomplete information, in a limited amount of time, and while being pressured for strong action to "defend American interests."²⁰ As a result what has been called "value extension" whereby "personal interests and political values other than those associated with safeguarding the national interest may intrude into the motivations and incentives of the decision-maker and his advisers."²¹ This can result in the emergence within the policymaking group of an unfocused consensus which emphasizes the "need for action to defend US interests" and seriously impairs rational decisionmaking. As a result the "desirability" of doing something to protect endangered US interests can result in an inadequate discussion of the "feasibility" of doing so. "The typical error under these

circumstances is a gross underestimation of the costs and risks of the action taken."²²

For the purposes of the remainder of this chapter I have chosen to use the concept of the national interest as operationalized by Donald E. Nuechterlein.²³ The heart of his conceptual framework is comprised of four basic national interests which are applicable to all sovereign states (defense of homeland, economic well-being, favorable world order, and promotion of values) and four levels of intensity (the stakes) which all states believe to be invoked in specific international issues. The four levels of intensity are survival, vital, major, and peripheral.²⁴ The conceptual framework is shown in the following matrix.

NATIONAL-INTEREST MATRIX ²⁵				
Basic Interest at Stake	Intensity of Interest			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland
Economic well-being
Favorable world order
Promotion of values

To utilize the matrix, a definition of terms is essential. National interest may be described as "the perceived needs and desires of a sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states which constitute its external environment."²⁶

The basic interests of states suggest four fundamental interests. First, "defense interest" which involves

...the protection of the nation-state and its citizens from the threat of physical violence by another country, and/or

protection from an externally inspired threat to the national political system...it does not include alliances with other states, although it may include strategic bases whose primary function is the protection of the homeland.²⁷

Second, "economic interest" which involves "the enhancement of the nation-state's economic well-being in relations with other states."²⁸

Third, "world-order interest" which requires "the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state can feel secure and in which its citizens and commerce can operate peacefully outside their own borders."²⁹

Finally, "ideological interest" which ensures "the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good."³⁰

In sum, the four national interests outlined are "dynamic factors" conditioning the behavior of nation-states, and changes in priority among them are usually measured in years rather than in months.

Intensities must also be categorized in order to allow the analyst to better determine the differing degrees of interest that a government perceives to be involved in given international events.

Survival issues are those in which

The very existence of the nation-state is in jeopardy, either as a result of overt military attack on its own territory or from the imminent threat of attack should an enemy's demands be rejected. The key to whether an issue is one

of survival, or a vital issue, on this scale of priorities is the degree to which there is an immediate, credible threat of massive physical harm by one state on another. By this definition, there probably are no economic, world-order or ideological interests that qualify...Only if the issue is at the survival level would a government be justified, on any rational ground, in actually using strategic-nuclear weapons against an enemy.³¹

Vital issues are those in which

Serious harm will likely result to the state unless strong measures, including the use of conventional military force, are employed to counter an adverse action by another state or to deter it from undertaking a serious provocation. A vital issue may, in the long run, be as serious a threat... as a survival issue...a vital issue [however] usually provides a government with sufficient time to seek help from allies, bargain with the antagonist or take aggressive countermeasures to warn the enemy...a vital issue may involve not only defense interests but also economic, world-order and, in some cases, ideological interests.³²

Major issues are those in which

The political, economic and ideological well-being of the state may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment which thus require corrective action in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats (vital issues). Most [major] issues...are usually resolved through diplomatic negotiation.³³

Finally, peripheral issues are those in which

The well-being of the state is not adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but the interests of private citizens and companies operating in foreign countries are endangered...Each nation-state makes its own determination on how greatly it values commercial enterprises operating abroad; for some, these companies constitute major issues of national interest; for others, they are only of peripheral importance.³⁴

In light of this framework what has shaped American policy toward Africa during the past decade? What are the American national interests in Guinea and Somalia?

C. UNITED STATES AFRICAN POLICY TO 1968

During the past twenty-five years Africa has been the scene of a continuing struggle between the West and Soviet Union for political influence. Commencing with Egypt in 1955, this struggle has spread southward. In most cases early Soviet successes were more the result of Western foreign policy miscalculations than of a coherently executed Soviet strategy. When the US refused economic and military aid to Egypt, the Soviets stepped in to fill the vacuum. When France cast Guinea adrift the Soviets again stepped in to fill the void. When Somalia found Western sources unwilling to provide her with military assistance because of her claims on the territory of her neighbors, the Soviets became Somalia's primary supplier of arms.

A significant determinant of US policy toward Africa has been the continuing black/white tension vividly seen in southern Africa (South Africa, Namibia and, until recently, Rhodesia). This has given US African policy a southern African focus, and much of US policy is framed in terms of US interests in southern Africa. This focus has, however, been extended to the entire Sub-Saharan Africa region since how the US reacts to the black/white confrontation in southern Africa sets the tenor for how black nations in Africa will react to the United States.

Prior to 1957, US policy toward Africa was characterized by "deferring to the colonial allies" and policy was based

on what they said was appropriate. As the former colonies in Africa began to win their independence, US policy began to take on a more activist character. This change was due, in part, to the new Soviet interest in Africa as reflected in Nikita Khrushchev's 1960 "wars of national liberation" speech, and their growing influence in newly independent Ghana and Guinea. During the Kennedy administration, the US frequently supported anti-colonial resolutions in the United Nations. This was in keeping with Kennedy's desire to project an image of the US as a "friend of all oppressed peoples," in order to allow the New Frontier to be "free of automatic identification with colonialism." This activist approach did not, however, produce any appreciable amount of consensus in American policy toward Africa; American policy thinking was split between those who advocated "deferring to the colonialists" and those who advocated continued dealing with Africa on its own terms.

The Johnson Administration between 1963 and 1968 became so preoccupied with the Vietnam War that Africa, with all of its instability, received little serious attention.

D. THE NIXON--FORD AFRICAN POLICY 1969 to 1976

1. National Security Study Memorandum Number 39

Shortly after assuming the Presidency in 1969 President Nixon directed that a comprehensive review of US policy toward southern Africa be conducted. On 10 April 1969 Henry

Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Adviser, issued National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) tasking the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Director, Central Intelligence Agency to conduct the review. The resultant study suggested five options which the US could follow in relations with southern Africa.

Option One called for a closer association with the white regimes in the area in order to protect and enhance US economic, strategic, and scientific interests.³⁵ This option was based on the premise that US disagreement with the domestic policies of either the white or the black regimes should not inhibit relations with them. Further, since the US was perceived as incapable of having significant effect on the situation, it was suggested that the US continue to pursue economic, strategic, and scientific interests because the political costs of doing so would not be excessive.

Option Two was based on the premise that the whites were in Africa to stay and African blacks would be unable to gain political rights through violence, since constructive change could only come by acquiescence of the whites. It was therefore suggested that the US seek broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in the area.

The premise upon which Option Three was based asserted that the US could not significantly influence the domestic policies of the white states, nor was there any internal indication that change would be forthcoming. Consequently, it was suggested that the US continue "limited association" with the white states while continuing association with black states in an effort to retain some economic, scientific, and strategic interests in the white states while maintaining a posture on the racial issue which was acceptable to the blacks, though opposing violent solutions to problems in the region.

Option Four was founded on the premise that the US could not influence the white states toward constructive change and therefore increasing violence was likely. As a result of this it was suggested that the US cut its ties with white states and seek closer relations with black states in an effort to enhance US standing on the racial issue both in Africa and internationally.

The final option was based on the premise that racial confrontation in southern Africa was not only unmanageable but would grow worse despite any effort the US might make. It was therefore suggested that the US disassociate itself from both black and white states in an effort to limit US involvement in the problems of the area.

On 2 January 1970 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon recommending the adoption of option two.³⁶ The President

followed this recommendation and approved a policy toward Africa whereby the US

...would quietly improve official relations with South Africa, including a partial relaxation of the arms embargo and avoidance of the issue of illegal South African control of Namibia (South West Africa) in a bilateral context; eschew pressuring the Portuguese; modulate American rhetoric on southern Africa at the United Nations; and, to balance these moves, increase [US] aid to black African nations.³⁷

This policy decision was not universally accepted in the State Department who tagged the chosen policy the "Tar Baby Option" because they asserted that the policy would prove sticky because once adopted, the policy would be impossible to abandon if it did not work.

The policy was implemented without fanfare. The White House preferred that the shift in policy not be revealed because it was intended to be a quiet, long-term relaxation, which was to become evident over a period of time. They were further concerned with both domestic and foreign reaction to the decision if it were widely publicized, since this would make it more difficult for the US to continue to express opposition to apartheid and white racism in southern Africa while moving closer diplomatically to the racist regimes.

The shift in policy was exhibited in a number of practical ways. First, the US redefined the rules of embargoes on military equipment to Portugal and South Africa; second, a new agreement was reached with the Portuguese government concerning the continued US use of bases in the Azores; third,

the Export-Import Bank was given authority to loan Portugal up to \$US 400 million; and fourth, there were a series of abstentions and negative votes at the United Nations on measures condemning apartheid and the white regimes of southern Africa.³⁸

President Nixon further highlighted the effects of the new policy in his "State of the World" speech made to Congress on 3 May 1973. After pledging America's continued commitment to the "goals of regional peace, economic development, self-determination, and racial justice in Africa,"³⁹ Nixon enumerated a number of economic indicators which showed increased US activity in Africa. Between 1970 and 1972 US bilateral and multilateral aid to Africa had risen from \$US 450 million to \$US 600 million.⁴⁰ American direct private investment in Africa was reported to have doubled in four years (1969-1973), reaching a total of \$US 4 billion, seventy-five percent of the total going to Africa's developing countries.⁴¹ Two-way trade between the US and Africa grew thirty percent between 1970 and 1973.⁴²

Nixon further reaffirmed that a cardinal principle of US policy was non-interference in African internal affairs. He asserted that the US recognized UN jurisdiction over Namibia, and favored self-determination in the Portuguese colonies. Although condemning South Africa's racial policies, Nixon indicated that the US did not subscribe to the belief that

isolating them from the influence of the rest of the world was an effective way of encouraging them to follow a course of moderation or to accomodate change.⁴³

2. The Angolan Civil War

The April 1974 coup d'etat in Lisbon eliminated one of the main presuppositions from America's African policy-- that the whites were in Africa to stay. The events of the subsequent twenty-four months, which led to a fundamental shift in US policy toward Africa, have been the subject of extensive interpretation and analysis. A brief historical analysis of the Angolan crisis as seen by US government decision-makers will be instructive in this regard.

US policy toward Angola was the subject of some internal Department of State controversy during late 1974. This controversy was evidenced in the removal of Donald Easum from his post as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, following his return from a trip to Africa by Secretary of State Kissinger. The disagreement focused on a speech made by Easum during his stay in Tanzania in which he urged that the US work toward change in southern Africa, rather than supporting the status quo. Upon his return to the US on 25 November 1974 Easum was removed from his post and replaced by Nathaniel Davis.

The Alvor Agreement, concluded in Portugal on 15 January 1975 and signed by the Portuguese Government and the

three Angolan nationalist parties (MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA), established the mechanics for a transitional government in Angola, and established 11 November 1975 as independence day.⁴⁴

The transitional government was installed on 31 January 1975, about the same time as the American 40 Committee approved a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) request for \$US 300 thousand in covert aid to the FNLA faction in Angola.⁴⁵

During the next five months a split developed between the African Bureau of the State Department and the CIA. This was partially due to the substantial increase in Soviet aid provided to the MPLA commencing in March 1975. This aid contributed to an increase in armed conflict between the three Angolan factions which threatened the Alvor Agreement. In response to this the CIA advocated a substantial increase in covert aid to the FNLA, and the initiation of covert support for UNITA.⁴⁶ The NSC Interagency Task Force on Angola, which was chaired by Nathaniel Davis, recommended a diplomatic solution to the problem. This "diplomatic option" would have included provisions that the US urge Portugal to play a stronger, but impartial role in the conflict and encourage Portugal and influential African governments to press the Soviets to reduce their support to the MPLA. The option favored the US working in concert with Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire to reduce the arms flow to Angola.⁴⁷

The Task Force saw three main advantages to the approach. First, it would shift factional competition back toward the political arena, thereby reducing the likelihood that Soviet arms would determine the outcome of the conflict and substantially improving the prospects of the FNLA and UNITA. Second, this option would reduce the danger of "big-power" confrontation on the continent. Third, it was felt that this approach would reflect US recognition that Angola was basically an African problem. As an added bonus the Task Force stressed that this approach would probably gain both congressional and public support in the US.⁴⁸

The Task Force pointed out to the 40 Committee that covert action would probably not only increase the level of violence in the conflict, but that it might seriously damage the chances for workable relations with the successor Angolan regime if the MPLA should come to power. This, the argument continued, was a high price to pay for action that would not serve larger US interests--in fact so far as concrete US interests in Angola were concerned, Gulf Oil Company's \$US 300 million investment in Cabinda appeared to be the principal one.⁴⁹

Despite these persuasive arguments, on 17 July 1975 the 40 Committee approved the CIA request for dispatching \$US 14 million to the FNLA and UNITA.⁵⁰ The choice of this policy option was especially questionable in light of the

fact that the CIA had in a report to the 40 Committee made it clear that even in the best of circumstances, US backed factions could not win the civil war. The CIA reasoned that if the struggle could not be won, the US should make victory for the Soviet backed MPLA as costly for the Soviet Union as possible.⁵¹

US covert aid began to arrive in Angola in late August and early September 1975, about one month before South African troops launched a major offensive into Angola. This was followed by an additional offensive launched from the north by Zairian and FNLA troops. These escalations were met by the first involvement of Cuban advisers on the front lines, and were followed shortly thereafter by the arrival of the first contingent of Cuban troops intended to be used in direct support of the MPLA.⁵²

As Angola approached independence day (11 November 1975) an increasing number of "leaks" were being published in US newspapers concerning US covert involvement in Angola. The congressional reaction to these revelations came first in the form of the "Tunney Amendment" which was passed by the Senate on 19 December 1975, cutting off all covert aid to Angola. This was followed about a month later by a House of Representative's vote to join the Senate in cutting off American covert aid to Angola.⁵³

In the congressional hearings held subsequent to these congressional votes, the Executive branch sought to

justify their policy decisions in a number of ways. In testimony before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William E. Schaufele, Jr. sought to characterize US actions in Angola as "reactive to those of the Soviet Union and Cuba, independent of those of South Africa, and designed to achieve a military situation which would promote a government of national unity composed of all three factions."⁵⁴

In earlier testimony, Secretary of State Kissinger asserted that despite the Alvor Accord, it was the intention of the Soviet Union and the Portuguese Communist Party to install the MPLA in power in Angola through stepped up arms shipments. As a result "on July 9 all-out civil war began when the MPLA attacked the FNLA and UNITA, driving both organizations out of Luanda, thereby ending the short-lived coalition government."⁵⁵

Characterizing the Soviets and Cubans as being guilty of "outside intervention in African affairs," the type of action which the Organization of African Unity condemns, Kissinger justified US covert aid to the FNLA and UNITA forces as being a response to Zairian and Zambian requests for US assistance in preventing the Soviet Union and Cuba "from imposing a solution in Angola, becoming a dominant influence in south-central Africa, and threatening the stability of the area."⁵⁶

Kissinger further denied US complicity in the South African intervention, claiming "South Africa responded by sending in military equipment, and some military personnel, without consultation with the United States."⁵⁷

He claimed that the US chose covert means of support in Angola to keep US visibility to a minimum, as the US wanted the greatest possible opportunity for an African solution.⁵⁸ This effort at minimum visibility he continued, was destroyed by the exposure of domestic debate and congressional action in the US, which removed the leverage of a possible military option, and which in turn made the possibility of achieving a diplomatic solution impossible.⁵⁹

The failure of US policy in Angola brought about a fundamental reevaluation of US policy toward Africa. A new policy was unveiled by Secretary Kissinger in an address delivered in Lusaka, Zambia, on 27 April 1976. Calling Africa a "continent of hope--a modern frontier," Kissinger assured African leaders that he was not attempting to give "American prescriptions for Africa's problems," nor did the US intend to set African against African because "African problems cannot be solved and your destiny cannot be fulfilled except by a united Africa."⁶⁰

Specifying that of "all the challenges before us [US and Africa]...racial justice is the most basic," Kissinger asserted that US support of racial justice in southern Africa was not simply a matter of foreign policy, but was an imperative

of the American moral heritage. Consequently, Kissinger reaffirmed an unequivocal US commitment to human rights as expressed in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Then, in what was a significant shift in America's African policy, Kissinger proclaimed: "We support self-determination, majority rule, equal rights, and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa--in the name of moral principle, international law, and world peace."⁶¹

Kissinger concluded his speech by emphasizing that the US did not seek any "pro-American African bloc confronting a bloc supporting any other power," nor did the US "wish to support one faction of a liberation movement against another." The basic principles of US African policy were the support of "African unity and integrity."⁶²

Kissinger followed up this speech nine days later with a speech at the fourth ministerial meeting of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Nairobi, Kenya. In this second speech he articulated the American view of how the "North" and the "South" could expand cooperation for global economic development.⁶³

By late August 1976, Kissinger felt that the new African policy had improved US relations with Africa. Stating that the "character of our [US] relationship with Africa has been transformed," he lauded the growth of "mutual confidence and respect between America and black Africa." He further articulated the US position toward direct dealings

with liberation movements in southern Africa (non-African nations should not deal directly with such movements), and toward the transfer of military equipment to Africa (although the US was determined to avoid unnecessary African arms races, she was willing to give serious consideration to "modest and responsible requests" from "friendly and moderate nations like Kenya and Zaire" to permit them to protect themselves against belligerent neighbors possessing substantial quantities of modern Soviet weapons...".⁶⁴

E. THE CARTER AFRICAN POLICY--1977 TO 1980

With President Ford's defeat in the 1976 general election, and the inauguration of President Carter in January 1977, American foreign policy in general was the subject of a re-evaluation, with President Carter unveiling the basic priorities of the "Carter Foreign Policy" in a speech given to the UN General Assembly on 17 March 1977. In the speech he called on the member nations to dedicate themselves to a "prolonged and persistent effort" to maintain peace and reduce the arms race; to build a better and more cooperative international economic system; and to work with potential adversaries as well as close friends to advance the cause of human rights.⁶⁵

In regard to Africa, President Carter reaffirmed the US commitment to work to help attain majority rule through peaceful means. He further asserted that the US was "ready to normalize...relationships and to seek reconciliation with all states

which are ready to work...in promoting global progress and global peace."⁶⁶ President Carter also pledged himself to work "to insure sustained American assistance as the process of global economic development continues."⁶⁷

The new emphasis in American foreign policy was on "human rights" which President Carter reminded all UN members that they had pledged to respect by signing the UN charter. "Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business."⁶⁸

In a speech made two months later President Carter intimated a new philosophical framework for conducting American foreign policy. He claimed that the US had freed itself of its inordinate fear of communism which had in the past led the US to embrace any dictator who joined "us" in that fear. He further asserted that US foreign policy must be open and candid.⁶⁹

It was left to Secretary of State Vance to articulate specific US policy toward Africa. In a 1 July 1977 speech, Vance asserted that US policy toward Africa emanated from the basic proposition that Africa had an unique identity--a continent of incredible diversity and enormous potential (human, resource, and energy).⁷⁰

Vance then proceeded to define the general nature of the US approach to Africa. First, American policies must be affirmative policies, not merely reactive to crises or

to other power's actions in Africa. Second, the US objective must be to foster a prosperous and strong Africa that is at peace, which can only be accomplished by helping Africans resolve their own disputes. Third, African nationalism should be encouraged. Fourth, US policies must be supportive of political, economic, and social human rights throughout Africa. Fifth, US ties with Africa include not only political ties, but cultural and economic ties as well. Finally, the US must seek openness in dealing with African nations, attempting to broaden dialogue even when we may not agree.⁷¹

Specifically, the US made "human development" the key to Africa's future, yet did not lose sight of the fact that Africa was in need of infrastructure. To help alleviate these problems Vance pledged US assistance. Although arms transfers would be discouraged, he reemphasized the former administration's stand that the US would "consider sympathetically appeals for assistance from states which are threatened by a buildup of foreign military equipment and advisers on their borders, in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa."⁷² Arms transfers would be, however, an "exceptional tool of our policy."

Admitting to the fact that the US could not impose solutions on southern Africa, Vance emphasized that the US, as one of "the few governments in the world that can talk to both white and black Africans frankly and yet with a measure

of trust," could and would use its good offices in seeking an African solution to the southern African problems.

Shortly after delivering this speech, Carter's African policy was given its first real test, not in southern Africa, but in the Horn of Africa where Somali-backed guerillas fighting in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia were officially joined by Somali army units.⁷³

There are indications that as early as July 1977 the US, in light of worsening Somali-Soviet relations, had informed Siad Barre that it was ready to join other governments in providing Somalia with an alternative source of military assistance.⁷⁴ This had been preceded by the April 1977 Ethiopian expulsion of the MAAG, the USIS and the remnant of the US personnel in Kagnew. This expulsion was followed by the suspension of a \$US 10 million foreign military sales credit and the halt in delivery of items in the military pipeline to Ethiopia.⁷⁵

After a reconsideration of its policy options in the Horn, the US announced in August 1977 that it would transfer no arms to Somalia as long as Somali troops were fighting in Ethiopia; and furthermore, the US would approve no third-party transfers to the Somalis of US-supplied equipment. Britain, France, and other West European arms producers stood behind the US decision.⁷⁶

The Carter Administration was caught on the horns of a dilemma. A traditional American ally, Ethiopia, was fighting

a war in the Ogaden with US equipment, supported beginning in late 1977 by Soviet equipment and Cuban troops. The Somali government was fighting the war with Soviet equipment in violation of the OAU's stand on the sanctity of Africa's colonial boundaries. Therefore US support of the Somalis, who had expelled both Soviet and Cuban advisers in November 1977, would be a contradiction of US policy supporting African solutions to African problems, and would surely anger many OAU members toward the US.

As a result of this dilemma, the US government did nothing to attempt to influence the outcome of the conflict which was eventually resolved, after massive Soviet and Cuban support to Ethiopia forced the Somalis to retreat from the Ogaden in March 1978. Anthony Lake, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, described the US "policy of restraint" as consisting of

a refusal to supply arms to either side; support for peaceful diplomatic initiatives by Africans themselves, including the [OAU]; and a willingness to provide economic and humanitarian assistance to both sides, to relieve human suffering and to convey symbolically our desire for good relations with both.⁷⁷

A readjustment of US foreign policy toward Africa was expressed by Secretary Vance in June 1978 when, in a speech specifying the "essential elements of our approach" toward Africa, he emphasized an "element" that had not been stressed in his July 1977 speech. Although President Carter had previously expressed the end of an "inordinate fear of

communism," Secretary Vance in his June 1978 speech stated

...in private and public, we have emphasized our concern about the nature of Soviet activities in Africa, and we have been in contact with European, Arab, and African countries and members of the nonaligned movement who share our concern. We have pointed out to the Soviets the problems which their activities pose for Africa and for our overall relations.⁷⁸

This then has become the thrust of US policy toward Africa. Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William Harrop summarized the continuing US policy in Africa in early 1980. In a statement before the House Subcommittee on Africa he "stressed" the main aspects of the American Africa policy that had been "carefully" developed and implemented during the previous three years. The main aspects were:

addressing the root causes of political instability, primarily through development assistance; seeking peaceful resolution of conflicts in southern Africa and elsewhere on the continent; responding to the legitimate security concerns of the African nations; and working with multilateral organizations like the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity...in the pursuit of these goals.⁷⁹

In recent months, as a result of the British-led solution to the Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) conflict and the refocusing of US foreign policy attention to the Middle East, Iran, and Afghanistan, Sub-Saharan Africa has resumed a relatively low priority on the Carter Administration's foreign policy agenda. Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe did not result in a "communist takeover" in that country. The Horn is relatively quiet. The US continues to press for a Namibian settlement, and an easing of racial restrictions in South Africa, but

these are viewed as problems that will be solved sometime in the future. In West Africa the US has deferred influence to the French, while quietly working to establish closer relations with a number of African nations.

In light of the southern Africa focus of current US African policy what are the American national interests in Guinea and Somalia?

F. DEFINING THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN GUINEA

American relations with Guinea, which got off to a slow start in 1958 when the US joined France in ignoring Guinea, have improved over the past two decades. This has been due in part to the fact that the US has found Sekou Toure, despite his radical rhetoric, to be a pragmatic leader, willing to compromise to acquire what is needed for his country.

Although Guinea was long considered to be a Soviet client, Toure's refusal to allow Soviet aircraft landing rights en-route to Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978, and his subsequent termination of landing rights in response to Soviet pressure to permit them to build a naval base on Guinean sovereign territory, has moderated the US view significantly.

An additional method by which Toure has garnered Western support and favor is his continued encouragement of foreign private investment in Guinea, with only reasonable restrictions.⁸⁰

In light of the fact that Guinea has done a creditable job of maintaining her nonaligned status, what, if any, American national interest is there in Guinea in 1980?

AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN GUINEA MATRIX

Basic Interest at Stake	Intensity of Interest			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	X	X	X	✓
Economic well-being	X	X	X	✓
Favorable world order	X	X	✓	X
Promotion of values	X	X	X	X
x = no interest		✓ = interest		

The matrix above is a presentation of the American national interest in Guinea presented in Neuchterlein's framework.

1. Defense Interest

Since neither Guinea nor any country that is or has been permitted to use Guinean facilities has posed any serious threat to the American homeland, it is apparent that American "defense interest" in Guinea is no more than peripheral. At the present time there are several American companies operating in Guinea, and a number of personnel working in the nation. As is the case with all US citizens living abroad, the US government is concerned about ensuring their safety and human rights to the greatest degree possible. It is unlikely that the lives of American citizens or the continued operation of American enterprises will be jeopardized in Guinea at anytime in the near future. Even in the unlikely event that US personnel are taken hostage, or US enterprises are nationalized, American reaction to such moves would involve diplomatic attempts to free the hostages and settle the claims of the nationalized enterprises.

2. Economic Interest

The US has no significant economic interest in Guinea. In 1976, out of a total of \$US 271 million in economic assistance provided to Africa, Guinea received only \$US 9 million in economic grants and credits.⁸¹ Preliminary figures for 1978, using a projected \$US 450 million in aid to Africa, reveal that Guinea received only \$US 10 million in grants and credits.⁸²

Trade figures show a similar trend. Although in 1977 Guinea exported \$US 55.55 million worth of goods to the US, Guinea only imported \$US 17.05 million worth of goods from the US.⁸³ In addition, the US is not dependent on Guinea for any single mineral.

Therefore in the unlikely event that Guinea and the US severed economic relations, the impact on the US economy would be minimal.

3. World-Order Interest

The American quest to limit outside intervention in Africa, makes the world-order interest a major US national interest. Stated US foreign policy seeks to let the Africans solve their own problems and encourages African nationalism. From the American perspective, any significant non-Western involvement in Guinea is potentially threatening to the entire West Africa region.

To date the socialist states in West Africa have been more rhetorically radical, than politically radical. As a

result they have not actively exported revolution to the degree that a "true Soviet satellite" might. The American national interest is therefore better served if Guinea remains nonaligned. Such a position will provide a more secure and peaceful environment within which to conduct not only bilateral relations, but multilateral relations as well. The US also has an interest in the economic development of Guinea, because a more economically stable Guinea will also be a more politically stable Guinea, less liable to fall prey to political attack.

4. Ideological Interest

In dealings with the West and East during the past two decades, Sekou Toure has been led by his own brand of nonaligned, socialist, pragmatism. As has been stated previously, the US is coming to the realization that it can deal with radical nationalists as long as their radicalism does not threaten the international political system.

As a result of this, Sekou Toure's "ideology" poses no threat to the US, nor is there any impelling reason for the US to attempt to impose its ideology on Guinea. We can have cordial relations and economic ties despite our ideological differences.

G. DEFINING THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN SOMALIA

Somalia, unlike Guinea, received US recognition upon independence. This support was, however, somewhat restrained

because of Somalia's irredentist claims against the territory of two of her neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, both of whom had good relations with the US. The fact that Somalia had a "working" pluralistic form of government also impressed the US, especially when many of the independent regimes were being overthrown in the mid-1960s.

Although the Soviet Union became Somalia's main supplier of military equipment, she received economic aid from the US and other European countries (Italy, Great Britain, and West Germany).

When Great Britain terminated aid in 1963, West Germany and the Peoples Republic of China filled the gap providing equivalent aid for at least two years. In the early 1970s, following the revolution which replaced the pluralistic system with a centralized government, the US and West Germany also terminated economic aid to Somalia. The West Germans acted because Somalia granted diplomatic recognition to East Germany and the US because Somalia refused to de-register Somali ships trading with North Vietnam.

In 1977 relations between the Soviets and the Somalis cooled and relations with the US improved. Today the US and Somalia enjoy what can be described as cordial relations. In view of these improving relations, what are the American national interests in Somalia in 1980?

AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST IN SOMALIA MATRIX

Basic Interest at Stake	Intensity of Interest			
	Survival	Vital	Major	Peripheral
Defense of homeland	X	X	✓	X
Economic well-being	X	X	X	✓
Favorable world order	X	X	✓	X
Promotion of values	X	X	X	X

x = no interest

✓ = interest

1. Defense Interest

At the present time neither Somalia nor any foreign power operating from facilities in Somalia, is a threat to the US. The US does, however, have more than a peripheral interest in Somalia because of the potential possibility that a nation opposed to the US could gain military facilities in Somalia from which to threaten US and European oil sea lanes of communication.

The US interest is not necessarily one of ensuring that the US or a "friendly" nation has access to Somali facilities. It would also serve US interests to deny their use to the Soviets. Therefore, to the degree that the economic well-being of the US and her allies could be threatened militarily from Somali bases, the US has a major defense interest in the nation.

2. Economic Interest

The US has even less economic interest in Somalia than it has in Guinea. The US extended only \$US 3 million in

economic grants and credits to Somalia in 1976, and even though the figure rose to \$US 14 million in 1978, much of this increase is attributable to an increase in aid for refugee relief.⁸⁴

In the area of trade, US involvement has been inconsequential. In 1977 Somalia exported \$US 1.36 million worth of goods to the US in return for \$US 5.06 million in US goods.⁸⁵

The US has no significant private investment interests in Somalia at the present time, and it is not likely that any private investment will be forthcoming.

3. World-Order Interest

Unlike Guinea, Somalia has been the stage for an East-West confrontation. Although the confrontation did not involve the commitment of US armed forces, the fact that the Soviet Union was again intervening in the internal affairs of Africa with the assistance of Cuban troops, set another dangerous precedent of the Soviets intervening "on request."

Since the confrontation in 1977, the Somali government has been wooing the West to replace the Soviets and Cubans expelled in November 1977. In order to prevent the Somalis from requesting the reentry of the Soviet Union into a "friendship and cooperation" relationship with them, the US must act to fill the economic and technical void left by the Soviet departure. The US does not need to force Somalia into becoming a client state, but should cultivate a positive relationship based on mutual trust and understanding.

Again as with the defense interest, the US interest is not so much one of becoming actively involved in Somali affairs--in fact the US should not become so involved--as in preventing the Soviet Union from regaining influence in Somalia and attempting to form an Ethiopian-Somali-South Yemen alliance.

The primary desire of the US toward Somalia is that Somalia remain nonaligned and at peace so she can concentrate on the economic development she so badly needs.

4. Ideological Interest

In Somalia, as in Guinea, the US has no desire or justification to attempt to project capitalist ideology on Somalia, nor is there any danger that Somalia will attempt to convert the US to "scientific socialism." As long as Siad Barre maintains a non-hostile position toward the US on the international scene, there is no ideological reason why the US cannot continue to provide economic aid to Somalia.

H. CONCLUSION

What policy option has the US chosen to use in 1980? It would appear that the US had chosen the pursuit of "Tempered Idealism" in Africa.

By use of this option, the US has attempted (unsuccessfully until now) to work with the Soviets in an attempt to substantially reduce the flow of arms from all sources into Africa, in order to increase not only African but also international stability.

The US continues to strive to keep both black and white Africans talking in Southern Africa in hopes of resolving the confrontation peacefully, and remains firm in its commitment to the central role of the UN in guiding Namibia to independence.

The US further continues to emphasize the important role that key African leaders within the OAU and in ad hoc groups can play in the resolution of internal African disputes.

Finally, in the economic sphere, the US is encouraging private investment in Africa, and is continually emphasizing to African leaders that increased economic cooperation with the US is in their country's best interest.

Since the mid-1970s US policy-makers have come to accept the fact that in a continent as diverse as Africa, a single policy is not sufficient. The US needs multiple policies focused on individual nations and regions. We must not focus our attention so fully on southern Africa, where the potential for explosive unrest is perhaps the greatest, that we lose sight of the drought-caused human suffering in the Sahel and the refugee problem in areas such as Somalia, the Sudan, and West Africa.

Although the specific American national interests in Guinea and Somalia were few and low in intensity, the US does have more intense interests in other parts of Africa; these should be recognized and policies developed to insure that the best interest of the US is served.

In formulating this policy, however, US policy-makers must ensure that they remain sensitive to the national interests of the African nations. This sensitivity will assist the African nations in maintaining their identity. We must continue to strive to find African solutions to African problems.

As has been seen in the previous chapters, the Soviet appeal in Africa is not always as significant as it sometimes appears. The Soviets have proved they can react quickly to requests for military assistance, but both Guinea and Somalia have learned that Soviet aid is costly, so costly in fact that economic development can suffer. It has further been seen that the Soviets are now reluctant to provide any substantial amount of economic and technical aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. This is evident to the pragmatic African leaders, and Soviet credibility will suffer in the long run.

The idea that the US, along with its industrial allies and the newly rich oil-producing nations, can hope to solve or even basically alleviate the economic problems in the poor Sub-Saharan Africa nations with massive relief aid, is no longer tenable. What is most needed is a program of assistance designed to solve the fundamental problem of the developing nations, the attainment of self-sustaining economic growth. The agricultural area is one area where this type of program could be introduced. Both Guinea and Somalia have vast untapped

agricultural resources which, if developed fully, could relieve their country's balance of payments problems, by alleviating the necessity for the two countries to import such large amounts of food.

Additionally, if private investors were provided reasonable assurances of the safety of their investments by African nations, they could do much to foster this desired economic development.

Of utmost importance to American credibility in Africa is US policy toward the resolution of the impasses in Namibia and South Africa. Black Africa is looking to the US for consistency in enforcing the human rights portion of our foreign policy. To fail to enforce the policy across-the-board makes human rights a very hollow foundation upon which to build a foreign policy.

FOOTNOTES

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³E. H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London: St. Martin, 1945), p. 2.

⁴George and Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests," p. 219.

⁵Ibid., p. 220.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Donald E. Nuechterlein, United States National Interests in a Changing World (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973), p. 1.

⁹George and Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests," p. 227.

¹⁰Fred A. Sonderman, "The Concept of National Interest," Orbis 21 (Spring 1977):124.

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¹²Ibid., p. 125.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid. Also, George and Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests," p. 224.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 126.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹George and Keohane, "The Concept of National Interests," p. 231.

²⁰Ibid., p. 234.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 235.

²³Donald E. Nuechterlein, "The Concept of 'National Interest': A Time for New Approaches," Orbis 23 (Spring 1979):73-92.

²⁴Ibid., p. 75.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 76-77.

²⁸Ibid., p. 76.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid., p. 79.

³²Ibid.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid., p. 80.

³⁵The following synopsis of NSSM 39 options has been taken from National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa Study in response to NSSM 39 reprinted in Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen, eds., The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1976).

³⁶Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 130

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 134.

³⁹President Richard M. Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 70's Shaping a Durable Peace (Africa)," Africa Today 20 (Spring 73):3.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 5.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 7-9.

⁴⁴The Alvor Accord charged the transitional government with preparing for a peaceful turnover of power by integrating the military forces of the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, writing a constitution and organizing an election to take place prior to independence day.

⁴⁵William E. Schaufele, Jr., "The African Dimension of the Angolan Conflict," Department of State Bulletin 74 (March 1, 1976):279. Also, Nathaniel Davis, "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir," Foreign Affairs 57 (Fall 1978):110.

⁴⁶Davis, "The Angola Decision," p. 110.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 112.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 113.

⁵⁰Gerald Bender, "Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure," in American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance, ed., Rene Lemarchand (Washington: University Press of America, Inc., 1978), pp. 86-87. The \$US 14 million was subsequently raised to \$US 32 million in November 1975.

⁵¹Gerald Bender, Presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, May 30, 1980.

⁵²Bender, "Kissinger in Angola," pp. 125-126.

⁵³Ibid., p. 127.

⁵⁴Schaufele, "The African Dimension of the Angolan Conflict," p. 279.

⁵⁵Henry Kissinger, "Implications of Angola on Future U.S. Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin 74 (February 16, 1976):177.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 178 and 181.

⁶⁰Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1977), pp. 368-369.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 370.

⁶²Ibid., p. 380.

⁶³For speech see Department of State Bulletin 74 (May 31, 1976):657-672.

⁶⁴Henry Kissinger, "The Challenges of Africa," Department of State Bulletin 75 (September 20, 1976):356-357.

⁶⁵President Jimmy Carter, "Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy," Department of State Bulletin 76 (April 11, 1977):330.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 331.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 332.

⁶⁹President Jimmy Carter, "A Foreign Policy Based on America's Essential Character," Department of State Bulletin 76 (June 13, 1977):622.

⁷⁰Cyrus Vance, "The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations," Department of State Bulletin 77 (August 8, 1977):165.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 166.

⁷²Ibid., p. 170.

⁷³Tom J. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, 2nd ed. (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), p. 124

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 126.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 125.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 126.

⁷⁷Anthony Lake, "Africa in Global Perspective," Department of State Bulletin 77 (December 12, 1977):845.

⁷⁸Cyrus Vance, "The United States in Africa," speech presented at the 58th annual meeting of the United States Jaycees, 20 June 1978.

⁷⁹United States Department of State, Current Policy No. 141, February 25, 1980, p. 1

⁸⁰Most private investment is made in joint Guinean/Foreign companies with Guinea owning 49% of the company and receiving 65% of the profits.

⁸¹U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1979, 100th ed., (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 835. Also, Secretary Cyrus Vance, "The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations," p. 166.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Annual 1971-1977 (Washington: IMF, 1978), p. 141.

⁸⁴U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 1979, p. 835.

⁸⁵IMF, Direction of Trade Annual 1971-1977, p. 241.

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
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